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ABSTRACT 
 
The relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance has been the focal 
point of corporate governance literature and the subject of a rich empirical literature. 
However, the current literature is characterised by a lack of uniformity and consensus 
regarding the nature and direction of this relationship. This thesis aims to contribute to this 
literature by reviewing the diverse literature on this subject related to developed market 
economies and by investigating the relationship for small open transition economy, 
Montenegro.  
 
The profound heterogeneity and inconclusiveness of the empirical research on this topic 
motivated us to undertake a Meta Regression Analysis (MRA) of the wide-ranging 
econometric studies on the subject in the first part of the thesis. To the best of our knowledge, 
this MRA is the first study to measure publication selection bias in the empirical literature 
and to correct for it in deriving quantitative insights into the nature of the relationship of 
interest. The primary finding of the MRA suggests that both the functional form used in the 
primary studies to specify the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance (i.e. linear or non-linear) and the identity of the largest owner matter in 
assessing the presence of publication bias, authentic empirical effects and the heterogeneity 
of the findings in this empirical literature. We find that concentrated insider ownership has a 
positive effect and concentrated outsider ownership a negative effect on firm performance. 
Furthermore, the pattern of publication bias suggests that researchers have a strong incentive 
to conform to current prevailing theories. 
 
In the second part of the thesis, we use primary data collected and organised by the author to 
analyse for the first time the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance in 
Montenegro. The results support the hypothesis that high ownership concentration enables 
effective monitoring by investors to protect their interests; i.e., in the specific circumstances 
of transition, ownership structure may be (temporarily) used as a viable substitute for the 
still-underdeveloped corporate governance framework. 
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PREFACE 
 
The nature of the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance is one 
of the most widely discussed in the corporate governance literature. There is also a rich 
empirical literature investigating the relationship under various corporate governance settings 
and different ownership types, using different model specifications, estimation methods and 
variables employed. This has inspired us to engage in a systemic quantitative investigation of 
this literature in order to contribute further understanding of this complex relationship. 
Furthermore, we are interested in pursuing the investigation of this relationship (its 
importance and magnitude) in the context of a small open transition economy with a poorly 
developed corporate governance framework following the process of privatisation, which 
induced rapid changes of ownership structures. For this purpose, we have prepared an 
original dataset containing information on 204 joint stock companies quoted on the 
Montenegrin stock exchanges (Nex and Montenegroberza) in order to estimate a dynamic 
panel model testing the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance 
during the period following the Mass Voucher Privatisation programme. In the following 
paragraphs, we outline the structure of the thesis, highlighting the main research questions 
and justifying the methodologies applied in order to support our arguments. 
 
In Chapter 1, we review recent developments in the theory of the firm, particularly in the 
areas of transaction cost, property rights, incomplete contracts and agency cost, informed by 
the seminal work of Coase and Williamson. These developments perceive the firm as a 
“nexus of incomplete contracts,”entered into by contracting parties who have bounded 
rationality and act in an environment of asymmetric information and uncertainty where 
information is costly. Under these conditions, the diverging goals of various parties and their 
pursuit of self-interest results inthe agency problem. Although we briefly discuss the 
transaction cost literature (focused on ex post contract behaviour and institutional 
development that should treat the consequences of incomplete contracts between the 
principals and the agents) and the property rights theory (focused on the rights and 
obligations of the contracting parties), the focus of the chapter is on the Agency theory. We 
pay special attention to the behavioural assumptions concerning the principal as well as the 
agent (“contractual man”), which are reflected in the agent’s opportunism and self-interest 
and characterised by adverse selection and moral hazard. Furthermore, we investigate the 
13 
 
robustness of the theoretical assumption of the agency theory concerning the trade-off 
between risk and incentives, reflected in pay-for-performance contracts between risk-neutral 
principals (shareholders) and risk-averse agents (managers). 
 
Agency theory is especially concerned with the ex ante economic incentives characteristic of 
contracting parties and whether those incentives may be adjusted in order to ameliorate the 
agency problem. However, reducing the agency problem comes with costs (monitoring cost, 
bonding cost and residual loss). The agency theory literature tries to assess how changes in 
the level of uncertainty affect the impact of incentives on the agent (managers). We also 
analyse the robustness of various corporate governance mechanisms that have been 
developed to deal with agency cost and discuss the extent to which they can be relied on to 
align the interests of owners and managers.  
 
In Chapter 2, we turn to properties of ownership concentration as a supplementary 
(complementary) corporate governance mechanism in resolving owner-manager conflict. We 
review the theoretical basis of the question “Whether ownership concentration affects firm 
performance in the context of developed economies” by investigating the evidence on 
whether or not it leads to enhancement of management incentives to maximize firm value, i.e. 
to act in the best interest of owners. Therefore, we analyse the properties of Alignment, 
Entrenchment and Neutrality theories, which focus on the importance, direction and 
repercussions of the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance. 
 
These theories are supported by wide ranging evidence to establish whether ownership 
concentration is a viable mechanism providing strong monitoring of managers by 
strategically oriented investors (owners), or whether it enhances moral hazard behaviour by 
managers pursuing their own interests that diverge from value maximization, or whether 
ownership structure is an endogenous outcome of shareholders’ decisions on what proportion 
of a company’s shares they wish to hold. In addition, in the penultimate section, we analyse 
the empirical literature in the context of transition economies where the implementation of 
various privatisation programmes resulted in a radical transfer of ownership rights, the 
emergence of different types of dominant owners, and a generally concentrated ownership 
structure (more so than in many developed market economies). In these countries, more often 
than not, massive change in ownership structure was rarely followed by equally significant 
changes in the corporate governance framework to efficiently deal with the problem of 
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expropriation of minority shareholders by large shareholders facilitated by poor investor 
protection regulations. Using qualitative review of the literature in transition economies, we 
explore which type of dominant owners can be considered the most efficient and, in 
particular, the robustness of the view that, in the post-privatisation period, private ownership 
performs better than state ownership. 
 
Bearing in mind the diversity and richness of the theoretical frameworks and empirical 
research on this subject, that complement each other, the narrative review leads to a strong 
need for further clarification and quantitative generalization. If we pursue the underlying 
reasons for various conclusions regarding the relationship between ownership and 
performance, we note that there are strong reasons explaining differences in results and, 
hence, the non-unanimity of conclusions and all-round lack of consensus. Differences in 
results can, among other reasons, be due to: (i) differences in model specification and 
estimation techniques; (ii) differences in the corporate governance framework in which 
research is embedded; (iii) differences in variable specifications of the type of dominant 
ownership (insiders vs. outsiders) and also measures of firm performance (accounting vs. 
market based indicators); and, (iv) control for endogeneity. 
 
Therefore, in order to provide a systematic and rigorous synthesis of the empirical work that 
was previously lacking, in Chapter 3 we supplement the narrative review with a Meta 
Regression Analysis (MRA), investigating the question of “Whether, and how, ownership 
concentration affects firm performance in developed economies”? MRA is “the systematic 
review and quantitative synthesis of empirical evidence of a given hypothesis, phenomenon, 
or effect; seeking to summarize and to explain the wide, often disparate, variation routinely 
found among reported econometric results” (Stanley et al., 2013, p. 391). Our investigation 
builds on the Meta Analysis conducted by Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007) by 
employing the methodology of MRA, which entails procedures for filtering out the influence 
of publication bias on estimates of authentic empirical effect. 
 
After introducing the MRA procedures, explaining the sample characteristics, and explaining 
the moderator variables used in MRA in order to explain the heterogeneity of the results in 
the primary empirical literature, Chapter 3 begins with a full sample model specification, 
testing for the presence of authentic empirical effect and potential publication bias. Further 
investigation proceeds by dividing the overall sample into nine subsamples based on two 
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criteria or sources of heterogeneity in the literature. The first criterion is the type of dominant 
owner (Insiders vs. Outsiders); and secondly, the functional forms explaining the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance (linear vs. nonlinear). We find 
evidence of persistent publication bias in all subsample MRAs. Moreover, the pattern of 
publication bias suggests that researchers have a strong incentive to conform to the prevailing 
theories (alignment or entrenchment). Our main finding indicates that concentrated insider 
ownership has a positive effect on firm performance, while concentrated outsider ownership 
has a negative effect. Conversely, the hypothesised non-linear inverted-U relationship is, at 
best, not proven in the case of concentrated insider ownership.  
 
A strong motivation for pursuing the investigation of the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance stems from the fact that this relationship has not been 
analysed in empirical studies for Montenegro, despite interesting characteristics such as its 
small size and the uniqueness of its privatisation programme. Therefore, in Chapter 4, we try 
to fill this gap in the empirical literature by answering the questions: “Is there a causal 
relationship between ownership and performance in Montenegrin firms?” and “What type of 
ownership is considered 'superior’ in terms of better corporate performance in 
Montenegro?” Moreover, responding to these questions would also enable us to analyse 
whether there is a difference in the sign and significance of the relationship between countries 
with developed corporate governance systems (referring to the results of the Meta Regression 
presented in Chapter 3) and those with a poorly developed corporate governance setting, 
which is characteristic of transitional economies (TEs), including Montenegro. Using a panel 
database gathered by the author from a sample of 204 joint stock companies listed on the 
Montenegrin Stock exchanges over a five-year period (2004-2008), we analyse the evolution 
of ownership concentration (the share of the largest shareholder) and show changes in 
ownership concentration between different types of owners with special reference to the 
strategy undertaken by the state, privatisation funds and foreign owners. Concerning 
modelling strategy, we report on standard sampling and specification issues and introduce 
potential variables. In terms of the estimation strategy, we argue that the GMM estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) is appropriate for the characteristics of our sample and variables of interest: (i) a 
relatively large N (204 companies) and small T (5 years); (ii) independent variables that are 
not strictly exogenous (stemming from reverse causality or unobserved heterogeneity, which 
may affect both firm performance and ownership concentration); and (iii) persistence effects 
16 
 
in the dependent variable (firm performance). The empirical results suggest a significant, yet 
small, positive impact of ownership concentration on firm performance. This would imply 
that in the context of the Montenegrin transition economy, ownership concentration might be 
considered as a viable supplement to the still underdeveloped or non-existent corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
 
In our final Chapter 5, we summarise the main findings of this dissertation and outline the 
main contributions to knowledge of our research. The core findings are used to derive a 
number of policy recommendations in the area of corporate governance, aimed to enhance 
corporate governance practices in Montenegro. The main limitations of the research are also 
outlined, and, finally, some suggestions for further research are presented. In the context of 
the Montenegrin economy, we conclude that the robustness of the reported results, especially 
concerning the impact of different types of dominant owners on firm performance, should be 
reassessed once privatisation is fully completed and the restructuring plans of privatized firms 
have been fully implemented. 
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CHAPTER 1 
AGENCY THEORY AND 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
 
 
“The directors of such (joint stock) companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with 
the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch 
over their own.” 
 
                Adam Smith (1776) 
 
“...by definition the agent has been selected for his specialized knowledge and the principal 
can never hope to completely check the agent's performance." 
 
Arrow (1968, p. 539) 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
Economic theory regards a ‘contract’ as the fundamental elements on which the contracting 
parties, bound by its terms, base their behaviour. However, the self-interested behaviour of 
individuals (contracting parties) with different subjective needs may produce conflict of 
interest between the parties and lead to these individuals acting in ways that may be against 
each other’s interests (Padilla, 2001, p. 3), resulting in sub-optimal outcomes. Agency theory 
deals with the problem of identifying the costs of these conflicting interests (agency costs) 
and formulating mechanisms to alleviate it (Eisenhardt, 1989), to the extent possible. The 
relationship between owners and managers represents a classic case of the agency 
relationship. The owners are the principals, the managers are the agents, and the agency cost 
is the reduction in profits that could have been achieved if the principals (owners) had full 
information about the firm and full control over the firm's actions (Donaldson and Davies, 
1991, p. 50). The agency relations and agency costs, which characterize the operation of 
modern corporations, also constitute the underlying basis of the corporate governance 
literature.   
 
Corporate governance may be defined as a set of processes, rules and structures which 
regulate the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different stakeholders: 
shareholders, managers, board of directors, employees, investors, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, etc. (Ching et al., 2006). Although corporate governance relies on a set of theories 
such as agency theory, property rights theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependence 
theory, stewardship theory, and most importantly transaction cost theory (Abdullah and 
Valentine, 2009, p. 89), the primary focus of this chapter is on the ‘agency theory’ which 
highlights the cost of the divergence of interest and the mechanisms designed to reduce or 
eliminate it.  
 
Although Adam Smith (1776) highlighted the inherent conflicts associated with governing a 
joint stock company (intra-stakeholders relationships illustrated in the opening quotation of 
this chapter), the concept of ‘corporate governance’ evolved in the last decade of 20thcentury 
as a result of developments in law, economics and social sciences that examined the conflicts 
arising in financial, labour and product markets and their legal implications. In the last twenty 
years corporate governance has received significant attention across the globe at both firm 
and national levels. The increased mobility of capital and the development of international 
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financial markets, global investor oriented firms, the emergence of mergers and acquisitions 
which have increased cross border competition, and most importantly a string of corporate 
scandals and the global financial crisis of 2008, have forced firms and countries to adopt 
internationally recognized and comparable standards of corporate governance. This has 
gradually reduced the differences between corporate governance systems around the world. 
Consequently, the relative importance and complexity of ownership concentration as a 
substitute to the prevailing (and to some extent ineffective) corporate governance 
mechanisms has increased. This has further increased the ambiguity of examining ownership 
concentration and its impact on firm performance. 
 
In this Chapter, we explore the theoretical basis of the debate on agency theory and its 
various dimensions, briefly explaining the underlying agency problem and types of agency 
costs emerging from the owner-manager relationship (separation). In particular, we discuss 
the role of the transaction costs theory and the importance of contracts in regulating the above 
relationship. Section (1.2) is focused on the extensions to the theory of the firm. The main 
purpose of this Section is to provide a short overview of the theories of transaction cost and 
property rights in order to relate them to the agency theory. The illustration of structural 
theoretical principles formulated from the three theories highlights their conceptual 
differences while connecting them by using agency theory as a reference point of 
comparison, given that this theory holds a central place of research in this Chapter. However, 
we stress that the agency theory concentrated on the principal-agent conflict and actions that 
emerge from that conflict, after an incomplete contract is signed between contracting parties. 
 
Section (1.3) integrates the earlier discussions and provides in more detail the properties of 
agency theory and agency problem that arise from the separation of ownership and control, 
with special reference to adverse selection and moral hazard behaviour of the agent and the 
analysis of incentive-risk trade-off, emerging from agent's risk tolerance and the agent's 
responsiveness to incentives. We analyse the robustness of the negative trade-off between 
risk and incentives, which assumes that incentives (for agents) will be subdued in uncertain 
environments. Section (1.4) interprets the structure of the agency cost and its components: 
monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss endured either by shareholders (monitoring 
costs) or by managers (bonding costs).  
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The penultimate Section (1.5) explains the conventional internal and external (firm level vs. 
market level) mechanisms of corporate governance such as: (i) the managerial labour market; 
(ii) hostile takeovers; (iii) leverage; (iv) non-executive board members, (v) executive 
compensation contracts. Section (1.6) concludes.  
 
 
1.2 Agency theory, Transaction Cost theory and Property Rights theory 
 
For a long period, economic theory developed without a complete and coherent theory of the 
firm. In the last century, starting with the seminal work of Coase (1937), economists felt the 
need to develop theories which would deal with the reasons for the very existence of firms, 
their limits in different types of markets in which they operate and their internal relations 
(Foss et al., 2006). Up until then, the firm was seen solely as a self-interested utility 
maximizing economic actor with a focus on production and costs. At the centre of Coase’s 
work was the concept of transaction costs involved in a firm’s normal economic activity. 
Transaction costs may be defined as “friction losses” or the resources lost to the parties 
involved in the process of economic activity (Braendle, 2011). 
 
Much progress has been made in the theory of the firm since Coase (1937) especially in the 
areas such as property rights, uncertainty, asymmetric information, market failures and 
transaction costs. As Williamson has extensively argued, there are significant inter-linkages 
between the theory of transaction cost, the theory of property rights and the theory of agency 
cost, primarily based on the ‘contract’ (purportedly as an incentive alignment tool), and the 
transaction cost of enforcing this the contract after it is signed.
1
 
 
The incentive alignment strand of the theory focuses on ex ante properties of the contract. 
The transaction cost literature concentrates on ex post contract phase (when the contract is 
signed) and the institutional development that would deal with the consequences of 
                                                     
1
Williamson (1985) develops an intricate framework, referred to asthe Cognitive Map of Contracts, to 
demonstrate Williamson the interrelationships between the three sets of theories. It describes the transaction cost 
economics approach to the analysis of economic organization in the firm. The core of the analysis is the 
contract, its purpose, and what it tries to accomplish. In the process of contract formation, the emphasis may be 
on either incentive alignment (property rights and agency theory) or on transaction cost features of the contract, 
after it is signed (transaction cost theory).  
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‘incomplete’ contracts – most contracts in the real world are ‘incomplete’ because, in the 
presence of uncertainty about future, it is not possible to predict all contingencies, thus 
creating room for opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1980, p. 29; and Foss and Klein, 
2010, p. 2). 
 
The transaction costs theory assumes that the parties involved in contracting have bounded 
rationality and, being self-interested, they are prone to opportunistic behaviour. According to 
Simon (1951), bounded rationality reflects the presence of contractual incompleteness, which 
induces a need for adaptive (corrective) decision-making. Opportunism is defined as self-
interest seeking behaviour (Foss and Klein, 2010) with the implication that contracts will 
often need various types of safeguards in order to prevent their escalation. Transaction cost 
theory provides us with information about the institutional environment in which the contract 
is signed and implemented. Issues of incomplete contracts and opportunism are described in 
more detail in subsections to follow. 
 
The property rights theory and its relation to theory of the firm was developed by Coase 
(1959, 1960), Alchian (1958, 1965 and 1969), Demsetz (1967 and 1969) and Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972 and 1973). This theory maintains that ownership rights should be analyzed 
through three types of rights: (i) the right to use the asset; (ii) the right to change the form and 
the substance of asset, and (iii) the right to appropriate returns from asset. Provided that these 
rights are clearly defined, the general assumption is that they will be exercised for the benefit 
of the owners of a property. According to Williamson (1980, p. 27), this outcome will be 
obtained if “(i)  the legally sanctioned structure of property rights is respected, and (ii) human 
agents discharge their jobs in accordance with instructions.” Any less-than-efficient allocation 
of resources can then be attributed to contracts with ill-defined property rights or contracts 
which are incomplete due to uncertainty.  
 
Concerning the property rights theory, it helps to explain the rights and obligations of the 
principals and their agents by explaining the basic economic incentive system that creates 
resource allocation among different entities. Libecap (1989) argues that property rights theory 
enlightens conflicting economic interests and bargaining strengths of those affected in the 
process of contract creation.  
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Agency theory, which will be analyzed at length in next subsections, is focused on the 
analysis of ex ante economic incentives characteristic of contracting parties. It is important to 
highlight the differences among these three theories which have a common thread - the 
conceptual framework of the firm (jointly considered as a nexus of incomplete contracts 
among entities involved in its actions). In Table 1.1 we outline and compare different 
dimensions of the three theories. 
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Table 1.1: Comparison of Agency theory, Property rights theory and Transaction cost 
theory  
 Agency Theory Property Rights Theory Transaction cost theory 
    
Unit of analysis Principal agent contract Institution Transaction 
Focal dimension Incentives Property rights Various types of  asset 
specificity Treatment of cost Residual loss Rent seeking, Externalities Maladaptation, Hold up 
problem 
Treatment of 
2contract 
Ex ante incentive alignment Ex ante property rights allocation 
and ex post distributional conflicts 
Choice of ex post governance 
mechanism 
Strategic intent Shareholder view Stakeholder view Shareholders view 
Source of market 
friction 
Information asymmetry Externalities, vested interests, 
uncleanly defined and difficulty to 
enforce property rights 
Bounded rationality, 
uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, opportunism 
Source: Kim and Mahoney (2005) 
 
The first diverging point of the three theories is the unit of analysis. The agency theory is 
concerned with the contract between the principal and the agent; the property rights theory on 
the institutions that are focus on the effective enforcement of rights and responsibilities of 
contracting parties once the contract is signed, and the transactions cost theory with the 
transaction itself or the utilization of the contract (Kim and Mahoney, 2005, p. 232).  
 
The second point of departure is the focal dimension of these theories. The agency theory is 
focused on the incentives of individuals (agents and principals) especially on how to align the 
agent’s behaviour with the interests of the principal. The property rights theory is primarily 
concerned with whether property rights in a particular contract are clearly defined and are 
enforceable or not and assessing negative externalities in cases where property rights are not 
sufficiently secured or are enforced inefficiently. The major concern of the transaction cost 
theory is to resolve potential contracting problems in the process of bargaining that emerges 
when there is asset speciﬁcity (which is associated with the potential hold up problem) and 
opportunistic behaviour by individuals involved, making the contract incomplete.  
 
                                                     
2
We have already highlighted differences in the (fourth) time dimension of the theories. In addition, due to 
lesser relevance do not analyse the aspect of theoretical orientation (not mentioned in Table 1.1), causing 
difference between theories. For further discussion on this dimension, see Kim and Mahoney (2005). 
 
24 
 
Regarding the treatment of cost, the third aspect, agency theory is focused on ex ante creation 
of proper incentive alignment mechanism that will ensure the agents’ actions are in the best 
interest of the principal, as well as assuring efficient monitoring of the agents’ actions. All 
this is implemented with the aim of diminishing the residual loss. In the case of property 
rights theory it is assumed that if property rights are insecure or less that efficiently assigned, 
this will trigger negative externalities from the stakeholders’ point of view. Finally, according 
to transaction cost theory (in)complete contracts may result in inefficient economic outcomes, 
which in the setting of self-interested (opportunistic) contracting parties may cause ex post 
maladaptation and hold-up problems (Williamson, 1985). This is very much present when a 
transaction requires “one or both parties to make signiﬁcant transaction-speciﬁc investments 
since such investments create quasi-rents that may be subject to hold-up” (Leiblein and 
Miller, 2003, p. 841). 
 
Concerning the strategic intent (the fifth dimension), which takes into consideration the scope 
and number of interested parties in the process of contract formation, the agency theory takes 
into consideration primarily ex ante alignment of incentives between the principal and the 
agent, i.e. it reflects the perspective of  shareholders. The property rights theory pays 
attention to the ex post contracting interests of various parties (stakeholders approach) with 
conflicts and interests triggered by the initial allocation of property rights. The transaction 
cost theory is also interested in shareholders perspective during the creation of (in)complete 
contract (transaction) under the conditions of bounded rationality and self-interested 
behaviour of contracting parties.  
 
The sixth element of departure among these three theories is the source of market frictions 
(i.e. the sources of imperfections in the market). According to agency theory, market frictions 
are the consequence of the fact that there is no perfect mechanism that can fully align 
interests of the agent and the principal, i.e., monitoring costs, bonding costs or residual loss 
are higher than zero (more on these costs later). If there was a perfect mechanism, it would be 
possible to create a complete contract between individuals. Transaction cost theory argues 
that asset specificity and opportunistic behaviour of individuals create market frictions, whilst 
property rights theory assesses the negative externalities of unclearly deﬁned property rights 
or unsecured property rights that cause market frictions. 
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To sum up, the recent developments in the theory of the firm maintain that the firm can be 
described as a nexus of contracts entered into by different entities. However, bounded 
rationality, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty of the environment make these contracts 
incomplete. The outcome of the contracts’ incompleteness is that parties, for situations that 
are not specified in the contract, must consent regarding the distribution of control rights, 
opening up the possibility of post-contract bargaining and potential hold ups. The agency 
theory addresses the issue of how to neutralize decreased efficiency arising from this 
situation by primarily analysing the behaviour of the principal and the agent within the firm. 
Efficient allocation of control rights analysed by the agency theory requires a special 
institutional design - the corporate governance framework. 
 
 
1.3 Agency Theory
3
 
 
Agency theory refers to a set of principles used in dealing with the outcome of dispersed 
ownership that allows for the separation of ownership and control and the consequent conflict 
between owners and managers. The theory has its roots in the work of Adam Smith (1776) 
who argued that if a group of persons that are not the owners manage a corporation, it is more 
likely that owners’ objectives will be diluted rather than fulfilled due to self-interested 
behaviour of managers. Berle and Means (1932) who analysed in further detail the problems 
arising from dispersed ownership and the consequent separation of ownership and control. 
Although Adam Smith (1776) and later on Berle and Means (1932) pioneered the discussion 
linking the separation of ownership and control and corporate performance, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) formally addressed the problem as “the agency problem”- a complex 
conflict of interest between owners and managers formed by the contractual arrangements 
between them. 
 
The agency relationship was thoroughly analyzed by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 5) who 
perceives it “as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal) engages another 
person (the agent) to perform some services on their behalf, which implies delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent.” They claim that if both parties are utility maximizing 
units, “there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests 
                                                     
3
For a full discussion of the origin of the agency theory see Mitnick (2013). 
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of the principal.” The main purpose of agency theory is to assess the behaviour of both 
parties resulting from their conflict of interests, which occurs after they design a contract – 
and when it is found out that they have access to different levels of information and different 
risk preferences and that they operate in an uncertain environment. Moreover, the agency 
theory also deals with the resolution of the problem: how the contracting parties can try to 
design a contract in order to minimize the costs caused by their different goals, self-interested 
behaviour and asymmetric information in the contracting environment where the information 
is costly. 
 
The main properties of the agency theory are explained in Table 1.2. As noted, the principal 
and the agent have different goals and risk preferences which put pressure on the principal to 
create an incentive arrangement to force or incentivize the agent to execute actions aimed to 
maximizing the principal's welfare and diminish the agent’s moral hazard behaviour.  
 
Table 1.2: Agency theory characteristics 
Key idea Principal agent relationships  should reflect efficient organization of 
information and risk bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self Interest, Bounded rationality, Risk aversion 
Organizational assumptions Partial goal conflict among participants. Efficiency as the effectiveness 
criterion.  Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information assumptions Information is a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection). Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly different goals and 
risk preference 
Source: Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 59 
 
In the next subsection we will explain various aspects of Table 1.2, in particular: the unit of 
analysis in the agency theory; the formulation of (in)complete contract between the agent and 
the principal, as well as the related assumption of self-interested behaviour on the part of the 
principal and (primarily) the agent, reflecting opportunism and bounded rationality. In 
subsection 1.3.2 we will discuss in more detail the contracting problems associated with the 
agent’s behaviour reflecting moral hazard and adverse selection. Aspects referring to the 
principal-agent risk tolerance and risk sharing will be part of the separate discussion in 
subsection 1.3.3 in the context of risk-incentives trade off paradigm. 
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1.3.1 Self Interest (Opportunism), Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts 
 
The behavioural assumption about the principal and the agent, according to the Williamson 
(1985) and other transaction cost authors, is that the contracting parties act with bounded 
(limited) rationality. The concept of bounded rationality as the cognitive assumption guiding 
economic actors (including contracting parties) was first developed by Simon (1947, 1961) 
who argued that bounded rationality prevents economic actors to make the best choice 
possible, being “intendedly rational but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1961, p. xxiv). 
 
In the context of the principal-agent relationship, bounded rationality is reflected through the 
fact that the principal lacks perfect information regarding the agent’s behaviour. The main 
consequence of bounded rationality is that all contingencies cannot be fully accounted for, 
i.e., the contractual parties are not able to foresee all possible future outcomes. Consequently, 
they are unable to formulate a long-term outcome-contingent contracts – thus arises the issue 
of contractual incompleteness. Given that not all situations can be accounted for, both the 
principal and the agent must adapt and sign imperfect commitments–an imperfect contract 
which increases the possibility of opportunistic behaviour. 
 
In short, there are at least three factors that prevent the development of a complete contract: 
 
i. Transaction cost of writing a contract. According to Hart and Holmstrom (1987, p. 3), 
the transaction cost of writing a contract increases because it is impossible to plan for 
and document all provisions that will take into account all possible obligations of the 
agent and how he should react in “every conceivable state of the world. It is 
impossible to create this kind of contract free of cost. 
ii. Cost of enforcing the contract 
iii. Bound rationality-or as Tirole (1999, p. 743) defines it “unforeseen contingences.” 
 
The first two aspects are the focus of the property rights theory while the third aspect is 
linked more to the agency theory and transaction cost theory, i.e., the “contracting man” who 
does not have the ability to take into consideration all contract outcomes and unforeseen 
contingencies. The idea of bounded rationality is further expounded by Foss (2001) and 
Weber and Mayer (2011) who suggest that there are two types of “cognitive bounds on 
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rationality”: (i) processing limitations (bounds of the quantity of information that contracting 
parties are able to process), and (ii) perceptual limitations (restrictions on how these 
information are perceived by contracting parties).4 
 
Once an incomplete contract is created, it increases the importance of ownership and the 
theory of ownership. As Grossman and Hart (1986) argue, the ownership of asset represents a 
residual right of control over asset, i.e., right to determine the use of asset in contingencies 
not governed by an explicit (incomplete) contract. The empirical literature following 
Williamson (1985) is very rich in creating states of optimal contract mechanisms for the 
principal. Differences in models usually are due to the risk sensitivity of the principal and 
agent.  
 
An additional dimension of the transaction cost theory, and relevant to agency theory, is that 
that except for bounded rationality, the enforcement of incomplete contracts are prevented 
because of the opportunistic behaviour of the agent. As Hart (1989, p. 31) argues “not only 
does an incomplete contract contain gaps, errors, and omissions by reason of bounded 
rationality, but mere promise unsupported by credible commitments is not self-enforcing by 
reason of opportunism.” 
 
Williamson (1985, p. 47) describes opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile”. In more 
general terms, he describes opportunism as the “incomplete or distorted disclosure of 
information especially calculated to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise 
confuse”, which is present before contracting (adverse selection) and afterwards (moral 
hazard).
5
 This prevents the creation of a complete (efficient) contract between principal and 
agent, resulting in an inefficient outcome.
6
 
 
Williamson (1985, p. 48) argues that the ex post opportunistic behaviour of the agent may be 
prevented (subdued) if the contract contains appropriate safeguards that are introduced in the 
contract ex ante. Alternatively, the neutralization of moral hazard behaviour or adverse 
selection would be possible only if the agent were fully honest (neutralize asymmetric 
                                                     
4For a full discussion of the perceptual limitations of contracting parties, see Simon, 1978 and Heimer, 1985. 
5
For a discussion of these two aspects of the agent’s behaviour see the next sub-section. 
6
For discussion of the critique of classical assumption that parties (principal and the agent) are self-interested 
utility maximizers, see Perrow (1986). 
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information) or if an external mechanism exists that activates full subordination to the 
principal. Given that these extremes are not in line with assumptions of market based 
economies, opportunism cannot be avoided (Williamson, 1999, p. 1099).  
 
 
1.3.2 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 
 
As noted in the previous subsection in the environment of the self-interested behaviour of the 
contracting parties and asymmetric information between them, it is highly unlikely that the 
agent will act in the best interest of the principal. This is the core assumption of the agency 
theory. In this subsection we will explain in more detail the elements that enhance the conflict 
between the principal and the agent and prevent the creation of complete contract between 
them: adverse selection and moral hazard behaviour of the agent.  
 
Adverse selection (the agent having private information regarding costs or revenues that is 
undetectable/unavailable by/to principal) underlies the opportunistic behaviour of the agent 
(manager) in the process of the delegation of responsibilities to the agent (Barbagallo and 
Comuzzi, 2008, p. 7). Therefore, the core problem lies in the process of delegation which 
“generates asymmetry because agents can know private information (true ability, cost 
structure, technology or hidden knowledge),” (Mondello, 2012, p. 1). In terms of timing, 
adverse selection refers to the period before a contract is signed. This information asymmetry 
leads to sub-optimal results.  
 
In the case that the principal fails to correctly assess the capacity and the ability of the agent, 
the agent’s (manager’s) moral hazard behaviour will appear after the contract is signed. Moral 
hazard (where the agent can take an action undetectable by the principal) represents the 
behaviour of the agent with a suboptimal (inefficient) outcome created in an environment 
where the agent does not bear the full consequences of her actions. Then, he has a tendency 
to act less carefully (riskier) than he otherwise would, leaving it to another party (principal) to 
bear the consequences of the agent’s (managerial) actions. In essence, moral hazard could be 
described as the problem (inefficiency) that is generated by the principal’s (owner’s) inability 
to observe agent’s (managerial) actions/ efforts after contracting. 
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1.3.3 The Role of Uncertainty in the Risk-Incentives Trade-off 
 
The agency theory literature tries to assess how changes in the level of uncertainty affect the 
impact (strength) of incentives on the agent (managers). The general assumption of this 
literature (especially Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; Allen and Lueck, 1995; Lafontaine, 
1992; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002; Laffont and Martimont, 
2001; Grund and Sliwka, 2010; etc.) is that there is a negative trade-off between uncertainty 
and incentives provided to the agent (manager). An optimal incentive contract provides a 
negative trade-off between the level of uncertainty in the (firms) environment and the impact 
of the incentives. It is assumed that the principals (shareholders) are risk-neutral, but the 
agent is risk-averse, and the second assumption is that the agent reacts to incentives 
positively, i.e. incentives provided to the agent are used as “positive reinforces” for desired 
behaviour (expected by the principal).
7
 The most prominent consequence of the above 
assumption is that the principal can no longer structure the agent’s information rents to ensure 
efficient incentive compatibility. To incentivise a risk-averse agent to take on riskier projects, 
the principal needs to provide some additional risk premium. The impact of incentives (i.e. 
responsiveness of the agent to incentives) decreases with the agent’s level of risk aversion. In 
the extreme case when risk aversion converges to 0 it is possible to create optimal contract 
with efficient outcome. In the conditions of increased volatility of the performance measures, 
incentives become costlier to provide and so the optimal level of incentives should decrease.  
 
This implies that when we look at managerial contracts, we should find a negative 
relationship between variation (volatility) in the ﬁrm performance indicator and the 
proportion of managerial pay that varies with the ﬁrm performance. In short, risk-neutral 
principals (shareholders) want their agents (managers) to take on riskier projects in 
anticipation of higher returns. On the other hand, given that the performance of projects 
undertaken by the risk-averse manager determines the manager’s level of compensation, the 
manager prefers a compensation structure that has less vulnerability to earnings volatility. 
Therefore, given a certain level of compensation, the manager will favour a higher percentage 
of fixed cash payment along with investment projects with a lower level of risk. As Rantakari 
(2008) argues: an increase in the instability of the firm performance measure increases the 
volatility of the agent’s pay for any given level of pay-for-performance. 
                                                     
7
For full discussion on the agent motivation and sensitivity to incentives see Benabou and Tirole (2003). 
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At this point it is useful to briefly make a distinction between risk and uncertainty in the 
context of the agency problem and stress the agency theory assumption on how agents 
respond to incentives.  
 
Mauboussin (2008, p. 36) provides a clear explanation on the difference between risk and 
uncertainty:  
 
“So how should we think about risk and uncertainty? A logical starting place is Frank 
Knight’s distinction: Risk has an unknown outcome, but we know what the underlying 
outcome distribution looks like. Uncertainty also implies an unknown outcome, but we don’t 
know what the underlying distribution looks like. So games of chance like roulette or 
blackjack are risky, while the outcome of a war is uncertain. Knight said that objective 
probability is the basis for risk, while subjective probability underlies uncertainty.” 
 
In order to describe the difference between risk and uncertainty more accurately Mauboussin 
(2008, p. 36) argues that risk is considered as “the possibility of suffering the loss” i.e. risk 
always has a notion of loss while “uncertain is not known or established” i.e. “something can 
be uncertain but does not necessarily incorporate the chance of loss”. The problem arises 
from the fact that risk-averse agents in everyday decisions have to translate investment 
opportunities (uncertainty) into probabilities (risk). An optimal incentive tool would be able 
to distinguish between controllable risks for which agents should be held accountable, and 
those uncontrollable risks for which agents should not be held accountable. However, this 
would assume a principal who is fully informed and who has the ability to create a complete 
contract. According to the agency theory and the transaction cost theory, neither is possible.  
 
The fundamental assumption of the agency theory regarding the risk-incentives trade off in 
the contracting process has been challenged in theoretical and empirical literature. Both 
Prendergast (2002) and Shi (2011), for example, fail to find valid predictions of a negative 
trade-off between risk and incentives and introduce delegation of decision-making as a 
mechanism that subdues the negative trade-off. Incentives are more desirable in the more 
uncertain environment, based on the underlying assumption that the agent is risk neutral not 
risk averse. Prendergast argues that the classic literature on the agency theory fails to account 
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for the presence of the allocation of responsibilities to the agent (delegation), which changes 
the negative impact of uncertainty on incentives in the opposite direction.  
 
Baker and Jorgensen (2003) distinguish two types of uncertainty, which they label volatility 
and noise, and on which the impact of the level of incentive depends. They argue that this 
division of volatility from noise is critical for explaining the ambiguity in findings of classic 
agency theory. According to Baker and Jorgensen (2003), noise is the uncertainty whose 
realization does not affect the agent’s optimal action choice. His decision remains unaffected 
either because the agent (manager) cannot react to it, or because it does not affect his optimal 
actions. In contrast, volatility is the uncertainty that affects the agent’s optimal action and on 
to which the agent is able to react. They argue that the classic agency theory solely takes into 
consideration volatility as a manifestation of uncertainty whilst neglecting noise. Holding for 
the possibility of delegation assumed in Prendergast (2002), they argue that when the agent 
has more pre-decision information and when the environment is uncertain, it is more valuable 
to give the agent stronger incentives. Similarly to Prendergast (2002), they find that an 
increase in volatility increases the impact of incentives on agents.  
 
Similarly, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) discuss determinants of ownership structures and argue 
that in noisier environments incentives should be stronger, not weaker.8According to them, 
with increased uncertainty in the firm’s environment, increased ownership concentration can 
be expected (increased ownership concentration is a way the owners can increase their 
oversight on management and reduce the agency cost). The rationale behind the assumption 
is that the benefits from monitoring will be larger in unstable environment. Namely, in the 
case when the firm operates in a very stable environment managerial performance can be 
evaluated more easily. When the environment is more unpredictable, closer monitoring is 
necessary. So they expect ownership to be more concentrated for firms which face greater 
uncertainty, which is measured by the standard deviation of excess stock market returns. As a 
consequence, there is a positive relationship between the level of ownership concentration 
and the high levels of uncertainty existing in a firm’s environment.  
 
                                                     
8
At this point, we are not interested in four forces affecting (determining) ownership structure: (i) Value 
maximizing size; (ii) Control potential; (iii) Regulation; and (iv) Amenity potential that will be separately 
analyzed in Chapter 4. 
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In summary, given that the environment is uncertain, and the agents and the principals have 
to deal with risk and incentive (assess the risk and react to incentive), the theories and 
empirical evidence have produced divergent views on the perception of agent's risk tolerance 
(risk neutral vs. risk averse), and the agent's responsiveness to incentives (sensitive vs 
insensitive). It appears that the discussion of the variety of factors (such as the agents’ 
tolerance to risk, different views on uncertainty, whether a part of uncertainty can be 
controlled or not, etc.) proposed in the literature only adds to the ambiguity of whether the 
conclusions of the agency theory on the trade-off between risk and incentives is robust or not.  
 
 
1.4 Agency Cost and Its Components 
 
The agency problem represents one of the core problems that the corporate governance 
framework tries to resolve through the design of mechanisms for effective corporate control.  
The agency cost is formalized within the contracting relations between the two sides. The 
contract and contractual relations are the essence of the company’s activities, where 
contractual relations exist not only with employees but also with suppliers, customers, 
creditors, etc. Therefore, “it is important to recognize that most organizations are simply legal 
fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationship among individuals” 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In essence, the main aspects of the agency problem are 
conflicting interests between the principal and the agent as well as decentralized information 
that prevent the principal from having perfect information on the behaviour of the agent, to 
whom the control of the firm is delegated. 
 
Reducing the agency problem relies upon two key concepts: (i) how to decrease the level of 
asymmetric information; and (ii) how to design proper incentives that would align the 
interests of the principal with those of the agent at minimal cost. The importance of 
asymmetric information is crucial prior to concluding the contract, while the creation of 
incentives continues after signing it. However, due to the nature of this contract, the main 
problem is how to force the manager to take actions that will be in the best interest of 
shareholders (firm’s value maximization) bearing minimal cost (by both the principal and the 
agent). The contract represents an obvious mechanism for resolving the problem that arises 
from the imperfect alignment of interests and incomplete information issue. This mechanism 
relies on three pillars of the agency relationship: (i) distribution of decision rights between 
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managers and shareholders; (ii) the level of knowledge (skills) and information that managers 
and shareholders have; and (iii) usage of the incentive as a motivation mechanism. 
 
Decision rights represent the right to have a particular control over a particular asset. There 
are two different types (Fama and Jensen, 1983): (i) decision right of a manager to initiate 
and perform a particular decision; and (ii) the decision of shareholders to ratify, monitor and 
reward or punish managers according to their performance. The level of knowledge, skills 
and information that the principal and the agent possess are critical for the creation of a 
perfect incentive-based contract that would align their interests. There are three types of 
information problems stemming mostly from the principal's lack of information: adverse 
selection, moral hazard behaviour of the agent, and non-venerability (Laffont and Martimont, 
2001, p. 12). 
 
In order to avoid agency cost, one should be aware of the main properties of the principal 
agent relationship from the prospective of under-optimization of the contract often due to 
inevitable incurred costs of the principal or the agent. This dynamic can be summarized 
through the following points: (i) the more ambiguous the contractual environment, the greater 
the information advantage and the larger information superiority of the agent, the higher the 
information cost of the principal; (ii) the more complex the contracting process (inclusion of 
various autonomous bodies ex ante and ex post), the higher the information loss; (iii) the 
more risk averse the agent behaves, the more information cost the principal would bear; (iv) 
the more performance provisions are documented in the contract, the better the performance 
expectations of the firm; (v) the better the information obtained from the past agents, the 
better the performance conventional characteristics framed by the principal; (vi) the poorer 
the principal–agent communication channels, the greater the discrepancy between agent and 
principal interests; (vii) the greater the discrepancy between the agent and the principal, the 
greater the agency cost; (viii) the higher the cost of information, the more the principal will 
concentrate on satisfactory rather than optimal solutions. 
 
In short, the agency problem is grounded in the existence of agency cost when the agent 
pursues the principal’s goals and in which certain costs have to be realized. This cost is based 
on two concepts: information asymmetry that exists between the principal and the agent; and 
the incentive mechanism developed to decrease that asymmetry. Nonetheless, there is no 
perfect contract that could bring the agency cost to zero and that ensures that the agent will 
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make the decisions in the best interest of the principal without costs. The principal has to bear 
some costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 5) due to numerous reasons. In addition, any 
principal agent contract will always induce three types of costs: (i) monitoring cost, (ii) 
bonding cost and (iii) residual loss. The scope of these costs will depend on the complexity of 
the contract and its ability to efficiently treat issues of asymmetric information and agents’ 
incentives. 
 
 
1.4.1 Monitoring costs 
 
The monitoring cost can be explained as the extra expenditures (resources) paid by the 
principal in order to monitor, observe and finally control the agent. These expenses, borne by 
the principal, have the purpose of limiting the agent’s behaviour not to depart from actions, 
which in the environment of complete contracts should be in the best interest of the principal. 
This cost arises when shareholders do not have full perspective of the manager’s behaviour. 
Once the separation of ownership and control happens, monitoring that is imposed by 
shareholders will force agents (mangers) to be accountable for the outcomes of their actions. 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 311), the monitoring cost includes (besides the 
cost of observing and measuring agent’s performance) the costs of controlling managers’ 
behaviour via budget restrictions, compensation policies and firm rules. There are various 
monitoring costs that occur, e.g., external auditing, cost of firing managers, cost of 
interviewing managers, cost of non-executive directors, etc. The principal will later recover 
some of these costs. For example, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that while in the beginning 
the principal is paying the cost of monitoring by signing a compensation contract; the 
shareholder will adjust compensation covering these costs later. 
 
Both, normative and positive agency theory are based on the hypothesis that incentive 
contracts are the first best solution to align the interest of the principal and the agent, while 
monitoring should be present to reduce the gap between the principal and the agent. Beatty 
and Zajac (1994, p. 317) point out that strong monitoring is appropriate in those corporations 
in which managerial compensation is only weakly connected to firm performance and 
recommended only when its benefits are higher than its value. On the contrary, Wright et al. 
(2002) argue that compensations of executives depend on the level of monitoring. Active 
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monitoring will induce a change of compensation through higher returns, while passive, 
insufficient monitoring will cause changes in compensation due to acquisition of the firm. 
 
Monitoring costs will be mainly borne by the largest shareholder, given that shareholders 
have to be driven by certain incentive in order to bear the extra cost of monitoring. Large 
shareholders are interested in the firm’s success (value maximization). The larger the 
shareholder’s stake, the lower the free riding problem associated with monitoring. However, 
excessive monitoring cost can be counterproductive. Namely, according to Burkart et al. 
(1997), too much monitoring will constrain managerial initiative, i.e., excessive monitoring 
may prevent managers to search for firm-specific investments and to produce high short-term 
profit. Namely, managers will not have the direct incentive to show their performance by 
producing short-term profit in the case when this signal will not be appreciated and valuated 
by shareholders.  
 
The optimal level of monitoring, according to Himmelberg et al. (1999), is specific to each 
individual firm’s contracting environment. Corporate governance mechanisms that are 
considered to reflect monitoring costs as identified by Pillai (2003, p. 1), include: (i) cost of 
audits; (ii) budget restrictions; (iii) compensation policies; and (iv) operating rules, etc. He 
argues, “Monitoring can also be imposed by legislative practices such as compliance with 
Stock exchange listing rules or (industry specific) corporate governance codes.” 
 
 
1.4.2 Bonding Costs 
 
The second element of agency cost is bonding cost. There are two aspects of bonding costs. 
The first refers to expenditure that the principal (shareholder) incurs in order to align the 
interests of the agent with his own interests (Hoskisson et al., 2009, p. 57). This aspect of 
bonding cost is usually associated with a certain type of incentive scheme provided by the 
principal for the agent. In the context of the owner-manager relationship, this refers mainly to 
compensation schemes for managers. The second refers to the extra expense that the agent 
has to bear in order to prove that his decisions are “bonded” with the principal and that he/she 
will not take actions contrary to the interest of the principal. It is important to note that the 
agent (manager) initiates these costs. Examples of bonding costs include the introduction of 
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formal control systems (e.g. forming internal audit department) or enforcement of conditions 
for further disclosures in financial statements (Pillai, 2003). 
 
 
1.4.3 Residual Loss 
 
Residual loss can be defined as the reduction in welfare experienced by a principal due to the 
difference between interests of the principal and the agent. According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976, p. 5), residual loss can be measured as “the dollar equivalent of the reduction in the 
welfare experienced by the principal” as a result of the divergence of interests between the 
agent and the principal. The difference between the value maximizing welfare (from the 
prospective of the principal) and the level of welfare achieved by the actions of the agent 
represents residual loss. 
 
In the context of the firm, i.e., the owner-manager relationship, residual loss represents the 
loss that the owner will experience once he starts to dilute his ownership (Williamson, 1988, 
p. 572). The loss occurs due to asymmetric information, keeping in mind that shareholders 
are not in a position to foresee all possible actions of managers. If there is a definition of the 
“optimal” residual loss, it could be defined as a loss which emerges as a trade-off between 
monitoring and constraining management and enforcing contractual mechanisms (monitoring 
and bonding costs) designed to reduce the agency problem (McColgan, 2001).  
 
 
1.5 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 
One of the fundamental concerns of corporate governance is how to design efficient 
mechanisms of corporate control which will force managers to act in the best interest of 
shareholders. In this section we take a more comprehensive approach analysing different 
corporate governance mechanisms primarily from the perspective of how they can alleviate 
the agency problem.  
 
The governance mechanism of each country is created by its political, economic and social 
history as well as by its legal framework. Corporate governance per se, in its narrower 
definition, has a function to assure better fulfillment of the principal’s (shareholder’s) 
interests. The level of accomplishment of this function characterizes a corporate governance 
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mechanism as efficient or inefficient. Corporate governance mechanisms are usually defined 
as structures developed “in publicly traded corporations as a response to agency conflicts 
between owners and managers, conflicts that result from the separation of ownership and 
control” (Gillan, 2006, p. 1). In a broader context, the corporate governance mechanism can 
be described as “a complex of elements actuating social and economic, legal and 
organizational relationships needed for achieving the objectives set for the parties of 
corporate (governance) property” (Ashurov, 2010, p. 1). If properly set, corporate governance 
mechanisms would enable all corporate governance stakeholders to perform their functions in 
order to maximize their own benefits while preserving the balance of interests between them. 
 
The type of prevailing corporate governance systems in a country restrains choices of 
adopted corporate governance mechanisms. In the case of insider corporate governance 
systems
9
, the main conflict exists between large shareholders and minority shareholders. On 
the other hand, in the case of outsider systems, corporate governance mechanisms will try to 
diminish the conflict between weak shareholders and managers.  
 
In the broader context, Denis (2001) argues that there are two preconditions for effective 
governance mechanism. Firstly, a chosen mechanism has to close the vacuum between 
managers and shareholders’ interests. Secondly, it is expected that the mechanism 
significantly affects corporate performance and firm value. Denis identifies four groups of 
mechanisms which include: (i) legal and regulatory mechanisms that exist outside the firm; 
(ii) internal control mechanisms present within a firm (the board of directors, executive 
compensation schemes and ownership concentration, non-executive ownership and leverage); 
(iii) market based external control mechanisms (e.g. corporate takeover market voluntary and 
hostile); and (iv) product market competition. 
 
However, we follow a narrower and prevailing division based on the criteria of whether the 
mechanism is firm-based or market-based, or whether one is an internal or external 
mechanism (Gillan, 2006; Rezaee, 2007; Aljifri and Moustafa, 2007; Al-Malkawi and Pillai, 
2012; etc ). The most important internal corporate governance mechanisms are: (i) the board 
of directors; (ii) managerial incentive compensation; (iii) ownership concentration; (iv) 
dividend payouts; (v) financial leverage, and (vi) board size. The most important external 
                                                     
9
The insider and outsider corporate governance system are discussed in the Appendix (2.1) to this chapter. 
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corporate governance mechanisms are: (i) market for corporate control (managerial labour 
market); (ii) the system of voluntary and hostile takeovers; (iii) product market competition; 
(iv) monitoring by security analysts; and (v) reputation. 
 
We will begin with the review of two external disciplining mechanisms that have received the 
greatest deal of attention in empirical literature (managerial labour market and takeover 
mechanism). This will be followed by a discussion of three internal mechanisms (debt 
financing – leverage; executive compensation contracts; and nonexecutive directors).  
 
 
1.5.1 Managerial Labour Markets 
 
The managerial labour market, a disciplining corporate governance mechanism, is expected 
to prevent managerial opportunism and protect shareholders' interests by imposing constant 
pressure on managerial behaviour to avoid poor performance of the firm which would 
damage the manager’s reputation in the labour market. (Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2003). 
This mechanism should be considered complementary to the rewarding and incentive based 
corporate governance instruments such as compensation contracts that should incentivise 
managers to achieve good firm performance. This market competition mechanism for 
managers is developed mostly in the “outsider corporate governance” systems. According to 
Brickley et al. (1999, p. 341), “career concerns force managers to perform well since poor 
performances generally leads to a fall in demand for their services.” Fama (1980) argues that 
the managerial labour market successfully controls managerial behaviour in achieving 
satisfactory levels of firm performance not through a fear of dismissal channel but rather by 
triggering managers to build up their reputation, which is independent of incentive 
compensation. 
 
The impact of the managerial labour market may also be felt prior to and after changes in top 
management (Denis and Denis, 1995; Glunk and Heiltjes, 2003). Changes in top management 
composition should break organizational inertia, break the existing routines and initiate 
strategic changes in the company (Gordon et al., 2000; Dalton and Kesner, 1985; Virany et 
al., 1992, etc).  
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Of course, there is the counter argument that frequent changes at the top management have a 
disruptive effect on the organization by increasing instability leading to lower firm 
performance (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993). Furthermore, most studies find that the top 
management is only dismissed at a rather late stage when poor performance of the firm 
becomes evident with the publication of the company’s financial accounts.  
 
It has been argued that the effectiveness of this instrument may be better observed considered 
jointly with incentive-oriented mechanisms such as managerial remuneration or managerial 
compensation schemes, with which it is closely intercorrelated (Coughlan and Schmidt, 
1985). Although in the empirical literature on both managerial disciplining and managerial 
compensation are treated separately, they are to a large extent complementary mechanisms 
used for managerial control (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 
2003). According to Brookman and Thistle (2013, p. 252) “the most important determinant of 
managers’ compensation is managerial skill followed by firm size and labour market 
opportunities, and that luck is not an important determinant of managerial compensation.”  
 
In short, it appears that the managerial labour market may have some relevance in aligning 
the interest of managers and owners.  
 
 
1.5.2 Hostile Takeovers 
  
Hostile takeovers are considered a very potent instrument for the disciplining of managers 
and aligning their behaviour with the interest of shareholders. According to Manne (1965) 
and Samuelson (1970), whose work represents a corner-stone of the literature on hostile 
takeovers, share prices reflect the quality of a firm’s performance and that of its managers. If 
an outsider perceives that the company is underperforming, he/she will have an incentive to 
acquire the shares of the firm with the aim to run the firm more efficiently by replacing its 
inefficient managers. Therefore, in order to decrease the probability of hostile takeover bids, 
managers will, ex ante, increase the efficiency of the firm, thus acting in the interest of 
shareholders and reducing the agency problem between managers and owners (Grossman and 
Hart, 1980; Scharfstein, 1988).  
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The effectiveness of hostile takeovers has been the subject of a long-standing debate and 
empirical investigation in the literature on corporate governance. Only a limited number of 
empirical studies support the market-disciplining role of the corporate takeovers, arguing that 
corporate takeover targets only underperforming companies whose performance recovers 
after the takeover (Dullard, 2012). Recent, post-financial crisis empirical evidence diverges 
yet is inclined to suggest that hostile takeovers are “anything but a prerequisite for an 
efficient system of corporate governance” (Puchniak, 2008, p. 90). 
 
The effectiveness of the hostile takeover threat as a corporate governance mechanism is 
based on two assumptions: (i) targets of the hostile takeover are underperforming firms; and 
(ii) these firms underperform because managers do not take actions and decisions that are in 
the best interest of shareholders. Both assumptions have been criticised in the literature. 
Much of the empirical evidence challenges the first assumption by finding no clear evidence 
that pre-takeover performance of targeted firms is worse than their post-takeover 
performance (Mandelker, 1974; Langetieg, 1978; Comment and Schwert, 1995; Martin and 
McConnell, 1991; Franks and Mayer, 1996; Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003; etc.).  
 
On the second assumption, the plethora of empirical evidence provides mixed and 
inconclusive results. Some studies show that hostile takeovers do impose a discipline on 
incumbent managers who become more reluctant to take self-oriented actions and depart 
from the interests of shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001; 
Scharfstein, 1986; Mikkelson and Partch, 1997; etc). Similarly, Kini et al. (2004) argue that 
the corporate takeover market is an efficient “court of last resort” affecting managerial 
behaviour when internal mechanisms are ineffective and weak. On the other hand, the threat 
of takeover might generate short-term perspectives and incentivize the managers to let go of 
long-term profitability (Stein, 1988) which in turn may lead to suboptimal managerial 
behaviour. Another strand of the empirical literature argues that hostile takeovers are a 
reflection of self-interested behaviour by the managers of the acquiring company, at the 
expense of their own shareholders, who engage in takeover activities with the aim of empire-
building (Marris, 1963, 1964). 
 
It is important to mention that this corporate governance mechanism is more characteristic of 
the “outsider corporate governance” systems. Takeovers in Continental European countries 
are different to those in the US or the UK. According to Jenkinson and Ljungquist (1997), 
42 
 
hostile takeovers in Germany are rather rare due to significant ownership concentration. 
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) maintain that firms with poor performance (particularly those 
UK and USA) are more likely to be targets of takeovers and their managers are more likely to 
be fired. However, they state that in the 1990s due to the shift of managers’ focus from long-
term profitability to stock prices, corporate governance mechanisms evolved from hostile 
takeovers to incentive based schemes.10 
 
In short, although the agency cost theory considers takeovers as an efficient external 
corporate governance instrument which should “redeploy corporate assets more efficiently 
and discipline incumbent managers,” (Burkart and Panunzi, 2006), the empirical evidence for 
this view is inconclusive 
 
 
1.5.3 Debt financing – Leverage 
 
The theory on how the capital structure of a firm is influenced by agency cost considerations 
was initiated by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Unlike other corporate governance instruments, 
leverage involves at least two agency conflicts: between managers and shareholders; and 
between shareholders and debt holders. In the context of our research, we will focus on how 
leverage can be utilized as a tool to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. 
Debt financing is a common method of raising finance everywhere, especially in the 
continental European ownership structure given that the capital market in these countries is 
still underdeveloped in comparison to Anglo-Saxon countries. The debt financing market 
represents an implicit internal market mechanism for binding managers to work in the best 
interest of the firm (repayment of interest). According to Easterbrook (1984), the external 
capital market forces managers to work in the firm’s best interest, i.e., value maximization. 
Debt is expected to reduce the agency cost of free cash flow by reducing the cash flow 
available for spending for managerial self-interest, (Jensen, 1986). By using debt, managers 
                                                     
10
Changes in the anti-takeover legislation during the 1990s weakened, and limited the role of, the Anglo Saxon 
corporate governance systems as they introduced measures that elevated legal barriers to hostile takeovers. As a 
consequence, the structures of managerial incentive schemes as well as other corporate governance mechanisms 
were changed. In EU countries, takeover bids are regulated by the EU Directive on Takeover Bids (2004/25/EC) 
which harmonized the conditions for bids (irrevocability, disclosure, equal treatment) in all countries, yet though 
it failed the establishment of principles such as the equitable price. Although the main aim of the Directive was 
to encourage value-creating takeovers, according to recent empirical literature it made it more difficult to 
embark on takeovers, allowing the incumbent managers to be less disciplined and to engage in more entrenched 
behaviour (Wymeerch, 2008 and Humphery-Jenner, 2012). 
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pre-commit to distribute future cash flows. Liao et al. (2012) argue that a good corporate 
governance structure assures an optimal level of leverage. 
 
There is a large body of empirical literature highlighting two views of the relationship 
between governance mechanisms and leverage: (i) that leverage enforces good governance; 
and (ii) that leverage is the outcome of good governance. The first view can be interpreted as 
a self-disciplining internal governance mechanism which mitigates the costs of the manager-
shareholder agency conflict (Grossman and Hart, 1982; and Jensen, 1976 and 1986). Here, 
leverage restrains costly and ineffective managerial actions and increases firm value. In 
particular, creditor monitoring as well as a higher threat of bankruptcy may result in serious 
consequences such as dismissal and loss of reputation for managers (Farinha, 2003).  
 
The second view maintains that the quality of corporate governance affects the scale of 
leverage. According to Berger et al. (1997), Cremers et al. (2004), Klock et al. (2005) and  
Florackis and Ozkan (2009), the quality of corporate governance determines a firm’s cost of 
debt financing and, consequently, the choice of capital structure. Managers who are not 
subject to effective corporate governance mechanisms will continually take suboptimal 
decisions, making their companies less effective compared to those with better corporate 
governance mechanisms. Put differently, managers (who are, in essence, risk-averse) are less 
willing than shareholders (who are risk-neutral) to choose debt financing (usually because of 
job security concerns). Therefore, they will choose lower than the optimal level of leverage. 
Consequently, firms with poor corporate governance practices, where managers have stronger 
decision-making power, will have less than optimal leverage and slower rates of adjustment 
of the capital structure (Zheka, 2006).
11
 
 
The two views mirror each other, showing that leverage represents an effective internal 
governance mechanism that disciplines managers and forces them to avoid wasting the firm’s 
assets (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Zwiebel, 1996; Jiraporn and 
Gleason, 2007; and Nielsen, 2006). 
  
                                                     
11
Some authors, e.g. Zwebel (1996) have argued that entrenched managers choose debt to further their own 
future empire-building, attempting to prevent ex post control changes, and will on average have higher leverage 
levels, though there is not wide support for this view. 
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1.5.4 Non-Executive Directors: Outsider Directors 
 
The role of outsider directors as a corporate governance mechanism can be considered 
essential in the process of diminishing agency costs. The presence of outsider directors in the 
Board strengthens its independence. They are present as objective, reliable monitors that 
should independently monitor and discipline managers (Kumar and Singh, 2012). As Brennan 
(2006) argues, the board of directors may be considered as “the zenith” of the internal 
corporate governance mechanisms. McNulty and Pettigrew (1996) point out that the board of 
directors has three main functions as a corporate governance mechanism: (i) a monitoring 
function- control of managerial performance; (ii) a strategic function –enables the board to 
decide on strategic firm decisions, and finally (iii) a resource function –enables the board to 
decide about acquiring critical resources such as additional working capital or know how. It is 
expected that outsider directors strengthen these functions through unbiased, independent 
monitoring.12 However, in the context of the principal-agent problem, the role and the 
effectiveness of outsider directors is subject to an extensive debate in empirical literature. 
 
On the one hand, there are many studies that find the impact of the outside directors to firm 
performance is positive. According to Daily and Dalton (1992), Brickley et al. (1994), and 
Baysinger and Butler (1985), the existence of outside directors on the board improves the 
performance of the firm. Furthermore, according to Beasley (1996), the existence of outside 
directors on the board diminishes the chances of financial statement fraud, while Rosenstein 
and Wyatt (1990) find that the share price will increase on the day of the announcement that 
outside directors will be added to the board.  
 
On the other hand, there is also a large number of studies reporting that the impact of outsider 
directors on firm performance is insignificant (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003; Fields and Keys, 2003; Yermack, 1996; Klein, 1998, Core et al., 1999, 
Bathala and Rao, 1995; Vafeas and Theodoru, 1998; Mehran, 1995, Harris and Raviv, 2010; 
Ferris et al., 2003; Kumar and Singh, 2012; Mura, 2007; etc). According to Morck et al. 
(1988) NEDs have to monitor the performance of management and consequently they should 
have a personal financial interest in the firm. In reality, they usually do not have strong 
                                                     
12
Of course one may legitimately ask why would an experienced, highly skilled person with a very loose 
connection with the firm agree to take on this role? The explanation for NEDs’ behaviour can be found in a 
variety of theories such as stewardship theory, corporate responsibility theory and cognitive theory.The 
discussion of these theories, however, are outside the scope of this research. 
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financial incentives (Hart, 1995) or, even worse, they may not have enough expertise to 
efficiently monitor executives (Jensen, 1983) which leads to the lack of evidence for the 
impact of NEDs on firm performance to be significant. Furthermore, according to Fernandes 
(2005), firms with zero NEDs have less agency problems between managers and shareholders 
and pay executives less. 
 
Thus, as in the previous mechanisms of good governance expected to ameliorate the agency 
problem, the empirical support for this mechanism too is inconclusive. 
 
 
1.5.5 Executive compensation contracts 
 
Executive compensation contracts represent an internal incentive-based corporate governance 
mechanism targeted to align the interests of shareholders and management. Using 
compensation contracts, owners provide an extra incentive to managers to follow 
shareholders’ interests, which should lead to improved corporate performance. Of course, 
management remuneration represents an extra cost for shareholders, so its value should be 
targeted at the level where benefits of aligning the interest of managers do not fall below the 
costs remuneration. Although it seems that executive compensation is a well-designed 
mechanism that rests on agency theory with a developed formula based on either accounting 
or stock market performance, recent scandals around executive pay packages make this a 
controversial corporate governance instrument.  
 
The older empirical literature postulates the validity of agency theory; it regards, the 
executive pay package as a way for shareholders to align the interests of shareholders with 
managers, providing them with a straightforward incentive to raise shareholder value. Here, 
the CEO compensation represents a viable corporate governance instrument that positively 
affects firms’ performance. According to Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) and Murphy (1985) 
executive compensation - salary and bonus changes – has a significant effect on shareholders’ 
returns. Similarly, Gerhart (1990) finds a significant impact of bonus-based incentives on 
future profits. Using international comparison, Kaplan (1994) highlights that executive 
compensation seems to have a positive impact on firm performance in both Japan and the US, 
although Japanese managers receive lower levels of cash and share earnings compared to US 
managers. According to Overton (1991, p. 325), “incentive compensation has the potential to 
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motivate executives and focus their energies on behaviour that directly supports or fulfils 
organizational goals". In addition, part of the “traditional” empirical literature in the post 
Enron era still does not change its findings. According to Sigler (2011), the compensation of 
managers after the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation positively affects firm 
performance, while the size of the company as well as the tenure of the manager mostly 
affects the level of executive compensation. Similar findings can be found in the numerous 
contributions by Brick et al. (2006), Danes et al. (2005), etc., consistently arguing the 
efficiency of the agency theory.  
 
On the other hand, the modern empirical investigation challenges the optimal incentive 
contracting theory which argues that managers have been able to get self-targeted pay, using 
captured boards and remuneration committees. Recent scandals including Enron, WorldCom, 
Global Crossing, HealthSouth Corporation, Fannie Mae, etc., resulted in the perceptions that 
CEOs of public companies are overpaid and their boards provide poor oversight. According 
to Kaplan (2012) this perception combines three views: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay 
keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for performance; and (3) boards are not doing their 
jobs as monitors. Moreover, according to Bebchuk et al. (2002), the managerial power within 
the firm is influential enough to prevent boards from operating at arm’s length when setting 
executive compensation arrangements. Instead, executives have power to influence their own 
pay and, in addition, they use this power to extract rent. At the same time, extraction of rent 
leads to the use of inefficient pay arrangements and providing suboptimal incentives which 
thereupon adversely affects the value of the firm. According to Bolton et al. (2005) there are 
two aspects of the evident flaws of compensation scheme practices: the first one refers to 
faulty compensation scheme design, and the second refers to the lack of accountability and 
the rather passive role of the Board in the monitoring process.  
 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) go a step further claiming that executives have been able to set 
their own pay using captured boards and remuneration committees, coining the phrase “pay 
without performance.” They argue that the setting of executive salaries does not contribute to 
the reducing the principal-agent problem. Compensation schemes have been, over the years, 
have been decoupled from managers’ contribution to company performance; i.e. changes in 
the value of companies is not followed by corresponding changes to managers’ salaries. 
Furthermore, the asymmetric information between managers and shareholders, as well as the 
existence of weak board members, creates the opportunity for managers not only to fail to 
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reach targets to increase the value of the company but also to create perverse incentives and 
behaviour of managers. For example, according to Bebchuk and Fried (2005, p. 11), 
executives who expect to obtain shares through share compensation schemes have an 
incentive “to report misleading results, suppress bad news, and choose projects and strategies 
that are less transparent to the market.” Indeed, Turner (2009, p. 79) blames inadequate 
remuneration schemes in the financial sector for the outbreak of the financial crisis, claiming 
that “....there is a strong prima facie case that inappropriate incentive structures played a role 
in encouraging behaviour which contributed to the financial crisis.” 
 
As a result of various scandals in the 1990s and early 2000s, the legal framework for 
corporate governance was amended in many countries, aiming at preventing the misuse of 
power by executives in important areas of corporate life. The 2003 Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation in the U.S, as well as the so-called “say on pay” practice (Section 951) introduced 
by Dodd-Frank legislation (2010) are examples of these changes. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2003 introduced structural changes in the governance of public companies, introducing 
additional disclosure requirements in public firms with the aim of improving the accuracy 
and reliability of information provided to shareholders. The most prominent requirement is 
the disclosure of information on granting executive options which have to be reported to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) within two business days of the grant date. After 
obtaining this information, the Securities and Exchange Commission investigates whether the 
requirement has mitigated the stock price, influencing behaviour of corporate executives. 
This requirement should deter managers from behaviour that influences post-grant-date stock 
returns which, according to extensive empirical evidence, are on average positive (Yermack, 
1997; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001; etc). According to provisions 
of the Dodd-Frank legislation, all public companies get an advisory shareholder vote on top 
executives’ compensations. Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank legislation imposes additional 
disclosure requirements regarding the compensation of the CEO, the ratio between the 
compensation of the CEO and employees, and whether the CEO or any other employee is 
permitted to purchase financial instruments that can be used for hedging purposes.  
 
In short, recent empirical evidence strongly suggests that managerial compensation cannot 
ensure that managers will make the "right” decision from the perspective of long-term 
interests of the firm. Together with weaknesses of other corporate governance instruments 
discussed in this sub-section, it can be concluded that none of them may be able to resolve the 
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principal-agent unambiguously. In the presence of uncertainty and opportunistic behaviour, 
the agency problem continues to dominate the shareholder-managers relationships and to 
draw the attention of policy makers. 
 
 
1.5.6 Ownership Concentration and Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 
The presence of agency conflicts between owners and managers has eventually led to the 
development of governance mechanisms at a legal level in most countries, aiming to ensure 
that managers act in the best interest of owners. However, apart from the legal provisions, 
ownership concentration (which exists in most countries of the world13) has been identified as 
the most commonly used instrument for efficient monitoring of managers, usually used when 
other instruments are lacking or are underdeveloped.  
 
Although it is assumed that ownership concentration would ensure efficient monitoring of 
managers, yet in different corporate governance settings across different countries ownership 
concentration varies in efficiency as a monitoring instrument of managers. For example, the 
efficiency of ownership concentration is weakened when there is significant free riding 
(where large shareholders pay the full cost of monitoring but gain only a part of the return 
from enhanced monitoring, proportional to the share of concentrated owner, and minority 
shareholders enjoy the rest of the gain without exercising any effort in monitoring or paying 
for it). Another aspect is that the identity of large owners matters in the sense that managerial 
ownership may be a viable source of incentive alignment and behavioural change of 
managers.  
 
Similarly, in the context of weak institutional settings (such as a lack of financial 
transparency, ineffective law enforcement, shallow capital market, weak protection of 
investors, etc.) and underdeveloped corporate governance mechanisms (characteristic of, for 
example, transition economies), ownership concentration  can be (miss)used for extraction of 
the private benefits of control by large shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders. 
                                                     
13As La Porta et al. (1999, p. 471) argue, using data from 27 developed economies, that with exception of a few 
cases, large companies are not widely held (which is assumed by Berle and Means, 1932) by dispersed 
shareholders. Instead, modern corporations are usually held by the State, families and to lesser extent by 
financial institutions. 
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These issues are just some of the features that should be analysed when ownership 
concentration is used as a tool for agency problem mitigation.  
 
We will analyse in more detail the properties and consequences of ownership concentration, 
its impact on the alleviation of the agency problem and consequently on firm performance in 
the next Chapter. 
 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter, we assessed a set of fundamental concepts that define the role and the 
importance of corporate governance. Agency problem emerges in an environment where the 
firm is considered a nexus of incomplete contracts entered into by different entities with 
bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour and are subject to asymmetric information 
and uncertainty. The agency problem is created in an organization at the moment when the 
principal (owner) delegates work to the agent (manager) in order to work in the principal’s 
best interest. This can be divided into two elements: (i) divergent interests of principal and 
agent; and (ii) costs that a principal needs to bear in order to monitor the agent’s actions or to 
make adequate incentives for the agent to act in his best interest. Furthermore, this setting 
triggers the formulation of a compensation scheme for the agent, aimed at achieving efficient 
allocation of risk and rewarding the agent’s performance. This setting is complicated further 
by the fact that the risk-averse agent has to operate in an uncertain environment.  
 
If the principal and the agent want to maximize their personal wealth, the principal has to 
develop an incentives scheme and establish monitoring mechanisms to control any self-
interested activities of the agent (monitoring costs). At the same time the agent will spend 
funds in proving or guaranteeing that he is not taking any activities which would harm the 
principal (bonding cost). Even with monitoring and bonding costs, the incomplete contract 
between the principal and the agent will always create the condition for the residual loss to 
appear. 
 
Whether costs reflect the self-interested opportunism of managers (wealth creation for 
themselves instead of owners) or their shirking behaviour (lack of attention to maximize 
owners’ interest-firm performance), the principal is exposed to the agent’s behaviour. 
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Therefore, the corporate governance framework involves developing a set of structures, 
processes, cultures and mechanisms to cope with the inevitable agency cost and its 
minimisation. 
 
These mechanisms monitor and influence the behaviour of managers at the firm level 
(internaly) or market level (externally). Their efficiency varies with differences in corporate 
governance structures, legal frameworks, capital market settings and whether they are created 
to be utilised as a group or as a single instrument that ensure effective corporate governance 
framework. 
 
The discusion in Chapter 1, starting from theory of the firm and the properties of agency 
theory to different corporate governance mechanisms created for the efficient resolution of 
agency problem, forms the foundation on which our research relies, the role of ownership 
concentration and its impact on the firm performance, is based.  
 
Chapter 2, therefore, reviews the literature evaluating the role of ownership concentration as 
an alternative or a supplement to conventional corporate governance mechanisms in different 
economic environments (developed economies vs. transition economies). The 
inconclusiveness and, to some extent, the inconsistency of the empirical literature on the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value triggers the need for a 
quantitative review and summing-up of the literature using Meta Regression Analysis in 
Chapter 3.  
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND 
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THEORY PERSPECTIVE 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
In this Chapter we provide a detailed critical review of the literature on ownership structures 
in different corporate governance frameworks. The focus of this Chapter is to survey the 
theory and empirical evidence that analyses the relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance. The rapidly growing literature on this topic has its roots in the work of 
Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). They postulate that the agency 
problem arising from the separation of ownership and control reflects an underlying premise 
that self-interested managers take actions that may be inconsistent with the aims of 
shareholders. Therefore, the emerging ownership structure, reflecting the shareholders’ desire 
to optimise their position given all relevant factors, is considered an important instrument in 
corporate governance frameworks that are created to resolve the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers. How powerful or effective this process may be remains the 
question that we shall try to analyse in more detail in this Chapter as well as in Chapter 3. 
 
In addition, discussion of the second part (starting with subsection 2.4) of Chapter 2 is 
motivated by the rich debate on how the agency problem is reflected in the ownership 
concentration-firm performance relationship in Transition Economies (henceforth TEs). 
Given the weak institutional settings (inefficiently enforced property rights, governance, and 
poor protection of minority shareholders) in these countries, two issues will be addressed: 
first, the assessment of the ability of ownership concentration to counterbalance the deficient 
institutional settings in TEs, i.e., to what degree ownership concentration can control and 
align managerial behaviour; and second, the assessment of how efficient ownership 
concentration in this setting can prevent the expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, in the context of TEs as an inseparable part of the above-mentioned discussion, 
we review a rich body of empirical literature which analyses the superiority of different 
ownership structures, or identities, in respect to achieving better firm performance. This 
review specifically examines whether foreign ownership outperforms other types of 
ownerships, and whether privatisation is vindicated by underperformance of state-owned 
firms compared to other types of ownership. These two issues will be the subject of separate 
empirical analysis in Chapter 4. 
 
We commence Chapter 2 with a section explaining the existing variations in country-specific 
ownership structures with special reference to the analysis of cross-country legal frameworks 
53 
 
which predominantly moulded corporate governance settings and the role of the ownership 
concentration in them. This leads to the influence of ownership concentration as the 
controlling mechanism that should force managers to align their behaviour with shareholders’ 
interests. We continue by outlining theoretical views on whether ownership concentration 
affects firm performance at all and, if so, whether the effect is positive (incentive-alignment), 
negative (entrenchment of managers or outsiders and the expropriation of the private benefits 
of control) or non-monotonical (combination of these opposite effects) or non-existent. In the 
penultimate section (2.4), we review the  changes in ownership structures and types of 
dominant owners in TEs, triggered by various privatization methods and which have taken 
place in parallel with the emergence of corporate governance mechanisms and the 
development of stock markets in these countries. We conclude by setting the scene for the 
quantitative review of the empirical evidence using Meta regression analysis in Chapter 3.  
 
 
2.2 Ownership structure: Cross-country variation 
 
There are significant differences in the levels and structures of shareholding across countries. 
These differences primarily reflect the diversity of the corporate governance systems in 
different countries. Stressing the importance of variations within corporate governance 
systems, we can divide ownership structures across the world into two groups: (i) ownership 
structures which reflect insider (Anglo-Saxon) corporate governance system present in the 
USA, in the UK, Australia, and to some extent in Canada (although it is more of a hybrid 
system with predominant influence of the insider system); and (ii) ownership structures 
which reflect outsider corporate governance systems (Continental European) present in 
Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Scandinavian countries and Benelux countries. Again, in the 
case of Japan, it is more of a hybrid system with stronger emphasis is on the outsider 
corporate governance system.  
 
The main attributes of the insider corporate governance system are: dispersed ownership, a 
developed alternative corporate governance mechanism such as a managerial labour market, a 
market for corporate control in the form of hostile takeovers (Ferrell, 2003), and a developed 
mechanism of equity based compensation to create incentives for managers (Coffee, 2005). 
At the same time, these systems have developed within a very developed and liquid capital 
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markets (Becht, 1999). Moreover, Coffee (2001) points out that the cost of entry and exit into 
the firm’s shareholding are low. These systems are prepared to swap the possibility of 
ownership concentration and a certain level of active investment for the sake of liquidity. 
Pyramidal ownership is usually forbidden in these countries. This type of ownership was 
common in the USA until the implementation of the New Deal initiatives in 1930 (Morck, 
2006). 
 
In the Continental European corporate governance systems, with some variations among 
countries, ownership concentration (i.e. large block holders) is the most prominent feature. In 
these systems, standard corporate governance instruments such as managerial labour market 
and hostile takeover (external mechanisms) are underdeveloped, while managerial contracts 
are mostly cash-incentive based. Contrary to the Anglo-Saxon systems, Continental European 
capital markets are less liquid with shareholders that are more interested in long-term active 
investment than in speculative trade. The less liquid capital markets in the Continental 
European countries may result in distorted and inefficient information about the firm’s 
quality if judgment is made on the share price. The main difference among Continental 
European countries is the variations in the ratio between ownership right and voting right of 
shares, i.e. whether countries have pyramidal or cross ownership (as in Germany), or they do 
not (as in the Netherlands).  
 
Berglof and Burkart (2003), supported by Barca and Becht (2001) and; La Porta et al. (1999), 
find that, on average, companies in Austria, Belgium, Germany and Italy have a single 
controlling blockholder, which holds more than 50% of voting rights. Similarly, in the 
Netherlands, France, Spain and Sweden, a single controlling blockholder is very common, 
holding between 20% and 43.5% of the voting rights. On the other hand, in the United 
Kingdom, on average, a single shareholder controls only 9.9% of voting rights. La Porta et al. 
(1999) compared companies from 27 of the most developed economies and, unsurprisingly, 
found high dispersion of ownership in the UK and US companies, while other countries 
starting with Germany (institutional shareholding) and Sweden (family shareholding) 
experienced concentration of ownership. With these differences between Continental 
European and Anglo-Saxon ownership structures, the question of their origin and their 
explanation becomes fundamental to this discussion and needs to be answered. 
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One possible explanation has been offered by the so-called “law and finance theory” 
developed by La Porta et al. (1998, 1999, and 2000). This theory represents an aspiration to 
integrate the theory of corporate finance, institutional economics, and legal and economic 
history to explain the above divergence in corporate governance systems, and their effect on 
economic growth. La Porta et al. (1998) as well as Graff (2005) point out that countries’ 
corporate finance laws rely on the historical legacy of their laws. There are three main types 
of legal legacies which might explain the differences in ownership concentration across 
countries: Common law, Civil law and German and Scandinavian civil law. 
 
The Common Law which originated in the UK and adopted in all former UK colonized 
countries including USA, Australia and Canada, is predominantly based on the rights of 
private property: 
 
“The English common law tradition is almost synonymous with judges having broad 
interpretation powers and with courts moulding and creating law as circumstances change. 
The common law is obsessed with facts and deciding concrete cases, rather than adhering to 
the logical principles of codified law”.   
Beck and Levine (2003) 
 
 
On the other hand, France has a legal legacy based on Roman Law principles, widely known 
as “Civil Law”.   
 
“Like Justinian, Napoleon sought a code that was so clear, complete, and coherent that there 
would be no need for judges to deliberate publicly about which laws, customs, and past 
experiences apply to new, evolving situations. Furthermore, this approach required a high 
degree of procedural formalism to reduce the discretion of judges in regulating the 
presentation of evidence, witnesses, arguments, and appeals ... The French situation 
encouraged the development of easily verifiable “bright-line-rules” that do not rely on the 
discretion of judges.”  
Beck and Levine (2003) 
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In Germany and Scandinavia they made certain adjustments to Civil Law. German Civil 
Code, based on Bismarck’s changes of civil law in 1873 represents, “a dynamic, common 
fund of legal principles that formed the basis for codification in the 19th century” outline 
Beck and Levin (2003, p. 8). Moreover, in contrast to the revolutionary zeal and antagonism 
to judges that shaped the Napoleonic Code: 
 
“German legal history shed a much more favourable light on jurisprudence and explicitly 
rejected France’s approach ... Whereas the Napoleonic code was designed to be immutable; 
the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch was designed to evolve.”  
Graff (2005) 
 
Although one cannot derive a conclusion about differences among ownership structures in 
different countries from the description of their legal legacies, empirical literature finds the 
evidence that the adaption of the common and civil law has different effects on the level of 
ownership concentration and the type of agency problem that arises as a consequence of the 
separation of ownership and management. According to Lopez-de-Foronda et al. (2007, p. 
1130) in common law countries, “as a consequence of the relationships between managers 
and shareholders, capital structure and managerial ownership are the most effective 
mechanisms of control. In civil law countries, however, as a consequence of the conflicts 
between majority and minority shareholders, the ownership concentration and the sharing of 
control within the firm become crucial.” 
 
One of the most important differences among these legal systems is their capability to evolve 
and adapt. In respect to the above criteria, these laws can be ranked as follows: the most 
adaptive is Common law, followed by German and Scandinavian civil law while the law with 
the lowest ability to adapt is French civil law. As Common law has a greater power of 
adaptation, it is easier in common law countries to develop new corporate governance 
instruments for investor protection. Graff (2005) takes nine criteria to measure which of these 
three laws assure the best investment protection: (i) one share-one vote, (ii) proxy voting by 
mail, (iii) shares not blocked; (iv) cumulative voting, (v) oppressed minority, (vi) pre-emptive 
rights, (vii) extraordinary rights, (viii) anti-director rights and (ix) mandatory dividend. He 
found that the common law system is better (obtaining a grade 4), then the German Law 
system (obtaining an average grade of 3) while the French law system had a grade 2.33. This 
implies that in terms of shareholders’ protection, common law performs better. It appears that 
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the common law system generally provided a more favourable starting point for financial 
development and economic growth, whilst the French variety of the civil law tradition 
provides the least opportunities.  
 
However, Graff (2005) fails to prove that common law provides better investor protection 
over German or French civil law, although he notes “the legal tradition” of the common and 
civil laws view investors differently. Therefore, in the context of the evolution of corporate 
governance based on different legal frameworks, it appears that common law provides the 
most favourable setting for the corporate governance development as opposed to civil law 
which shows the least favourable setting. 
 
Another perspective on the evolution of corporate governance systems is provided by 
Bebchuk and Roe (1999). The so-called “path dependency theory” in essence represents the 
quantitative equivalence of “finance and law theory” previously explained. According to 
Bebchuk and Roe (1999), corporate structures differ across advanced economies due to the 
historical development path of corporate structures. They argue that the corporate structures 
in any economy in the present depend largely on those structures that it had in the past. Path 
dependence is created by combining two factors: (i) structure driven factors, and (ii) rule 
driven factors. In structure driven factors, the corporate structures embedded in an economy 
are built upon the structures with which the economy started. Initial ownership structure (the 
ownership structure in time t0 has such a powerful effect because it affects the identity of the 
ownership structure that would be chosen by the firm in time t1 providing incentives to 
existing shareholders  and accelerate changes in the future ownership structure. In rule driven 
factors, corporate rules, which impact ownership structures, will themselves rely on the 
ownership structures built in the initial phase. These initial ownership structures induce the 
constitution of both, (i) rules and mechanisms that would be effective, and (ii) the interest 
groups that would have enough power to choose these rules and mechanisms.  
 
Finally, Coffee (1999) provides the “Strong Convergence Thesis”, explaining differences in 
ownership structure across countries, but more importantly, attempting to provide an answer 
to the question of what a future superior ownership structure should look like. According to 
Coffee (2001), dispersed and concentrated ownership are not just different, but they are 
competing. The ultimate “winner” of this Darwinian process is not yet known. Would 
winners be sharing a market-focused system based on dispersed ownership like that which is 
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present in the USA and the UK, or would it be block holdings and cross shareholdings 
characteristic of Continental Europe and Asia? According to the “Strong Convergence 
Thesis” a winner does not necessary have to exist.  
 
This thesis provides a middle ground solution, between two schools of thought: (i) the 
neoclassical view recognizable in the work of Demsetz (1983) and Easterbrook and Fischel 
(1991); and (ii) the political forces and path dependency view promoted by Roe et al. (1999) 
and Graff (2005) which has a different vision of the future of corporate governance systems. 
On the one hand, the neoclassical school of thought treats corporate governance as one type 
of technology. There is no middle solution. If a company chooses a technology which is less 
effective in the long term, the firm’s overall efficiency will suffer and competition will 
punish the company for making a wrong choice. As Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) point out, 
if we take into account the efficiency of corporate governance systems, one system has to 
ultimately prevail and firms that choose the “wrong” corporate governance system will have 
to adjust or disappear.  
 
The proponents of political (legal) forces and history path dependency theories find that in 
common law countries political forces established an environment in which security markets 
can grow and prosper at the expense of lower capacity of active managerial monitoring 
through ownership concentration and creating incentive instruments founded on the short-
term achievements of managers. Alongside that, political forces based on civil law created 
strong financial intermediaries in comparison to weaker stock markets where ownership 
concentration provides better monitoring of managers that are focused on achieving long-
term goals (Pound, 1993). This means that both systems have survived due to their relative 
differences which have a long history and path dependency (Roe et al., 1999). In the 
meantime, they continuously created different sets of political and legal devices in 
accordance to their priorities (stock market liquidity vs. long-term investment). 
 
These conclusions are not echoed in the work of Aguilera and Jackson, (2003); Aguilera et al. 
(2012); Haxhi and Aguilera (2012, p. 234) who argue that, “firms have some degree of 
freedom in creating their corporate governance portfolio even though they are embedded in a 
given national or institutional environment. “They strongly oppose the assumption that 
internationalization of the corporate governance practices should be seen as increasing 
competition over "best practices,” leading to a convergence toward practices of Anglo-Saxon 
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Countries. At the same time, they disagree with the contrasting assumption that the countries 
will continue to diverge along stable, path-dependent trajectories. Instead, Aguilera and 
Jackson, (2003, p. 461) claim that “the multilevel interactions spanning from international to 
national and sub-national policies, most strikingly through the European Union,” together 
with variations in behaviour among different stakeholders should incentivize corporate 
governance practices “hybridization” rather than fostering convergence or “path dependency” 
of corporate governance practices. 
 
These findings are in line with those of Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2009 and 2012) whose 
argument is that inevitable changes in corporate governance are subject to increasing 
integration of product and capital markets. Nonetheless, these changes that aim to achieve 
greater efficiency are limited and usually subject to local institutional and political settings 
leading to the creation of “hybrid” solutions rather than the adoption of mechanisms 
characteristic of other corporate governance settings. 
 
Finally, those supporting the “Strong Convergence” idea point out that in future, a 
convergence of systems can be expected (Carati and Rad, 2000; Gilson, 2000; Nestor and 
Thompson; 2004; Wojcik, 2006, among others). Continental European countries are 
gradually developing their stock markets and devices for minority shareholders protection 
while the USA and UK are developing devices for better monitoring of managers, including 
better organization of dispersed shareholders on the secondary markets. Coffee (2001) 
predicts the convergence of these systems given that both systems wish to overcome their 
relative weaknesses by developing legal instruments, bringing them ever closer.  
 
To sum up, the “law and finance” theory developed by La Porta et al. (1998) explains in 
detail how current ownership structures have developed across different countries. The core 
explanation is that the legal legacies (such as the judicial system) of countries affect the 
development of their corporate governance systems. “Path dependency” theory, promoted by 
Bebchuk and Roe (1999), more or less provides a quantitative explanation of “law and 
finance” theory, providing time dimensions to the theory. The conclusion is that ownership 
structures are deeply dependent on their past values and owners' identities, causing further 
divergence of corporate governance mechanisms across countries.  
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At the same time, the three different theories provide different visions of future corporate 
governance systems and their potential ownership structures. While “legal” and “path 
dependency” theories predict the further development of each, the Continental European and 
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems are driven by intrinsic differences in their laws 
and economic backgrounds. The neoclassical view promoted by Demsetz (1983) supports the 
theory that one corporate governance system has to prevail considering corporate governance 
as a type of more or less efficient technology.  
 
 
2.3 Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Theory from Developed 
Economies 
 
The idea that ownership concentration and firm performance relationship is ambiguous is 
considered more an axiom in current empirical research than a theorem requiring proof. Berle 
and Means (1932) triggered a prolonged debate on how the separation of ownership and 
control leads to the strengthening of management incentives to maximize firm value, i.e. to 
act in the best interest of owners. This problem was thoroughly analysed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) who stress the importance of solving the agency problem between self-
interested managers (agents) and owners (principals) with clear instructions to the agents to 
act in the owners’ best interest and aim for firm value maximization. Therefore, we try to 
explain three broad strands of research based on different understandings and assessmentsof 
whether ownership concentration can actually monitor managers or changeentrenched 
managerial behaviour; andultimately, how ownership concentration interrelates with firm 
performance.   
 
Given that the empirical literature analyzing the impact of ownership concentration and firm 
performance is huge
14
, we focus on different theoretical aspects of this relationship and the 
relevance of the assumptions of the agency problem. This would give us an intuitive response 
to the diversity of findings of empirical research. In the case of developed economies, 
understanding the difference in theoretical aspects would help in coding the distinctive 
control variables that will be applied in the Meta Regression Analyses in the next chapter.  
                                                     
14
An economic literature data-base search of “ownership “+” “concentration” + “firm performance” or “value,” 
lists more than five thousand articles, books, papers, working papers, etc. on this topic 
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2.3.1 Incentive Alignment Theory 
 
The incentive alignment theory is based on the traditional agency theory literature that 
predicts that an increase in managerial or outsider ownership will help align the interests of 
managers (or outsiders) with other shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Zeckhouser 
and Pound (1990) argue that the increase of the stakes of single owners advances their 
incentive to fully utilize their control rights and impose performance maximizing decisions 
thorough monitoring the managers. The classical agency theory assumes that active 
monitoring of management will restrain managers from extracting benefits at the expense of 
shareholders. Extraction of benefits by managers takes many forms from shirking and 
consumption of excessive perquisites to sub-optimal investment (Fleming et al., 2005, p. 31).  
 
The question arises, if large owners are able to prevent this behaviour among managers, how 
do we explain a dispersed ownership structures in Anglo-Saxon countries, for example? This 
question raises two issues of interest: (i) whether incentive alignment theory is sensitive to 
the type of corporate governance system in the country; and (ii) whether the alignment of 
managers’ interests is more effective through its direct control or through the creation of 
appropriate incentive-based and control-based (bonding and monitoring) instruments. 
 
It seems that the type of corporate governance system matters in the context of incentive 
alignment – managerial entrenchment controversy. When managerial contract incentives are 
not so strong, as in Continental European countries where stock based compensation and the 
market for corporate control are not developed (Coffee, 2005), it can be expected that the 
room for manoeuvre for managerial entrenched behaviour is less possible and incentive 
alignment through managerial monitoring is a more likely outcome. Namely, one might 
expect that in the ‘insider corporate governance systems’ (characteristic of Anglo–Saxon 
countries and explained in detail in Appendix 1.1) where ownership concentration is 
substituted with internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, some of these 
mechanisms (especially incentive contracts that should help to align the interests of owners 
and managers), may turn out to be inefficient. Even more, they may trigger the entrenched 
behaviour of managers with detrimental impact on firm performance. On the other hand, one 
may expect that in the ‘outsiders corporate governance systems’, ownership concentration as 
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a popular instrument substituting other (less developed) corporate governance instruments 
may efficiently alleviate the agency problem by aligning their interests by better monitoring. 
For example, in line with the incentive alignment theory, Kaserer and Moldenhauer. (2008) 
use data from Germany and find a strong long-term positive relationship between insider 
ownership concentration and firm performance. However, these studies do not provide any 
explanation as to whether a positive significant relationship between insider ownership and 
firm performance in Continental European countries is due to share based contracts or better 
monitoring practice of large outsider shareholders. Given that the differences in corporate 
governance systems might have a significant impact on the firm performance volatility across 
countries, this issue needs to be taken into account in the MRA in Chapter 3.  
 
Although the incentive alignment theory should represent a logical outcome of agency 
theory, there are only few studies that analyze the power of certain types of corporate 
governance mechanisms such as managers’ stock options compensation plans. In one of those 
rare studies, Jin and Meulbroek, (2001) examine whether stock option contracts have the 
power to align interests of managers with interests of the firm and whether this mechanism 
can be sustained in conditions of low market prices. They discovered that equity-based 
compensation contracts and stock option contracts are both very efficient in aligning 
managerial interests with the interest of firms, and moreover, in contrast to the logic of self-
interested behaviour, managers seems to be insensitive to a decline in stock prices. On the 
other hand, Jensen et al. (1989) argue that managerial compensation contracts are rarely 
connected with firm performance, which could lead to underperformance of managers. 
Namely, managers become more focused on performance driven contracts, focusing solely on 
the targeted firm performance. Similarly, Jensen et al. (2004, p. 98) argue that “while 
executive compensation can be a powerful tool for reducing the agency conflicts between 
managers and the firm, compensation can also be a substantial source of agency costs if it is 
not managed properly.” 
 
In short, we can conclude that incentive alignment theory represents a clear outcome of the 
agency theory explained by Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen and Meckling (1976): 
managers will behave in line with the firm’s interests if they are insider owners of those 
companies. However, many questions remain unanswered, such as: What type of 
compensation contracts are necessary to genuinely align interests of managers? To what 
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extent are these contracts really connected with firm performance? Empirical evidence 
finding the positive impact of ownership concentration on firm performance is very extensive 
and varied. However, the evidence for a positive impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance is more is more in the context of Continental European countries and emerging 
markets rather than Anglo-Saxon countries. Therefore, an interesting question is whether the 
incentive alignment theory is more applicable in the Continental European counties, where 
monitoring of managers by large outsider shareholders might be an efficient solution, or if the 
corporate governance systems in these countries create the opportunity for the extraction of 
private benefits of control by large shareholders or opportunistic behaviour by insider 
owners, which undermines the assumptions of incentive alignment theory? The answers to 
these questions go beyond the scope of the narrative review of the incentive alignment 
theory. We will return to these issues later in the MRA in Chapter3.   
 
 
2.3.2 Entrenchment Theory 
 
The underlying assumption of “entrenchment theory” (henceforth ET) is that managers 
exercise private benefits of control by: (i) implementing costly entrenchment strategies  in 
order to preserve their positions in the firm, (ii) neutralizing voting power of other 
shareholders, (iii) making their dismissal by other shareholders costly, (iv) expropriating 
other shareholders. Managerial entrenchment, if not controlled, leads to the expropriation of 
shareholders’ wealth or an inefficient allocation of firm resources (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; DeAngelo and Rice, 1983, Jensen and Warner 1988). Therefore, 
entrenchment of managers is one of the most acute demonstrations of agency problem 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983).  
 
Ang et al. (2000) pioneer an attempt to quantify agency cost (in absolute and relative terms) 
that is triggered by the separation between owners and managers. They find that agency cost 
is inversely related to the managerial stake in the firm and they assume that agency cost, 
calculated as the loss of the revenue created by sub-optimal asset utilization, results in 
dubious investment decisions by managers, known as managerial shirking. However, Jensen 
and Ruback (1983, pp. 30-31) argue that it is very difficult to measure the agency costs of 
manager-shareholder conflict due to at least three reasons: (i) measurement of the relative 
impact of the various external and internal mechanisms may subdue managerial departure 
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from firm value maximization; (ii) difficulty in identifying and quantifying benefits that 
managers obtain when implementing opportunistic decisions; and finally, (iii) when a 
suboptimal decision is made, it is difficult to distinguish whether it is the result of managerial 
incompetence, managerial opportunism or just bad luck. Furthermore the shareholder-
managers conflict and their relative power may be blurred with differences between cash 
flow and voting rights of the shareholders (Morck et al., 2005; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; 
Jensen and Warner, 1988). 
 
The entrenchment theory begins with Fama and Jensen (1983) who stressed the offsetting 
costs related to significant management ownership. They argue that when managers hold 
small ownership stake, they are disciplined with various factors such as: (i) the managerial 
labor market (Fama, 1980); (ii) the product market (Hart, 1983); and (iii) the corporate 
control market (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Stulz, 1988; Manne, 1965; Marris, 1964). In 
practice, managers use various mechanisms to neutralize the effects of especially external 
corporate governance mechanisms (Dahya et al., 1998; De Miguel et al., 2004; Denis et al., 
1997; Morck et al. 1988), through: (i) poison pills
15
 (Field and Karpoff, 2002; Bebchuk et al., 
2002; Denis, 1990); (ii) anti-takeover measures (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009; 
Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jensen and Warner, 1988); (iii) increased cost of management 
layoffs; or (iv) “golden parachutes”16 (Blair, 1994; Kleinfield 1982; Lambert and Larcker 
1985; Fiss, 2006). The focus of our interest is whether managerial ownership and the 
behaviour of managers have a detrimental impact on firm value. 
 
According to the classic assumption of the shareholders-management conflict, entrenched 
behaviour would lead to inefficient allocation or misuse of resources, and adverse effect on 
firm performance. This occurs due to the existence of asymmetric information between 
managers and shareholders which creates a moral hazard problem and the inability of 
shareholders to quantify the loss occurred by opportunistic behaviour of managers. 
 
However, another strand of empirical evidence maintains that the impact of managerial 
entrenchment actions on firm performance is not harmful at all. According to Surroca and 
                                                     
15
Poison pill can be defined as a mechanism or management strategy used to discourage hostile takeovers as 
attempts to make its shares less attractive to the potential acquirer.  
16Golden parachute usually refers to the extra compensation that management receives when their contract are 
terminated, or when they are forced out of the company, usually just before or after the takeover. In this manner, 
shareholders have an increased cost of potential layoff of the management.   
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Tribo (2008) and Waddock and Graves (1997), managerial entrenchment may have a positive 
impact on firm performance when there is excessive external pressure from financial markets 
which promotes corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies implementation, and which 
are in the long-run beneficial for firm performance. Similarly, Rajan and Wulf (2006, p. 1) 
argue that although “executive perks are a form of agency or private benefit and a way for 
managers to misappropriate some of the surplus the firm generates,” simultaneously 
managerial perks may have positive effects on managerial productivity and firm 
performance.
17
 
 
A large part of empirical literature on ET claims that managerial behaviour is a function of 
the managerial ownership level, alluding to the presence of the nonlinear relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance and reflecting shifts of managerial 
behaviour at different levels of ownership. For example, Stulz (1988) develops a model in 
and, in contrast to the findings of Jensen and Meckling (1976), finds that managerial 
ownership is positively related to firm value at lower levels of managerial ownership but 
becomes negatively affected at higher levels. Similarly, McConnel and Servaes (1990) show 
that after a certain level of managerial shareholding, cost of managerial entrenchment 
escalates and becomes more influential (providing more benefits) than the benefits of the 
alignment of interest characteristic of lower levels of managerial shareholding. According to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Haugen and Senbet (1981), it is assumed that if managerial 
performance is measured by means of high pay-performance sensitivity (for example by 
share prices), one should expect to observe managerial initiative to work hard and pursue 
lucrative, risky projects.  
 
However, high managerial ownership burdens managers relative to diversified small 
shareholders. According to Ross (2004) and Lewellen (2006) the more sensitive managerial 
pay is to a performance instrument, the more risk-averse the agent (or manager) becomes. 
This would imply that managers with high ownership stake in the firm become more risk 
averse, pursuing sub-optimal, less risky policies. A similar argument was used in the work of 
Bolton and von Tadden (1998) and Burkart et al. (1997) in the case of outsider concentration, 
pointing out that outsiders’ concentration makes owners risk-averse, restraining managers 
from risk-taking behaviour and/or initiative, and negatively affecting firm performance.   
                                                     
17For a detailed discussion on the pros and cons of managerial entrenched behaviour and whether they 
consistently pursue entrenched behaviour, especially in antitakeover measures, see Straska and Waller, 2013. 
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On the other hand, according to Morck et al. (1988), there is a non-monotonic but significant 
relationship between insider ownership concentration and firm performance: a positive 
relation can be expected at ownership levels below 5% and above 25%. However, in the 
medium range 5%-25% of managerial ownership, the entrenchment effect is stronger than the 
alignment effect inducing a negative impact on firm performance. The rationale behind this 
view is that at the low level of managerial ownership (below 5% for US firms), the managers’ 
position is very weak and the managerial labour market can punish managers who are not 
behaving in line with firm value maximization. On the other hand, a high level of managerial 
ownership would lead to aligning the interests of managers and shareholders (value 
maximization goal) because the benefits from a value maximizing goal overpowers 
entrenchment benefits. However, in the middle range (5% to 25%), benefits that managers 
could obtain by pursuing their own interests are higher than those obtained by firm value 
maximization, and in the middle range of managerial ownership, a negative impact on firm 
performance may be expected. Short and Keasey (1999) find that Morck’s threshold levels 
are too low in the case of UK companies, so they ran regressions with ranges of 10%-30% 
and 20%-40%, stressing that UK firms are smaller and less sensitive to wealth change in 
terms of increase and decrease of managerial ownership. These findings are similar to those 
of Cosh et al. (2001), Gugler et al. (2004), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Holderness et al. 
(1999), Alimehmeti and Paletta (2012), Gugler et al. (2008), etc., diverging mostly in terms 
of threshold levels. 
 
According to Gugler et al. (2003), it is very difficult and inaccurate to use one measure of 
insider ownership, usually the percentage of shares held by managers, if two different 
concepts - entrenchment and alignment of interest - are simultaneously present in the 
relationship. This issue becomes very important given that with the change of managerial 
ownership levels, their relative impact changes as well. Thus, Claessens et al. (2002) try to 
distinguish between two different variables: proxies for managerial ownership of which one 
captures only the entrenchment effect, while the other captures the incentive alignments 
effect.  
 
According to Gugler et al. (2003), the total value of managerial shareholdings is a good proxy 
for capturing incentive alignment. The rationale is that ownership concentration in the form 
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of a percentage shareholding does not take into consideration the size of a company. This 
means that an increase of 5% in insider managerial shareholding is, in terms of the 
percentage, to the same for a large as well a small company. However, this increase is 
significantly different if it means an increase of £50 mil. in the large company and £0.5 mil. 
in the small company. Conversely, the percentage of managerial ownership is a good proxy 
for capturing entrenchment effect. The logic behind this choice is that if the percentage of 
managerial shareholding increases, it is more difficult to control them, e.g., it is more difficult 
to “displace managers through takeover” or “vote them in a proxy contest”. Gugler et al. 
(2003) empirical results suggest that managerial entrenchment has a negative, significant 
effect on firm performance, while investment alignment has a significant positive affect on 
firm performance. However, in cases where shareholding rights are not equal to voting rights, 
using pyramidal holdings, i.e. the situation in most Continental European countries, this 
approach is not applicable. 
 
In summary, theoretical assumptions as well as empirical evidence of the negative and/or 
curvilinear relationship between (insider) ownership and firm performance is very rich and 
offers the evidence for the difference in the nature of the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance (linear vs. nonlinear) diverging primarily in the assessment 
of the managerial behaviour at higher ownership levels. This will be taken into consideration 
in Meta regression analysis in Chapter 3.  
 
 
2.3.3 The Neutrality Theory- Endogeneity of Ownership Structures 
 
The core explanation of the neutrality theory formulated by Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) is that there is a lack of a systematic relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance, i.e. ownership concentration adjusts itself to other firm and 
market condition variables –and therefore should be treated as endogenous. This theory 
questions the applicability of Bearle and Means’ (1932) idea of the separation of ownership 
and control, the presence and the magnitude of shareholders-managers' conflict and its 
resolution through ownership concentration. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990, p. 150) point out 
that if large shareholding  assures active monitoring that “could deter managers from securing 
benefits at the expense of shareholder, ”aligning their interest with those of management and 
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affecting firms’ performance in a positive way, then why do not all firms have large 
shareholders.” 
 
Using data from US companies, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) indicate that diffused ownership, 
characteristic of Anglo-Saxon countries, accept having disadvantages but these are 
counterbalanced with a set of advantages that manifest in value maximization behaviour.
18
 At 
its core, ownership structures (diffused or concentrated) that maximize expected returns 
(value maximization) are those that emerge from the interaction of market forces. According 
to the neutrality theory, the ownership structure of a firm reflects profit that maximizes the 
interest of shareholders, i.e., a conglomerate of those shareholders who own and who would 
like to own shares of the company, while the market for shares represents a catalyst for 
exchanging these profit maximizing preferences. Consequently, “the ownership structure of a 
corporation should be thought of as an endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the 
influence of shareholders,” (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001, p. 2) and no systematic 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance should be expected.   
 
Researchers supporting the neutrality theory have developed a number of explanations for the 
causes of the endogeneity of ownership structure. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) provided the most exhaustive theoretical background on the determinants 
of ownership structure and its endogeneity but their explanation of its cause remains 
(simultaneity and/or unobserved heterogeneity) will be explained in more detail in Chapter 4. 
On the other hand, Himmelberg et al. (1999) developed a theory on unobserved heterogeneity 
affecting both ownership structure and firm performance. Nonetheless, their theory is based 
on very restrictive assumptions (time invariant unobserved heterogeneity) and questionable 
econometric techniques (Fixed effect).
19
 Finally, Kole (1995) and Cho (1998) provide 
                                                     
18
 Cost of shirking, getting benefits from large ownership who invest in monitoring, or if there is no large 
shareholder getting poorer firm performance. 
 
19
This issue is analyzed in Chapter 4. In core, Himmelberg et al. (1999) provide extensive evidence in favour of 
the hypothesis that ownership concentration is endogenous due to unobserved, firm-specific heterogeneity (such 
as intangible assets, quality of monitoring technique of managers or market power). These affect both firm 
performance and ownership structure, thereby giving rise to an apparent yet nonetheless spurious relationship. 
At the same time, they model unobserved heterogeneity as a “firm Fixed effect” which, when included in an 
econometric specification, makes the relationship (between ownership concentration and firm performance) 
insignificant. On the other hand, Zhou (2001) argues that one-year changes in ownership are usually negligible 
and sporadic, which in turn are not likely to reflect within-year changes in firm performance. Instead, he 
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empirical results which are in favour of reverse causality being the source of endogeneity. 
Controlling for the endogeneity of ownership concentration is common in recent literature 
and can be easily controlled for using techniques such as the Instrumental Variable approach 
(IV) or General Method of Moments (GMM), as found in Javid and Iqbal (2008), Alonso-
Bonis and Andres-Alonso (2007), Damijan et al. (2004), Gugler et al. (2008), etc.  
 
We start with the theory presented by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) who were the first to highlight the idea that ownership should be treated as multi-
dimensional and endogenous. They argue that the agency problem explained by Berle and 
Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) is not very important in the context of a firm's 
performance, i.e., the manner in which share ownership is composed does not impact the 
quality of the firms’ performance. Demsetz’ Darwinian thesis of a superior corporate 
governance system being the outcome of fierce market competition argues that the “interplay 
of market forces” will determine a firm's performance while the ownership structure will be 
an “amalgam” of different shareholders with profit maximizing interests. This argument 
holds irrespective of owners’ identity and their relative stake, i.e., no matter whether the 
ownership structure is concentrated or dispersed (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001, pp. 210) or 
whether the largest shareholder is comprised of outsiders or insiders (Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001, pp. 215).  
 
To put this differently, they argue that shareholders will adopt the ownership pattern that 
maximizes expected return given the interplay of market forces affecting a particular firm. 
Furthermore, they explain that the “market succeeds in bringing forth ownership structures, 
diffused or concentrated, that are of approximate appropriateness for the firms they serve” 
(Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001, p. 231). Furthermore, the difference in the ownership 
structures is caused by a market environment that affects the firm (economies of scale, the 
type of the industry, level of regulation, etc.). If the market was perfect, a systematic 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, would not exist. However, 
they argue that although the market is far from perfect, it still is not so “imperfect” to create 
                                                                                                                                                                     
highlights the cross-sectional characteristic of (managerial) ownership structure: while ownership structure 
differs substantially from firm to firm, it hardly changes over time. In this case, because the Fixed effect 
estimator uses only within-group variation, it is inherently unable to yield efficient estimates of relatively 
unchanging ownership. 
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this relationship. In addition, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) provide an explanation for a set of 
market driven variables that affect ownership structure in the environment of an imperfect 
market, such as: firm size, amenity potential, level of market uncertainty, etc. 
 
Although, Demstz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) have presented a 
novel and important view on the relationship and insisting and the endogeneity of ownership 
structure, their theory also has a number of shortcomings. We can argue that by neglecting 
the agency problem, the identity of shareholders, or more precisely their interests, they 
underminethe importance of the corporate governance type. The neutrality theory is based on 
the so-called “ex-post rationalization” as explained by Zingales (2000). The market indeed 
determines firm performance, however, the market is an “ex post” evaluator of a firm’s 
competitiveness and comparative advantage. This comparative advantage reflects, among 
other things, the efficiency of corporate governance systems employed in the firm. Therefore, 
ownership structure should not be neglected, i.e., we could argue that an “amalgam of 
shareholders” or a better amalgam of potential investors interests is determined by the 
relative competitiveness of the firm.   
 
Our first comment on Demsetz' theory is that agency problem cannot be ignored when 
investigating the relationship. The neutrality theory cannot be universally applied in all types 
of corporate governance systems. Irrespective of whether we talk about concentrated or 
dispersed ownership, different shareholders have different interests which have an effect on 
the firm’s performance. Thus, not only that ownership matters, but the identity of 
shareholders matters as well. We argue that the type of corporate governance system and the 
identity of the prevailing or dominant shareholder will have an impact on firm performance. 
In the case of dispersed ownership where the “amalgam” of the shareholder is very 
diversified, synergetic influence on firm performance may not exist. However, in the case of 
continental European countries, where the “amalgam of shareholders” is much more 
concentrated, we could expect a significant impact of outsider ownership concentration on 
firm performance. 
 
The rationale for Demsetz’s critique is that market mediation theory could be applied in 
conditions where a stock market is developed and liquidity and ownership is dispersed. In 
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that case, the “amalgam of shareholders” is very diversified, and a significant proportionof 
shareholders is speculation driven with no incentive for long-term attachment or active 
involvement in a firm’s activities. In that case, the product market as well as the stock market 
could be explained as theperfect catalyst of shareholders preferences. However, do the same 
standards apply to companies in Continental Europe? Here, large owners that are exposed to 
risks are closely involved in strategic the decision-making process concerning a firm’s 
activities. Consequently, a significant relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance can be expected, whether positive (Gugler and Weigand, 2003) or negative 
(Wahla et al., 2012). The work of Gugler and Weigand (2003), Pindado and Torre (2004), 
etc. support the thesis that the ownership concentration and firm performance relationship 
works outdifferently in the case of German companies compared to US companies. 
 
The second issue represents the relative importance that the identity of shareholder has for the 
relationship. Although Demsetz argues that the behaviour of managers in companies with 
dispersed ownership is irrelevant for the firm performance, he is among the first scholars to 
point out the importance in dividing outsiders and insiders when investigating this 
relationship. This very relevant issue will be analysed further in Chapter 3. We argue that the 
identity of owners matters when investigating the relationship, especially because of its 
importance in solving agency problem and difference in behaviour of outsider and insider as 
shareholders. 
 
Finally, the third question we raise is connected with the econometric techniques that are 
applied. Namely, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) in their empirical research using  2SLS 
estimation do not provide any convincing test for the endogeneity of ownership 
concentration. In the robust test and the results obtained, they fail to conduct, for example, 
the Durbin Wu-Hausman test which could provide a clear picture of the potential endogeneity 
of ownership structure. Also, although the IV approach successfully solves the errors-in-
variables problem (Wooldridge, 2000, p. 461). Furthermore, an important drawback of 
performing IV estimation is “when x and the error term are uncorrelated, the asymptotic 
variance of the IV estimator is always larger than the asymptotic variance of the OLS 
estimator”, (Wooldridge, 2000, p. 466). Hence, the standard errors on IV estimates are likely 
to be larger than OLS estimates. Therefore, one may assume that in 2SLS, inflated standard 
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errors would lead toward less significant coefficients. This argument is explained in more 
detail in Chapter 4.  
 
The second seminal empirical research which is based on the neutrality theory was conducted 
by Himmelberg et al. (1999). Unlike Demsetz, Himmelberg et al. (1999) do not deny the 
importance of the agency problem but emphasize the importance of unobserved heterogeneity 
in contracting environments across countries, industries and firms-which explains the absence 
of a relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. Moreover, the 
unobserved heterogeneity also leads to differences in insider ownership structures across 
firms. Consequently, insider ownership concentration should be treated endogenously, i.e., 
the relationship does not exist but is being “built” on the basis of unobservable variables, 
affecting both insider ownership and firm performance. 
 
The sample used in this study is based on the US corporate governance system, taking into 
account existence of ownership diversification and supported by the sound protection of 
minority shareholders. Moreover, Himmelberg et al. (1999, p. 355) provided an explanation 
of the variables used to control for moral hazard such as: advertising intensity, R&D 
intensity, cash flow, and investment rate and price variability. 
 
However, Himmelberg et al. (1999) based their analysis on a set of very restrictive 
assumptions that have a significant impact on their results. It can be argued that these 
assumptions are questionable. The first issue is the appropriateness of the Fixed Effect 
estimator for investigating the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. According to Zhou (2001), a meaningful relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance will be hard to find when using Fixed Effect (FE) 
estimator. This estimator ignores changes taking place within the firm, i.e., it does not take 
into account the changes in insider ownership concentration within the firm over time; it only 
takes into account variation between firms. In that respect, very valuable information which 
can be useful in explaining the relationship is lost. By removing all cross sectional variation 
across the firms, it will be very unlikely that a significant relationship could be observed 
between ownership concentration and firm performance. In other words, the Fixed Effect 
estimator will not be able to capture a very important view that “managerial ownership 
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incentives are important for firm performance,” Zhou (2001, p. 560), where managerial 
ownership incentives are materialized by an increase in their shareholding (ownership) over 
years.  
 
The second issue is related again to the appropriateness of using FE estimator for examining 
the ownership-performance relationship. This could also  arise not only because of its 
inability to involve cross section variation, but because of its biased measurement error 
observed by Grilliches and Hausman (1986) which leads to over-rejection of the ‘no 
correlation’ hypothesis between ownership concentration variables and unobserved 
heterogeneity, i.e., this shortcoming of the FE estimator encourages results in support of the 
endogeneity assumption. In order to provide a check for robustness of the results obtained by 
the FE estimator (faced with limitations), Himmelberg et al. (1999) attempted to use an 
instrumental variable approach as an alternative to FE, but they find these results tentative 
because of weak instruments. 
 
The third very sensitive  issues on which the Himmelberg’s theory is based, is that 
unobserved heterogeneity represents a FE, i.e. it is time invariant. This is a very important 
element of the endogeneity argument because its proof is based on the existence of a 
correlation between time invariant unobserved heterogeneity and firm performance. In their 
regression, they account for observable firm characteristics (firm size, advertisement costs, 
etc.), and if unobserved heterogeneity is assumed a constant, then it would mean that 
managerial contracting environment is unchanged. If there is no change in the contractual 
environment, there is no change in managerial contracts (incentives) across firms, i.e., the 
assumption of the endogeneity of insider ownership concentration becomes unnecessary. 
 
Overall, we can conclude that by using FE, Himmelberg et al. (1999) progressed the debated 
by comparing research that uses cross-sectional OLS and 2SLS estimations. At the same 
time, they do not undermine the issue of agency problem, rather, they emphasize the role of 
unobserved heterogeneity in a contracting environment which affects insider ownership 
concentration and firm performance, causing the endogeneity (between insider ownership 
concentration and firm performance). We should stress the importance expected long-term 
interest of (insider) owners and expected long–term performance, explained by Zhou (2001), 
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that is missing in the case when FE estimator is used. Therefore, a dynamic panel data 
estimator could efficiently capture dynamic of the potential relationship and could be 
considered as a desirable estimation technique in comparison to Fixed Effects.   
 
Finally, the third group of studies supporting the neutrality theory is focused on the reverse 
causality as the main cause of the endogeneity of ownership concentration. Cho (1998) and 
Kole (1995) are the most representative empirical research in this area. Cho (1998) argues 
that there is reverse causality between ownership and performance stressing a three 
dimensional assumption that insider ownership has an impact on investment (i.e., capital 
expenditure), which in turn affects corporate performance. Controlling for endogeneity in 
simultaneous equations using 2SLS, he finds that investment positively affects corporate 
value, which affects positively insider ownership. He assumes that insider ownership is very 
sensitive to firm value and investment opportunities; which mean that managerial ownership 
will increase in the firms with better investment opportunities translated in better firm 
performance. This assumption coincides with the assumption of Murphy (1985), who argues 
that “ownership structure can represent an endogenous outcome of the compensation 
contracting process,” Cho (1998, p. 106). He argues that investment is the connecting 
element between insider ownership concentration and firm performance and mutually affects 
both of them (directly or indirectly). However, except for this point which is to a certain 
extent expected, he fails to provide any systematic explanation regarding the endogeneity of 
insider ownership. 
 
In the sample used by Cho (cross section data from 1991), the mean value of insider 
ownership is 12.14%, significantly higher than that in the Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
which was 3% (for a similar sample for the period 1976-1980). This supports Coffee’s (2005) 
observation that substantial increase of insider ownership in the US companies occurred in 
the late 1980s and 1990s. However, if we look closely at Cho’s sample, the standard 
deviation is very high (18.1) and median is 4.45%, which explains that half of the firms 
included in the sample have quite low insiders stake (lower than 5%). Consequently, we 
could argue that the choice of the companies in the sample (taking into account that Fortune 
500 includes the largest publicly traded companies with very diversified ownership structure) 
can have a very important role in the obtained results. On the other hand, starting from the 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) conclusion of the shareholders’ risk adverse behaviour in large 
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firms, Kole (1995) develops the hypothesis of reverse causality, suggesting that managers in 
high performance firms will prefer higher equity stakes using stock-based compensation 
schemes. However, both of them concentrated heavily on empirical research and failed to 
provide any systematic explanation on the reverse causality as a potential reason for the 
endogeneity of insider ownership.  
 
The endogeneity of ownership structure is an assumption that is almost without exception 
taken into consideration in recent empirical literature. This issue, which strongly divides the 
empirical evidence, would be coded in the Meta regression analysis (see next Chapter). 
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2.4 Ownership concentration and firm performance: Theory and Evidence from 
Transition Economies (TEs) 
 
This subsection provides a review of the empirical literature concerning the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance in transition economies (henceforth 
TE). The ownership structures in developed and TEs diverge in their nature and conditions of 
development as well as in distribution, deepness of adjustments, speed and institutional 
framework in which they have developed. In general, TEs embarked on structural and 
political reforms aimed at macroeconomic stabilization and microeconomic restructuring. 
These countries are distinguished primarily by their relatively “high level of human capital, 
initial lack of wealth in private domestic hands, and a heritage of anti-entrepreneurialism,” 
(Estrin et al., 2009, p. 1). One of the dominant characteristics of TEs is the speed of 
ownership structural change, underpinned by each country’s specific privatisation design.  
 
In the context of TEs, we highlight two factors that predominantly affect patterns of 
ownership structure: (i) privatization, i.e. the process transferring the ownership rights in 
formerly state owned or socially owned enterprises and (ii) the gradual development of a 
corporate governance framework and its interrelation with ownership concentrations 
(perceived mostly as substitutes rather than complements, McGee, 2008; Lazarova, 2008). In 
this subsection, the following will be addressed: first, how privatization affects ownership 
concentration; second, whether ownership concentration fills the gap resulting from the 
absence of corporate governance mechanism and if so how; and third, what is the leading 
agency problem triggered by high ownership concentration (private benefits of control, 
expropriation of minority shareholders in TE).  
 
 
2.4.1 Privatisation and its implication for ownership structures in TEs 
 
Privatization is perceived as a core element of the transition process that should, among other 
benefits, improve corporate governance and firms’ efficiency (Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
In fact, privatization, perceived as the transfer of ownership rights (from the state to private 
owners), is seen as crucial for the efficient allocation of resources and long-term economic 
growth (Estrin et al., 2009). However, it is difficult to compare different countries given the 
differences in the speed of the privatization, the methods of privatization and  the initial 
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conditions. Namely, the differences in ownership concentration patterns across TE are 
primarily caused (among other relevant factors) by differences in: (i) privatization speed and 
sequencing; (ii) privatization methods, and (iii) initial conditions of institutional settings and 
their evolution. A general premise is that privatisation should create new and efficient 
ownership structures. However, the empirical evidence does not firmly indicate efficiency 
and optimal distributional effects of different privatisation methods. For example, some 
privatisation methods have a prominent dimension of social fairness, while others contribute 
to the development of the capital market (voucher privatisation) which may not coincide with 
the creation of sound corporate governance systems. 
 
Concerning the speed of privatization, according to Simoneti et al. (2005), “the ideal 
privatization strategy is to transfer assets as rapidly as possible to concentrated owners 
through open, fair and transparent methods.”20 In essence, “big-bangers”– academics support 
the premise that fast extensive privatisation and reforms are leading to efficient ownership 
structures (De Melo et al., 2001; Sachs, 1996; Aslund, 2002). A general strategy of most TEs 
was to privatize a large number of firms as soon as possible (Estrin, 1994). This strategy 
takes into account goals such as fast price liberalization, the withdrawal of the state from  
intervention with its less than optimal decision making, and achieving desired political 
stability (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1991; Shleifer and Treisman, 2005) or the prevention of 
asset stripping by managers and/or employees in the environment when property rights are 
not well defined and enforced (Frydman et al., 1993). The second group consists of 
“Gradualists” (Stiglitz, 2000; Popov, 2000; Popov, 2007; Burawoy, 1996, etc.) who argue 
that if privatisation is not accompanied by gradual and systematic institutional reforms, its 
implementation may have the detrimental effect of incentivizing new ownership structures’ 
perverse behaviours. As noted previously, various aspects of privatisation, if neglected by 
authorities that carry it out, may hamper its success at the country level and threaten 
accomplishment of its purpose: creating owners that will behave like “an active owner who 
could take responsibility for the enterprise and make a contribution to its equity,” (Baltowski 
and Mickiewicz, 2000, p. 435). Similarly, according Laban and Wolf (1993), Roland (1994), 
Bogetic and Conte (1992) and Ahuja and Majumdar (1998) “big-bang” fast, privatization 
does not appear to be easy and feasible, especially when it comes to the privatization of large 
companies. Furthermore, Portes (1991) challenge the“big-bang” approach arguing that it has 
                                                     
20
Transition – The first ten years: analysis and lessons for Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, The World 
Bank; 2002 (pp. 72-73). 
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high reversal costs in cases when early reforms have been unsuccessful. Moreover, a “big-
bang” approach does not prepare a country’s business environment for sequence-based 
reforms especially when reforms are unpopular or create instability.  
 
On the whole, there is no consensus in the literature regarding the privatisation method and/or 
design that can be declared as the most efficient. For example, Protsiv (2008), in the case of 
Ukraine, finds that the direct share to investors out performs other types of privatisation 
methods and positively affected labour productivity growth. Ellerman (1993), Stiglitz (2000) 
and Weitzman (1993) were strong supporters of privatisation to management and employees, 
while Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994), and Lipton and Sachs (1990) argued that 
privatization to outsiders is the most effective method of privatisation. Mass voucher 
privatisation (henceforth MVP) can be described as a “genuine and radical transfer of 
ownership rights to the broad public” (Lewandowski and Szomburg, 1989, p. 72). There is a 
general assumption that MVP is able to achieve at least three groups of goals: (i) social 
fairness; (ii) political support by the general public to the process of economic 
transformation; and (iii) finding effective owners through the rapid creation of transitory 
initial owners who would sell their shares to privately-managed privatization funds and 
skilled-strategic investors (Lieberman et al., 2003). However, it appears that irrespective of 
the privatisation methods used and the differences in proclaimed motives for privatisation, 
the economic systems and ownership patterns of former socialist countries will remain 
similar for some time (Baltowski and Mickiewicz, 2000). 
 
Similar divisions exists between those researchers that consider the importance of the initial 
institutional setting and/or liberalisation as a key factor for success of the 
privatisation/transition process (for full discussion see Godoy and Stiglitz, 2006; De Melo et 
al., 2001; Krueger and Ciolko, 1998, Heybey and Murrell, 1999) and those who acknowledge 
the importance of initial conditions for the success of privatisation but do not find them 
significant (Moers, 1999; Grogan and Moers, 2001). 
 
In any case, the privatisation methods that were implemented at a faster or a slower pace with 
more or less success, contributed to the emergence of (private) ownership structures that 
were, as Grosfeld and Hashi (2007, p. 2) argue, “a precondition for the emergence of the 
market environment.” Changes in ownership structures facilitated strong firm restructuring, 
leading to similar ownership structures across most TEs. The first common characteristic of 
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all TEs, and especially in the context of a wide range of privatization methods, is that the 
initial allocation of ownership rights was exogenous and according to the large empirical 
literature suboptimal (inefficient- for full discussion see Djankov and Murrell, 2002; 
Megginson, 2005; Hamm, King and Stucker, 2012; etc.). Privatisation designs and rules 
prevented adjustment of ownership (by participating agents) to firm characteristics (Claessens 
and Djankov, 1999). The second common characteristic is that the concentration of 
ownership of different groups (banks, privatisation investment funds, individuals, other 
private domestic/foreign companies, etc.) occurred irrespective of the privatisation method 
used. The third characteristic is that ownership concentration emerged in countries with 
relatively weak corporate governance frameworks, where the speed of institutional changes 
was generally slow. A general assumption is that the emergence of post-privatisation block-
holdings was a unanimous response of owners to the deficiency of investors’ protection 
framework. This is in line with Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who argue that ownership 
concentration can counterbalance the deficiencies of weak institutions. Therefore, in the 
absence of corporate governance instruments designed for effective monitoring in developed 
economies, ownership concentration is used as a means of control of management and 
maximization of firm value. This is an idea in line with views of Berle and Means (1932), 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Megginson et al. (1994). 
However, while ownership concentration may subdue one agency problem, in the absence of 
an effective institutional framework, it will escalate another - the expropriation of minority 
shareholders. In an environment where minority shareholders are not protected, there are 
limited ways to prevent large shareholders from extracting a firm’s value without sharing it 
with other shareholders, i.e. to extract private benefits for control. This may result in the 
negative impact of ownership concentration on firm performance.  
 
Although the empirical literature was able to illustrate the positive impact of ownership 
concentration in TEs (especially of certain ownership groups), numerous studies warn of the 
presence of minority shareholders expropriation. Therefore, we divide these studies into two 
groups: (i) those focusing on the impact of the ownership concentration on firm performance 
(a substitute for corporate governance), and (ii) studies focusing on the identity of the largest 
shareholder and its efficiency in respect to firm performance. 
 
There is a strong rationale to review this literature separately from empirical literature in 
developed economies. In developed economies, the resolution of the agency problem and the 
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corporate governance mechanisms depend upon whether the largest owners are insiders or 
outsiders. In TEs it is important to consider whether the largest owner is the state, a foreign or 
domestic entity, an individual, a family, a privatization/investment fund, a financial 
institution has a controlling stake (emerging mostly as a result of underdeveloped corporate 
governance framework. Some of the empirical literature covers both aspects simultaneously: 
the impact of different owners’ identities combined with the analysis of the level of 
concentration and the impact on firm performance. Both will be empirically analysed in the 
context of Montenegro in Chapter 4. 
 
 
2.4.2 The largest shareholder and firm performance 
 
It is generally agreed in the literature that the process of privatization in TEs was followed by 
the development of corporate governance, the legal and institutional framework that would 
help assure easy access to capital markets, increase firm efficiency and support better firm 
performance. It has been argued by some authors (e.g., Babic, 2003) that corporate 
governance in TEs should not blindly follow the corporate governance frameworks of 
developed economies, but rather their adoption should ensure a gradual process with high 
sensibility to country specifics. Others have pointed out that the process of privatization 
ensured that foreign firms with capacities such as transferring managerial know-how, 
bringing in additional investments and providing new market access, brought with them a 
“relatively advanced system of corporate governance”, which “compensates to a considerable 
extent for the underdeveloped legal and institutional system in many transition economies” 
(Estrin et al., 2007, p. 37). However, given that the transition process in most cases was 
gradual
21
, the main characteristic of TEs was, by default, “weak” institutions of corporate 
governance, accompanied by inadequately developed and/or ineffectively enforced property 
rights and underdeveloped capital markets (Acemoglu et al., 2002).  
 
Many authors have argued that that in TEs, poor corporate governance and the absence of an 
effective institutional framework (especially in areas associated with property rights 
enforcement) leads the investors to fill the corporate governance vacuum by concentrating 
                                                     
21
The prevailing empirical literature postulates that the privatization is one of the process that prerequisites for 
successful transition, which is predominantly dependent on systemic changes and policy reforms (Lipton and 
Sachs, 1990; Blanchard et al., 1991; Aghion and Blanchard, 1994). 
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their ownership (Lazarova, 2008; McGee, 2008). Large owners should have enough power to 
exercise tight control over managers’ behaviour, forcing them to align their interest with the 
interest of owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Frydman et al., 1997). However, part of the 
literature strongly suggests that ownership concentration in the context of TEs is “nothing but 
the second-best solution in response to a problem of weak institutional framework”, (McGee, 
2008, p. 325). Even if we put aside the implicit costs of ownership concentration present in 
developed economies, such as destruction of managerial initiative and risk-taking behaviour 
(Burkart et al. 1997; Burkart and Panunzi, 2001; Pagano and Roell, 1998; Aghion and Tirole, 
1997) or lowered stock market liquidity (Bolton and von Thadden, 1998), the key weakness 
of ownership concentration as a substitute for poor corporate governance remains the 
escalation of the “private benefits of control” due to poor protection of small shareholder (La 
Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 1999; Wolfenzon, 1999; Bebchuk et al., 1999; Modigliani 
and Perotti, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
Following Stiglitz (2000), Hamm, King and Stuckler (2012, p. 299) argue that TEs with weak 
institutional settings experienced poor economic performance and corruption mainly “due to 
information asymmetries and lack of an effective governance framework, the new private 
owners had the incentive and opportunity to pursue rent-seeking and asset-stripping.”22 The 
expropriation of minority shareholders by large owners takes many forms starting from 
investment misallocation, related party transactions combined with various forms of revenue, 
or “asset tunnelling” such as asset striping or transfer pricing (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Filatotchev and Mickiewicz, 2001). Given the strong incentive of post-privatisation owners to 
expropriate minority shareholders, because they find it easier easier to expropriate than 
provide extra effort to secure future economic returns, the question that inevitably arises is: 
how can different ownership structures (concentration) in TEs effectively compensate for the 
deficiency in governance and minimize expropriation of small shareholders? Therefore, 
empirical researches based on TEs is not solely focused on the agency problem of entrenched 
behaviour of managers who distance themselves from objectives set by owners once 
ownership and management control is divided. This problem has been extensively addressed 
primarily through the experiences of developed economies. However, the core agency 
                                                     
22
Similarly, Stiglitz (1985) argue that: “ownership concentration may trigger agency problems, namely, 
potential expropriation of minority shareholders by large post-privatization ownership structures within a 
deficient institutional framework (especially evident in enforcement of property rights and corporate 
governance).”22 
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problem, analysed extensively in TE literature, emerges in the form of a clear opportunity for 
the expropriation of minority shareholders by large block holders. 
 
However, this view is challenged by another line of research arguing that firms in countries 
with underdeveloped country–level corporate governance mechanism will react to lack of 
corporate governance deficiency by imposing better, stricter corporate governance 
mechanisms at the firm level on their own initiative (e.g. independently increasing disclosure, 
imposing disciplinary measures for managers, creation of reliable boards, etc). These 
practices would counterbalance the weakness of the laws at the national level and send 
signals to investors that these firms offer better protection of investors’ rights, something 
which should speed up investment inflows (Klapper et al., 2004; Easterbrook and Fischel, 
1991; Black and Gilson, 1998). Moreover, according to Doidge et al. (2004), by creatinga 
sound governance practice at firm level, the controlling shareholders willingly hand over 
their benefits of control, positively affecting firm performance. In sum, the literature conveys 
the impression that in the context of TEs, privatization and development of corporate 
governance will impact patterns of ownership concentration, which in itself is not a 
prerequisite for improved firm performance.  
 
The richness and diversity of theoretical views on how large owners behave in a weak 
governance setting is shown by the inconclusive and diverse empirical evidence (see Table 
A2.1 in the Appendix 2.1 for a summary of a large number of empirical investigations on the 
ownership concentration-firm performance relationship in TEs). The evidence is divided 
between those studies whose findings justify and acknowledge merits of ownership 
concentration as a potent instrument for both efficient management control and compensation 
for weak corporate governance framework whilst minimizing expropriation and those in 
which the post-privatisation ownership concentration is portrayed as a means of depriving 
minority shareholders from getting an adequate return on their investment. Some of the 
literature provides mixed evidence in which only certain types of ownership structures may 
be used as an efficient instrument to mitigate agency problem and minimise the expropriation 
of minority shareholders while positively affecting firm performance.  
 
In order to systematize empirical evidence from TEs, we focus on country-level studies rather 
than time-horizon criteria (studies capturing short, medium or long-term effects or ownership 
concentration following privatisation) or type of econometric technique used. Studies at the 
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country level should capture country-specific institutional framework (corporate governance 
setting) and its evolution. If institutional frameworks were well captured, it would be possible 
to filter common country level characteristics of the pre-privatisation institutional setting and 
the potential speed of its development/adjustment. Furthermore, given the still large diversity 
of country level studies,we concentrate on a selected number of the most noted empirical 
studies on the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and some of the successor states 
of former Yugoslavia which had similar institutional background and pre-privatization 
ownership structure (Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). This will 
provide the rationale for the hypotheses proposed for Montenegro that will be tested in 
Chapter 4. A shorter summary of these and other studies are provided in Table A2.1 in 
Appendix 2.1. 
 
The Czech Republic was the first country to implement a mass voucher privatisation (MVP) 
and therefore its experience has been the subject of more studies than other countries. The 
empirical evidence on Czech MVP is very diverse; reflecting the differences in the periods 
covered (during privatisation, shortly after privatisation or long-term perspective) and the 
econometric methods applied. One of the earliest attempts to investigate the impact of 
ownership concentration on performance is the paper by Claessens, Djankov and Pohl (1997) 
which covered the early MVP period (1992-1995) for a cross section of 706 firms, using OLS 
and Random Effect estimators. Although they find that a more concentrated ownership is 
associated with better performance (a higher market valuation and profitability), they 
acknowledge that “large owners in general have opportunities to expropriate value, as 
minority shareholders are not well protected given the weak court system in the Czech 
Republic” (p. 6). Furthermore, they admit that in the case of large foreign ownership, there is 
the potential for expropriation of minority shareholders through off-market transfer pricing 
between the subsidiary and its foreign owners, leading to dilution of the claims of minority 
owners and overall lower profitability. Using a sample of 392 firms over the period 1993-
1996, Cull, Matesova, and Shirley (2002) maintain that the Mass voucher privatisation 
contributed to asset stripping, tunnelling and dynamic “looting” of the type analysed by 
Akerlof and Romer (1993)
23
, given that many joint stock companies in that period had 
privileged access to soft credit from state controlled banks. 
                                                     
23
Akerlof and Romer (1993) put forward the idea of ‘bankruptcy for profit’, when “poor accounting, lax 
regulation, or low penalties for abuse give owners an incentive to pay themselves more than  their firms are 
worth and then default on their debt obligations” (p. 2). 
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A study by Weiss and Nikitin (1998) provides evidence for the opposite view: the poor 
performance of voucher privatization in the Czech Republic was caused by the failure to 
concentrate ownership to provide effective control over managers. However, Weiss and 
Nikitin (1998) acknowledge the presence of tunnelling, whereby the dominant owners 
expropriate the minority shareholders and tunnel the assets into a ﬁrm or account they fully 
control. Kocenda and Svejnar (2003), using panel-data from the post privatization period with 
potential to observe medium-term effects of strategic restructuring, maintain that the lack of a 
positive profit effect among virtually all types of domestic owners is consistent with the large 
shareholder “looting” at the expense of small shareholders. 
 
Hanousek, Kocenda and Svejnar (2007) using an unbalanced panel of 1,540 medium and 
large companies for the period 1996-1999 (after mass voucher privatisation), find that only in 
some instances and for selected performance indicators the effect of concentrated ownership 
on firm performance to be positive or neutral. This finding is in line with the the predictions 
of the agency theory (that better monitoring through ownership concentration may improve 
firm performance) and not in line with those theories predicting a positive effects for 
managerial autonomy. The authors share the concern of Claessens, Djankov, and Pohl (1997) 
that “in an underdeveloped legal and institutional setting, any one type of ownership could be 
associated with managers or key shareholders “looting” the firms, directly or through transfer 
pricing” (p. 9).  
 
Brown, Earle and Telgedy (2004) examine the impact of large block holders on firm 
performance in Hungary, using a sample of 168 firms for the period 1996 to 2001, using the 
fixed effect method to control for unobserved heterogeneity. They find that only when the 
share of the largest shareholder is used as the measure of ownership concentration, there is a 
positive, statistically significant effect on corporate performance. Their evidence suggests 
that the largest owner can be used as a viable instrument for management control and 
incentive alignment. Additional block-holdings have statistically insignificant or negative 
coefficients. This diminishing return to additional ownership concentration is explained by 
two potential factors. First, too many large shareholders can be involved in disagreement over 
strategic decisions in the firm, leading to blocking and negotiating joint decisions, i.e. 
creating “too many cooks” that can lead to suboptimal results. Second, the cost of 
concentration is reflected in reduced liquidity and informational value of the share price. 
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Empirical studies from Slovenia are divided between those that acknowledge that large 
block-holders have a positive impact on firm performance and those that acknowledge the 
potential for the extraction of private benefits of control in the institutional settings of the 
country. Damijan, Gregoric and Prasnikar (2004), using a sample of 150 large and medium-
sized Slovenian firms, applying OLS and GMM, argue that  concentration by large block-
holder might have a positive effect on firm performance. However, additional block-holdings 
do not help with monitoring and instead within a firm, it actually tends to reduce the firm 
value. These findings resemble those in the work of Brown, Earle and Telgedy (2004) for 
Hungarian firms, indicating that too many large shareholders can have a negative impact on 
firm performance. 
 
Brezigar, Gregoric and Zajc (2006) add to the discussion of block-holder motivation by 
investigating how ownership patterns in Slovenian firms affected firm performance in the 
post-privatisation period. They describe the creation of large block holders in Slovenian firms 
as a control contest between insiders and outsiders, and among different types of 
heterogeneous outsiders. They find that large block-holders in non-listed firms have a 
positive effect on firm performance, regardless of homogeneity or heterogeneity. On the other 
hand, in the case of listed firms, when two of the largest owners are homogenous, they 
perform poorly. However, unlike the findings in Gregoric and Vespro (2009), they argue that 
the poor performance of firms with two large shareholders is not due to poor collaboration. 
Instead, two large shareholders are more likely to form a coalition, showing rent seeking 
behaviour, interested in extraction of private benefits of control (this is especially visible in 
the case of  the largest owners are investment funds).   
 
Empirical evidence from Croatia is almost unanimous in detecting the extraction of private 
benefits of control by large owners. This behaviour of block-holders was captured, for the 
first time, in the empirical results of Micela Pop and Le Maux (2006). Using the data for 484 
companies listed at the Varazdin, and Zagreb Stock Exchanges during 2000-2003, and 
employing OLS and Fixed Effect methods, they find that Croatian firms display signs of 
increasing agency conflicts when more power is given to a single shareholder. Firms start to 
perform better only if additional large shareholders, comparable in size, are present. Given 
that they were unable to observe similar behaviour in the case of Romania, Micela Pop and 
Le Maux (2006) ascribe this country-level difference to the quality of legal protection offered 
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to minority shareholders due to the fact that Romania, compared to Croatia, was much closer 
to the alignment of its legislation to EU standards in that period. 
 
Pervan, Pervan and Todoric (2012) using an unbalanced panel of listed Croatian firms from 
the Zagreb Stock Exchange covering the 2003-2010 period, applied a Generalized Method of 
Moments estimation method and found a consistent negative relationship between ownership 
concentration (top four largest owners) and firm performance (ROA). They argue that the 
results confirm the entrenchment hypothesis by which the management of internally 
controlled firms expropriate small stockholders. The mechanism that facilitates expropriation 
of minority shareholders, they argue, lies in a low level of investor protection, evidenced in 
sluggish sub-index of strength of investor protection in Croatia’s Doing Business index.24 
 
According to Dharwadkar, George and Brandes (2000) the potential for expropriation varies 
in different governance structures. Only large dominant outside owners are able to replicate 
the effectiveness of the governance characteristics of developed economies when it comes to 
efficient monitoring of managers. If dominant ownership structures consist of non-controlling 
owners, the overall effectiveness decreases due to higher coordination costs (McDonald, 
1993) and/or lack of disclosure norms and intermediaries who gather information for non-
controlling owners (Khanna and Palepu, 1999). However, aligning the behaviour of managers 
through monitoring and control does not prevent dominant outsiders from disregarding the 
interest of minority shareholders. According to Dharwadkar, George and Brandes (2000), 
only dominant foreign owners are able to subdue the possibility of extraction of private 
benefits of control. They assume that dominant foreign owners will be under greater 
government scrutiny than domestic owners that are already well presented in a local social 
environment. A dominant foreign investor will more likely refrain from transfer pricing and 
profit repatriation (Fraedrick and Bateman, 1996).  
 
Summing up the empirical evidence from TEs, it is clear  that monitoring capabilities of 
block-holders, trying to resolve agency problem associated with entrenched managers in the 
absence of standard corporate governance tools, is not counterbalanced by another agency 
problem- the expropriation of minority shareholder. It is particularly important to note the 
                                                     
24
Sub-index of strength of investor protection of Croatia’s Doing Business index, remains low (4 on the scale 0-
10) over the period 2006-2011.  
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high premiums paid by large block-holders in Slovenia, which indicates the potential 
motivation for the extraction of private benefits of control. Similarly, the evidence from 
Croatia is undivided in finding a negative impact from ownership concentration on firm 
performance, indicating a weak institutional setting for the protection of minority 
shareholders. Therefore, when it comes to the investigation of the Montenegrin companies, it 
is difficult to put forwad the hypothesis that ownership concentration is a powerful 
monitoring tool positively affecting firm performance. More so it is evident (Cerovic, 2010) 
that Montenegro, a country that shared inherited initial institutional conditions with Slovenia 
and Croatia, is still lagging behind its potential (given the initial conditions) in the area of 
institutional building. 
 
 
2.4.3 Identity of the largest shareholder and firm performance 
 
Another issue of interest in the literature exploring ownership concentration and firm 
performance in TE is whether the type of owner who acquires a large block for shares during 
the privatization process matters. There are two aspects of ownership identity: difference 
according to the organizational structure of the owners (financial institutions, privatization 
funds, workers, mangers, other companies, individuals, etc.) and whether the owner is 
domestic investor, foreign investor or the state.
25
 There is much heterogeneity in the 
empirical literature analysing the impact of types of dominant owners emerging from the 
privatization programmes and firm performance. Here we shall briefly discuss some of the 
main qualitative surveys (Djankov and Murrell, 2000; Estrin et al., 2009; Ticha, 2012) and 
some that have been the subject of Meta-analysis by Djankov and Murrell (2002).
26
 Table 
                                                     
25
The first aspect is much more difficult to compare across countries, given that roles of some of them (for 
example privatisation –investment funds, workers, financial institutions) have different roles  in different 
privatization schemes implemented and were created and/or used with different purposes ( e.g. the role of 
banking sector in Poland and the Czech Republic). 
26Issues such as: (i) endogeneity of ownership concentration, (ii) the level of development of capital markets, 
(iii) the sophistication of potential investors, (iv) the type of privatisation schemes, sequence of the privatisation 
on the institutions state are carrying privatisation (Baltowski and Mickiewicz, 2000), (v) the strength of the 
existing private sector and market-based institutions, (vi) a bias in the choice of companies sold to private 
owners, i.e., usually the best and most productive (Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski, 1999; Salis, 2006), (vii) 
studies’ reliance on short time periods with observations gathered immediately before and after privatization 
which may capture only short term effects; are just some of the aspects that are usually missed or partially 
missed that should be controlled in the literature. Indeed, providing empirical evidence, or its narrative review of 
the literature, is highly inconclusive and hardly comparable. There is a clear need for the Meta regression 
analysis (MRA) on the literature that would help produce an unbiased effect size comparable across studies. 
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A2.1 in the Appendix 2.1, also summarises the features of many other studies referring to the 
performance of enterprises with particular types of dominant owners. 
 
In terms of the effectiveness of different types of owners, Djankov and Murrell (2000) 
conducted the most comprehensive qualitative analysis using 23 studies to compile a data set 
depicting the effects on restructuring of different types of owners. Comparing 11 different 
types of owners
27
 analysed in these studies they have chosen, they were able only to find the 
relative effects of different owners (i.e. which type of ownership is more effective than others 
in terms of firm performance after privatisation). In order to make a comparison possible they 
have created an internal scale in which the least effective ownership type has a score of zero, 
while the most effective has a score of 100.  
 
Figure 2.1 indicates how different ownership types affect firm performance after 
privatization. We can easily see that the aggregation of findings from 23 studies leads to the 
conclusion that the most effective owners are managers, concentrated individual ownership, 
investment funds, and foreigners. On the other hand, traditional state ownership is considered 
to be the least effective type of ownership. Scale presented in Figure 2.1 allows the reader to 
quantify the relative success of certain type of owners relative the most successful –foreign 
ownership. That implies that for example banks as the largest owners generates slightly more 
than only half as much restructuring as privatization to foreigners, while insiders as the 
largest owners generate only one third as much restructuring as foreign owners. 
 
 
 
                                                     
27
Djankov and Murrell (2000, p. 10) divide them into following groups: “1. Traditional state ownership: state 
ownership in enterprises that are 100 percent state-owned and that have not been part of a privatization program. 
2. State ownership in commercialized (or “corporatized”) enterprises: state ownership in enterprises that have 
been legally separated from the state, that are treated as private enterprises under corporate laws, and that have 
usually been part of a privatization program. In practice, this type of state ownership usually occurs in firms that 
are partially privatized. 3. Enterprise insiders (a composite group, where workers and managers were not 
differentiated). 4. Enterprise outsiders (a composite group consisting of all nonemployee, non-state owners). 5. 
Workers (non-management employees). 6. Managers (managerial employees). 7. Banks. 8. Investment funds 
(other than those owned by banks or the state). 9. Foreign owners. 10. Blockholders: outsider ownership that has 
been concentrated in the hands of large individual owners (such as individual entrepreneurs or domestic firms) 
other than those listed above. 11. Diffuse outsiders: the residual outsider ownership category, when outsider 
owners are not identified as belonging to the categories above. This category is dominated by individual outsider 
ownership that remains diffused across large numbers of individual owners.” 
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Figure 2.1 Relative Effects of Changing from Traditional State Ownership to Different 
Private Owners 
 
 
Source: Djankov and Murrell (2000)  
 
Later, Djankov and Murrell (2002) extended their research using Meta-analysis in order to try 
to synthesise the empirical studies analysing restructuring in transition in a transparent and 
comparable manner. Among several important issues, they consider the effect of different 
types of dominant owners on enterprise restructuring and performance.
28
 They conclude that 
the type of dominant owner is very important and different owners can have a significantly 
different impact on firm performance. They maintain that when investment funds are the 
dominant owner, the firms are five times more productive that if insiders were the dominant 
owners. Foreign ownership is found to bethree times as productive as insiders are. Other 
block-holders too, with an interest in better and faster restructuring perform better than 
insiders. At the same time, they find that firms with dominant private domestic ownership 
perform better than those in state ownership in Central and East European countries but the 
difference disappears in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
 
Estrin et al. (2009) analyse the efficiency and distributional effects of privatisation worldwide 
by reviewing some of the more recent and more important studies related to privatisation 
                                                     
28
Simultaneously, they test a set of hypothesis characteristic for this literature, such as: (i) whether privatisation 
generates more restructuring, (ii) the effect of different types of owners on enterprise restructuring, (iii) how 
large is the effect of the product market competition on firm performance, (iv) the relationship between 
enterprise restructuring and the hardening of budget constraints, (v) whether bringing in new capital is 
associated with better firm performance, etc. However, we are particularly interested in the second hypothesis 
that explores the different types of owners and privatisation schemes that provide the most successful 
restructuring and superior firm performance 
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around the world.
29
 They conclude that privatisation to foreign ownership and domestic 
ownership generates better firm efficiency compared to state ownership. This evidence is 
very robust across CEE region (but not so in China). Similarly, they find a robust presence of 
superior domestic ownership performance compared to state ownership.  
 
Unlike Djankov and Murrell (2002) who do not find strong evidence for the superiority of 
private domestic ownership in CIS countries, Estrin et al. (2009) manage to find evidence 
across both CEE and CIS countries. The discrepancy is explained by the treatment of 
endogeneity: studies, which have accounted for endogeneity, and used more sophisticated 
econometric techniques, find a strong evidence for the superior performance of domestic 
private ownership. Moreover, by taking into account recent studies which cover the period 
since privatisation, Estrin et al. (2009) can capture the long-term effects of privatisation when 
new owners take control and when there is time for the repercussions of their actions to be 
noted.  
 
Commander and Svejnar (2007) gather a large stratified random sample of 5,897 firms from 
26 TEs for the period 2002-2005, using 2SLS, OLS and Fixed Effect models, to investigate 
how the business environment, ownership concentration, exports, and changes in competition 
affect firm performance. They find that foreign ownership has a particularly strong effect on 
performance measured by the level of sales. 
 
Damijan, Gregoric, and Prasnikar (2004) use an unbalanced panel of 150 large and medium-
sized enterprises from Slovenia for the period 1998-2002, analysing primarily how the 
outside block-holders’ affects firm performance. They argue that post-privatisation 
concentration realizes mainly through takeovers (in listed firms) and exchanges of large 
blocks of shares (on the “over the counter” market). Simoneti et al. (2001) fails to find a 
significant impact of any of investors’ type on firm performance while using data based from 
the period covering the privatisation. In contrast, Damijan, Gregoric, and Prasnikar (2004) 
                                                     
29The analysis relies on extended database on studies reviewed in the Meta analysis of Djankov and Murrell 
(2002) dividing studies according to two criteria: (i) the quality of methodologies used and the sample size and, 
(ii) the difference in definition of ownership concentration. The first criteria is placing emphasis on those studies 
treating the issue of endogeneity (IV approach, Fixed effect) and using larger samples (at least 200 companies 
for large markets, and at least 75 companies for smaller markets) compared to earlier studies that use simpler 
techniques or smaller sample sizes. According to the second criteria, they divide the literature among those that 
examine the effect of ownership concentration on (i) total factor productivity, (ii) labour productivity, (iii) 
profitability, (iv) sales and revenues, (v) employment, (vi) wages and (vi) other indicators of profitability.  
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use data from the period when the process of privatisation was complete which would allow 
investors to “stabilize” their stakes. Using GMM and controlling for the endogeneity of 
ownership concentration, they find that an increase of outside control has no significant effect 
on firm efficiency (the total factor productivity growth – TPF growth).  The only 
“responsive” large investors are firms controlled by domestic non-financial owners and 
insider owners. When aggregately holding dominant ownership blocks, they perform better 
than firms controlled by the state-controlled Funds. 
 
In the aforementioned study by Pervan, Pervan and Todoric (2012), the authors find that 
foreign controlled firms have superior firm performance compared to those owned by the 
state or by domestic owners. The underlying rationale for the superior performance of foreign 
controlled firms is that they have faster and better access to financial markets, technical 
resources, and have large positive spill over effects by transferring skills and know how. This 
conclusion is very similar to that of Salis (2006) who identified the presence of technology 
transfer from foreign owners to local firms in Slovenia. Smith, Cin and Vodopivec (1997) 
find that, in Slovenia, privatised firms with higher revenues, proﬁts and exports are more 
likely to be either in foreign ownership or largely owned by employees. 
 
However, findings by Pervan, Pervan and Todoric (2012) are somewhat different from 
Dzanic (2012). In a study by Dzanic (2012) using similar data from the Zagreb stock 
exchange for the period 2003-2009 with a panel estimated with Fixed effects and 2SLS, he 
does not find strong evidence that foreign-owned companies have better firm performance 
than domestic-owned companies. His explanation for a negative or insignificant impact of 
foreign owners in different specificationson firm performance is due to late entry (after 1998) 
of foreign capital in Croatia. Namely, the political disturbance that occurred during the 
1990sin Croatia possibly prevented full realisation of positive spill over effects of foreign 
companies to their domestic affiliates. This conclusion is similar to Claessens and Djankov 
(2002) who argue that firms that are privatized for less than two years have labour 
productivity growth similar to those of state-owned enterprises; however, firms privatized by 
foreign owners for three or more years significantly outperform state-owned enterprises. 
 
Using a database of 100 companies from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005 and a methodology 
similar to Dzanic (2012), Suljkanovic (2007) finds no evidence for the superior performance 
of foreign owned companies in comparison to the state owned firms. Instead, firms run by 
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families and domestic individuals appear to have better performance compared to other 
ownership structures. Finally, in the case of Macedonia, Zalduendo (2003), using a sample of 
425 firms in the period of 1996-2000 and employing the OLS method, finds that private 
ownership together with a hard budget constraint and development of market-based 
institutions have a positive impact on firm performance. 
 
Although it is clear that ownership change per se does not have a positive impact on 
performance without complementary changes in legal institutions, management structure, 
access to finance, the competitive environment, etc., empirical evidence largely supports the 
view that private ownership is associated with better performance than state ownership. 
Therefore, in our empirical investigation, we would like to analyse the following hypothesis 
further: H1: In the context of Montenegro, firms which are privately owned perform better in 
comparison to state owned companies. A second hypothesis is generated by the 
overwhelming empirical evidence for the superior performance of foreign investors over 
domestic investors, i.e., H2: In the context of Montenegro, firms that are owned by foreign 
investors perform better than domestically owned companies do. Both hypotheses will be the 
subject of a separate empirical analysis in Chapter 4. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter, we provided a critical review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
exploring the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance. Berle and Means 
(1932) triggered a debate on the separation of ownership and control and how this may lead 
to the enhancement of management incentives to deviate from shareholder value 
maximization. This problem was further thoroughly analysed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
who stressed the importance of solving the agency problem between self-interested managers 
(agents) and owners (principals) who employ the managers to act in their best interest.   
 
The “alignment theory” postulates that ownership concentration is a viable instrument to 
align the interests of owners and managers at relatively low monitoring cost, replacing most 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms. The creation of block holders limits the 
agency problem while providing strong monitoring of managers by strategic, long-term 
oriented investors who have both the skill and the incentive to monitor managers.  
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However, the presence of large shareholders may (i) induce over-monitoring which 
discourages risk taking and initiative-oriented behaviour of managers; (ii) induce lower 
liquidity of shares, leading to reduced information value of share prices; and (iii) lead to the 
expropriation of small shareholders by large blockholders or managers, the extraction of 
private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders – particularly in 
environments with poorly protected rights of small shareholders. 
 
The “entrenchment theory” analyses the behaviour of managers in a situation when they hold 
a significant stake in their company and consequently may use their voting power to: (i) 
ensure the continuation of their tenures at the firm; (ii) make their dismissal very costly for 
other shareholders, (iii) engage in behaviour characterised by moral hazard and expropriation 
of other investors; and (iv) award themselves higher salaries that are not performance based.   
 
The ‘neutrality theory’ maintains that the ownership structure is endogenous, i.e., it is an 
outcome of shareholders’ decisions reflecting the desire of existing or potential owners, 
driven by profit-maximizing objective, to change their ownership stakes. The discipline 
imposed by market forces on managers and large shareholders compensates for any tendency 
to deviate from value maximisation. As a result, ownership concentration will not have any 
effect of firm performance. The endogeneity of ownership concentration may of course be 
induced by firm or market-specific unobserved heterogeneity and/or reverse causality. 
 
The very rich empirical literature confirms that the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance is a very complex issue, and the generalization of sign 
and significance of their relations remains a challenge. Differences in the prevailing corporate 
governance practices, the origins of the legal system, the estimation techniques employed, 
control for potential endogeneity, and the measurement of ownership structures and the 
identity of dominant owners are some of the reasons for the diversity of the empirical 
literature on this topic.  
 
Therefore, in order to develop a quantitative generalization of the ownership concentration-
firm performance relationship in developed market economies, we will pursue a Meta 
Regression Analysis (henceforth MRA) in Chapter 3. Although there have been some 
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attempts at Meta analysis
30
, the full capability of MRA was not systemically exploited in the 
context of the existing empirical literature analysing the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. As for the relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance in transition economies, and the specific case of Montenegro, the 
discussions of the second part of this Chapter will be used as the starting point for the model 
of firm behaviour in this country in Chapter 4. 
 
 
  
                                                     
30
See Sanchez-Balesta and Garcia-Meca (2007); Dalton et al. (2003); Heugens et al. (2009) 
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OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND 
FIRM PERFORMANCE: A META 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
96 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The issue of the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance is one 
of the most widely discussed in the corporate governance literature. However, although this 
relationship has been the subject of thorough empirical analysis with pronounced divergence 
in the theoretical underpinnings as well as in conclusions on the nature, significance and sign 
of the relationship, meta-regression analysis (MRA) of this literature has not yet been 
implemented. This leaves an empirical gap that will be addressed in this Chapter. The general 
definition of MRA is that is “a set of quantitative techniques for evaluating and combining 
empirical results from different studies” (Rose and Stanley 2005, p. 350). Accommodating 
and correcting the biases associated with applied econometrics is the central objective of 
MRA. Accordingly, MRA on the ownership concentration-firm performance literature will 
enable us to achieve three major goals (following Pugh et al., 2012, p. 281): (i) summarize 
findings from the empirical literature; (ii) identify sources of heterogeneity in these findings; 
and (iii) in so doing identify and control for publication bias – if any - in the empirical 
literature investigating the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value.  
 
Given that in Chapter 2 we provide a narrative review of the relevant literature, in this 
Chapter we focus on technical aspects of MRA and major modelling challenges arising from 
the richness of the empirical literature under consideration. Therefore, in Section 3.2 we 
provide details on how the literature was searched, compiled and organized. In Section 3.3, 
we outline properties of standard tests and procedures for jointly investigating publication 
bias and authentic empirical effect. Simultaneously, we present and interpret the econometric 
model based on the whole sample as well as on subsample MRA specifications. The 
penultimate section summarizes key results; including a comparison of results with those 
obtained by Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007), while the last section concludes.  
 
 
3.2 Data and sampling procedure 
 
According to Stanley (2001, p. 134) we should start MRA by compiling all relevant empirical 
studies as a way of reducing potential biases that may be induced by any selective approach. 
Thus, we used: EBSCO; the EconLit database; working paper series; the internet; and 
references obtained from the literature. Key words used in the search were: “ownership 
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concentration+firm performance”; “ownership structure+firm value”; and “ownership 
concentration+ performance”. These approaches identified more than 500 papers, but after 
selecting relevant empirical papers for the MRA, the search resulted in 62 empirical studies 
published in the period 1985-2010 (see Table 3.1) providing 946 estimates. The 62 studies in 
our MRA database are listed in Table 3.1 (columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 are explained later). 
Doucouliagos and Laroche (2009) postulate that MRA should rely on one of two strategies: 
(i) usage of a complete population of studies; or (ii) usage of a random sample from the 
population researching a particular effect or relationship. We defined the relevant population 
of studies by excluding purely theoretical papers as well as those studies that were empirical 
but that did not use regression analysis. In addition, structural differences among empirical 
studies investigating the ownership concentration-firm performance relationship required 
other, albeit minor, exclusions to achieve a coherent population of studies to be investigated 
by MRA. Accordingly, we also excluded econometric studies that defined either the 
dependent variable or the variable of interest in ways not clearly consistent with the theory 
under investigation: namely, those studies that defined firm performance as productivity 
growth or growth of wages, etc.; or that defined ownership concentration has too broad and 
unclear definition, or exploring one particular type of owners (state, privatisation fund, etc.).  
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Table 3.1: Studies Included within the Model 
Author 
Year of 
Publication 
Insiders Outsiders Endogeneity PureLinear 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column5 Column 6 
Drakos and Bekiris 2010 No Yes Yes Yes 
Benson and Davidson       2009 No Yes Yes Yes 
Dickins and Houmes 2009 Yes No No Yes 
Florackis and Ozkan 2009 Yes No No No 
Perrini, Rossi and Rovetta 2008 Mixed Mixed  No Yes 
Fishman, Gannon and Vinning 2008 No Yes No Yes 
King and Santor 2008 No Yes No Yes 
Schmid and  Zimmermann      2008 Yes No No No 
Hu and Izumida 2008 No Yes Yes Yes 
Bhabra  2007 Yes No No No 
Cho and Kim 2007 Yes No No No 
Kapopopulos and Lazaretou 2007 Mixed Mixed Mixed Yes 
Minguez-Vera and Ugedo 2007 No Yes No Yes 
Sabri Boubaker 2007 No Yes No Yes 
Yen and Andre         2007 No Yes No No 
Adams and Santos        2006 Yes No No Yes 
Cheung and Wei  2006 Yes No Yes No 
Mueller and Spitz-Oener 2006 Yes No Yes No 
Lskavyan and Spatareanu 2006 No Yes No Yes 
Olof, Bjuggren and Bohman 2006 Mixed Mixed No Yes 
Caspar Rose        2005 Yes No No Yes 
Davies, Hillier and McColgan 2005 Yes No Yes No 
Florackis 2005 Yes No No Yes 
Fernández-Rodríguez et al.   2004 Yes No No No 
Chirinko et al.  2004 No Yes No No 
Gugler and Yurtoglu 2003 Yes No Mixed No 
Edwards and Weichenrieder 2004 No Yes No Yes 
Miguel, Pindado and Torre       2004 No Yes Yes No 
Steen Thomsen and Rose      2004 No Yes No Yes 
Chen  2003 Yes No No Mixed 
Gedajlovic Shapiro and Buduru 2003 No Yes Yes Yes 
Gugler and Yurtoglu 2003 Yes No Mixed No 
Gugler and Weigand 2003 No Yes Mixed No 
Randoy and Goel 2003 Yes No No Yes 
Welch         2003 Yes No No Yes 
Miwa and Ramseyer  2003 No Yes No Mixed 
Williams, Coles and Sen 2001 Yes No No Yes 
Demsetz and Villalonga 2001 Mixed Mixed Yes Yes 
Lopez-Iturriaga 2001 Yes No Yes Yes 
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Chen and  Steiner         2000 Yes No Yes No 
Jameson, Sullivan and Constand 2000 No Yes No Yes 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 2000 No Yes No Yes 
Keloharju and Grinblatt 2000 Yes No No Yes 
Himmelberg et al. 1999 Yes No Yes Yes 
Pedersen Thomsten 1999 No Yes No Yes 
Barnhart and Rosenstein     1998 Yes No No No 
Cho        1998 Yes No Yes Yes 
Han and Suk   1998 Yes No No No 
Loderer and Martin      1997 Yes No No No 
Cai and Wei    1997 No Yes No Yes 
Agrawal and Knoeber 1996 Yes No No No 
Kole  1995 Yes No No Yes 
Mehran      1995 Yes No No Yes 
Santerre and Neun 1993 No Yes No Yes 
Craswell and Taylor       1997 Yes No Yes No 
Prowse         1992 No Yes No Yes 
Leech and Leahy       1991 No Yes No Yes 
McConnell and Henri Servaes 1990 Yes No No No 
Charles Hill    1989 Mixed Mixed No Yes 
Murali and Welch       1989 No Yes No Yes 
Wruck 1989 Yes No No Yes 
Demsetz and Lehn     1985 No Yes No Yes 
Source: Author  
 
Given that in Chapter 2 we failed to obtain a conclusion regarding the relevance and direction 
of causation between ownership concentration and firm performance in developed corporate 
governance systems, we decided to bind our dataset to empirical research developed from the 
experience of developed economies. In the case of developing economies, including TEs, 
ownership structures are developed in an environment of poorly developed corporate 
governance mechanisms (especially protection of minority shareholders) as well as of 
underdeveloped financial intermediaries and capital markets. These deficiencies jointly 
burden ownership concentration, which is expected to substitute for these deficiencies and to 
provide stronger alignment of managerial interests with those of owners. Furthermore, in TEs 
the process of transition, reflected mainly through the process of privatization, caused fast 
and radical change in the ownership structures that are not a result of the long-term corporate 
governance setting. Bearing in mind these specificities of ownership concentration in 
developing countries, as well as the pronounced heterogeneity of the empirical literature for 
developed economies, we decided that our contribution to the literature using MRA should be 
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focused on the experience based on developed economies. In order to provide efficient 
results, we implement procedures that comply with the Reporting Guidelines for Meta-
Regression Analyses in Economics developed by Stanley et al. (2013). 
 
 
3.3 Whole sample MRA specification 
 
 
3.3.1 Whole sample MRA specification – A funnelling research 
 
The main contribution of the MRA is that it estimates the ownership effect size – the 
parameter of interest - “beyond publication bias”, i.e. by extracting or netting out potential 
publication bias, while identifying sources of heterogeneity in the effect sizes estimated by 
the primary studies (Coric and Pugh 2010; Rose and Stanley 2005; Haile and Pugh, 2012). 
Meta-regressions can determine the degree to which the literature is biased by publication 
selection. 
 
Publication bias reflects research practices whereby authors, editors or referees favour results 
in one or the other direction, predominantly reporting findings that correspond with their 
prior conceptions. Namely, researchers have an incentive to conform to the prevailing 
theoretical understandings by not submitting unconventional estimated findings or by over-
searching among a wide variety of specifications in order to select for submission only those 
estimates of the desired size and/or significance (Pugh et al., 2012, p. 283). Publication 
selection is recognized as “another fundamental threat to valid empirical economic 
inference,” (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2009). 
 
A funnel plot is the most basic method for publication bias detection. Its informal 
examination of publication selection is the first step in the process of publication bias 
detection (Sutton et al., 2000). A funnel graph represents a scatter plot of some standardized 
effect size (e.g. the partial correlation coefficient - henceforth PCC - between the variable of 
interest – some measure of ownership concentration – and the dependent variable – the 
measure of firm performance – in each regression reported in the primary literature) against 
sample size or some other indicator of the precision of the estimate (e.g. the inverse of the 
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standard error of the PCC, which is suggested to be the best measure of precision; Stanley 
and Doucouliagos, 2009, p. 3). 
 
In the absence of publication bias, a plot from studies, which estimate the same effect, will be 
symmetrical and bear some resemblance to an inverted funnel. Namely, when there is no 
publication selection, estimates vary symmetrically and randomly around the ‘true’ 
population effect. On the other hand, a skewed funnel indicates the presence of publication 
bias; i.e. non-random distribution of the estimates around the true measure of the effect size 
(or Type I of directional selection). Bearing in mind that the small-sample researches are 
typically less precise (larger standard errors), they form the base of the graph and the plot will 
be more scattered and wider at the base than at its top. In contrast, estimates from larger data 
sets have smaller standard errors (more precise) and should provide more precise estimates 
compactly distributed around the true effect size, converging towards it as sample size 
becomes larger.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Funnel graph of full sample MRA specification (PCC against inverted SEE) 
 
Note: The vertical axis indicates the measure of precision  while the horizontal axis refers to estimates 
of the PCC 
 
Visual inspection of a funnel graph (Figure 3.1) based on the whole MRA sample provides 
some evidence of modest asymmetry, which may reflect the presence of publication bias. 
Namely, although the plot appears to have the form of an inverted funnel, skewness towards 
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positive values is evident. Furthermore, we notice a significant clustering in the case of 
studies with larger data sets (hence, more precise estimates).  
 
MRA data 
specification  
Visual Description of the  Funnel Plot Evidence of the 
publication bias 
Full Sample Relatively symmetrical with concentration at the 
lower levels (smaller samples), more skewed to 
the right, pronounced clustering on certain levels 
H0: Existence of 
publication bias; 
positively skewed 
 
Although a funnel plot provides useful information regarding the presence of positive 
publication bias in the full MRA specification, conclusions based on visual inspection can be 
considered as provisional. Namely, the main drawback of the funnel plots is that they 
represent a subjective, qualitative method, vulnerable to subjective interpretation (Haile and 
Pugh, 2011). Since the funnel graphs are “inherently ambiguous and subjective,” (Stanley, 
2007, p. 108) we proceed with investigation implementing quantitative and more precise 
procedures with the aim of estimating the representative effect size – if any – while 
controlling for publication bias. 
 
 
3.3.2 Testing for publication bias and authentic empirical effect (FAT-PET)–whole 
sample MRA specification 
 
In the previous subsection we emphasised that publication bias is a consequence of a general 
practice that editors, reviewers and/or researchers prefer results that are statistically 
significant (Stanley, 2005) and/or satisfy theoretical expectations and predictions 
(Doucouliagos, 2005). Publication selection arises if researchers, editors or reviewers use 
statistical significance as a model selection criterion (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). The 
general assumption is that researchers are encouraged by the editors’ selection process to 
conform to theoretical expectations and/or to present significant results. In turn, this 
incentivizes researchers dealing with small samples to search across different model 
specifications and/or econometric techniques in order to get larger estimates to yield 
statistically significant results. By default, a property of small samples is that they, because of 
limited degrees of freedom, have larger standard errors on estimated coefficients (i.e. yield 
less precise estimates). Hence, researchers using smaller datasets may try to compensate by 
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specification search and selecting larger estimates with – for a given level of precision – 
correspondingly higher statistical significance. If so, then this selection procedure leaves a 
statistical trace in the form of an empirical literature displaying widely scattered but 
asymmetric points at the base of the funnel plot. 
 
According to Stanley (2005, 2008) and Sutton et al. (2000), the point of departure of the 
strategy for publication bias and authentic empirical effect filtration is to estimate a MRA by 
regressing a standardized effect size on its standard error. This allows the meta-analyst to 
determine and correct for the impact of publication selection and simultaneously to estimate 
the effect or effects of interest suggested by the literature (Ludvigsen, 2008, p. 6). Given that 
regressions in the primary literatures under investigation are specified in different ways 
(linear, log-linear, non-monotonic), measuring variables in different units (Insiders, 
Outsiders, Herfindahl index (HHI), top 5 largest shareholders, etc.) and use different 
estimation methods, the first task is to identify a common effect size.  
 
A standardized strategy that we follow is to calculate for each regression the partial 
correlation coefficient (henceforth PCC) between the variable of interest (ownership 
concentration) and the dependent variable (firm performance). By calculating the PCC for 
each reported regression we achieve standardization of the effect across studies between 
ownership concentration and firm performance. Moreover, in the context of multivariate 
regression, this measures the direct relationship between the dependent variable and some 
variable of interest controlling for the effects of all other variables (Pugh et al., 2012). In 
other words, we identify an effect size that is comparable across all the studies in the 
literature. 
 
The basic MRA specification regresses the standardised effect size (i.e. PCC) on an intercept 
( ) and the conventional measure of precision (SEpcc, i.e. the standard error of PCC), as 
follows: 
    (3.1) 
 
ˆ
iii SEpccPCC  ˆ
ˆˆ
10 
104 
 
where i = 1,…,N indexes regressions in the MRA database,  and 𝛽1̂ are the coefficients 
estimated, and  is the regression error term.  filters out publication bias (i.e. 
correcting for publication bias) (Limits →0, E(PCC) → ), i.e the estimated intercept 
term reflects an estimate of the true or authentic empirical effect - or, more precisely, the 
average or representative PCC (or effect size) in the literature (Pugh et al, 2012; p. 287). With 
the standard errors set to zero,  would represent an estimate of the true effect in conditions 
of no publication selection. Simultaneously in the context of equation 3.1, statistically 
significant estimates of the slope coefficient reveal publication bias, which is thus 
controlled for in the estimation of the authentic empirical effect. 
 
However, equation 3.1 does not provide the most efficient results due to heteroskedasticity 
(Stanley and Doucoilagos, 2012), since the standard error is the estimated standard deviation 
of the PCC. Namely, the regression error term is likely to display severe heteroskedasticity, 
because instead of the constant variance assumed in OLS regression, the size of each 
individual error term varies considerably. The error variance varies with the sample size as 
well as with other individual characteristics of the primary regressions possibly by “several 
orders of magnitude” (Stanley and Doucoilagos, 2012, p. 24). 
 
Therefore, the recommendation by Stanley (2008) is that this bivariate MRA model should be 
weighted with the standard error of the PCC; i.e. for estimation be transformed into its 
weighted least squares (WLS) version. This procedure gives most weight to the most precise 
estimates (and vice versa). 
    
𝑇𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑖 = 𝛽0̂ ∙
1
𝑆𝐸𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖
+  𝛽1̂ + 𝑢?̂?     (3.2) 
Equation 3.2 is a bivariate weighted least squares MRA where the dependent variable is the t-
statistic on the variable measuring ownership concentration (variable of interest) in the 
primary regression and where both sides are weighted by the standard error of the PCC. 
Dividing through - i.e. weighting - the regression by the individual estimated standard errors, 
0ˆ
iˆ iSEpcc1ˆ
iSEpcc 0ˆ
0ˆ
1ˆ
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SEi,
31
 gives a weighted least squares (WLS) regression, which diminishes heteroskedasticity 
and yields estimates that are more efficient. 
 
The right-hand side variables of equation (3.2) provide estimates for conducting the FAT-
PET testing procedure in order to investigate publication bias and authentic empirical effect 
in the primary literature.
32
 The intercept term 𝛽1̂ provides the Funnel Asymmetry Test 
(henceforth FAT) for detection of publication selection, i.e. the FAT for detection of 
publication bias tests the hypothesis H0: 𝛽1̂ =0 in regression 3.2. Non-rejection is consistent 
with an absence of publication bias. The precision effect test (henceforth PET) detects 
genuine effect beyond publication selection (rejection of H0:  = 0 is evidence for an 
authentic empirical effect, in which case  estimates that effect). 
 
However, prior to FAT-PET procedure, we analyse the MRA model for the quality of the 
statistical specification. The theoretical background on the ownership concentration-firm 
performance relationship is very extensive, and the effect size is formed from heterogeneous 
studies using various methodologies and having widely differing characteristics. This by 
default would suggest the existence of heteroskedasticity in the error term. Moreover, in 81% 
of the sample, the estimates are not sampled independently, i.e. studies report multiple 
results. Therefore, the WLS estimators are not sufficient. Instead, the coefficients are 
estimated with cluster-robust standard errors where each cluster includes all the estimates 
from the same study. Moreover, in the chapter we incorporated a conservative approach by 
presenting cluster-robust standard errors while estimating regressions in which each 
observation is weighted by the inverse number of observations pertaining to each study (e.g. 
weight 1/3 if the study reports three regressions). This procedure assures that the observations 
are weighted in a way that gives equal weight to each study in the estimates.  
 
The bivariate MRA model set out in Equation 3.2 is augmented by moderator variables to 
become a fully-specified multivariate MRA model. In order to control for and measure 
sources of heterogeneity in the ownership concentration effects reported in the literature, we 
interact – according to model 3.2 above – our variable capturing an authentic empirical effect 
(the inverse standard error of the partial correlation coefficient) with moderator variables 
                                                     
31
For properties of WLS regression, see Wooldridge (2006, pp. 284-85).  
32 For a formal demonstration of this, see Pugh et al. (2012). 
0ˆ
0ˆ
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capturing information on each study and/or estimate of the types recommended in recent 
MRA reporting guidelines (Stanley et al., 2013). Therefore we introduce a set of standardized 
moderator variables controlling for data types (panel, cross-sectional, time series, etc.); 
publication year; geographical characteristic from which an data set is drawn (Anglo Saxon 
vs. non-Anglo Saxon); model specification (controlling for whether the estimated model 
includes/omits important variables generally considered in the literature); estimation 
techniques and approaches implemented (OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS, Fe, Re, etc.). The descriptive 
statistics reported in Table 3.2 reflect this interaction. 
  
107 
 
Table 3.2: Moderator variables to account for the variation among observed OC effects 
Variable Brief explanation of moderator variables Mean  Std.De
v 
          Effect size and measure of precision 
OCSE Ownership Concentration Effect size-dependent variable 0.50            2.29 
 SEE The inverse standard error of the partial correlation coefficients 28.2  21.8 
         Moderator variables –context of investigation 
Size 
Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable for size in the model, 0 
otherwise 
22.68 
 
24.10 
Investment 
Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable for investment in the model, 0 
otherwise 
5.05 
 
15.98 
Leverage 
Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable for the value of debt as a 
fraction of the book value of assets in the model, 0 otherwise 
16.04 
 
23.71 
Amenity * 
Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable for amenity in the model 
(indicator variables for example  utilities industries or media 
industries), 0 otherwise 
0.82 
 
3.12 
Control 
Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable for control in the model, 0 
otherwise 
1.12 
 
3.92 
Industry 
Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable for industry type  the model , 
0 otherwise 
9.47 
 
18.87 
FirmSpecific 
Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable for firm-specific risk in the 
model, 0 otherwise 
3.7 
 
12.83 
MarketSpecific 
Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable for market risk in the model, 0 
otherwise 
0.68 
 
3.27 
R&D 
Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable for research and development 
Expenditures in the model, 0 otherwise 
11.68 
 
21.97 
CapExp 
Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable for capital expenditures (on 
fixed plant and equipment) in the model, 0 otherwise 
8.13 
 
18.60 
AdvExp 
Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable for advertisement 
expenditures (s) in the model, 0 otherwise 
5.85 
 
12.73 
Published 
The year  an article is published (1985=1; 1986=2; 1987=3; …; 
2011=26) 
18.89 
 
4.59 
OLS 
Dummy, 1 if estimation is based on OLS with GMM as 
benchmark 
13.61 
 
17.71 
PARAM 
Dummy, 1 if estimation is based on Parametric approach with 
GMM as benchmark 
0.68 
 
4.53 
SPARAM 
Dummy, 1 if estimation is based on Semi Parametric approach 
with GMM as benchmark 
0.08 
 
1.46 
GLS 
Dummy, 1  if estimation is based on Generalised Least Squares 
approach with GMM as benchmark 
0.19 
 
2.48 
WLS 
Dummy, 1  if estimation is based on Weighted General Least 
Squares with GMM as benchmark 
0.11 
 
1.33 
2SLS 
Dummy, 1  if estimation is based on Two Stage Least Squares 
approach with GMM as benchmark 
3.71 
 
16.01 
3SLS 
Dummy, 1 if estimation is based on Three Stage Least Squares 
approach with GMM as benchmark 
1.22 
 
4.85 
FE 
Dummy, 1  if estimation is based on Fixed Effect approach with 
GMM as benchmark 
6.02 
 
15.26 
RE 
Dummy, 1 if estimation is based on Random Effect approach 
with GMM as benchmark 
0.18 
 
2.79 
Cross 
Dummy,  if estimation is based on cross-sectional data with time 
series as benchmark 
7.20 
 
8.74 
Pooled 
Dummy,   if estimation is based on pooled  data with time series 
as benchmark  0 otherwise 
18.37 
 
26.86 
Robust 
Dummy, 1 if a study presents at least one check of results' 
robustness, 0 otherwise 
18.51 
 
25.55 
Anglo Saxon Dummy, 1 if a sample is for Anglo Saxon countries, 0 otherwise 
17.38  24.16 
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Insiders 
Dummy, 1 if a study  examines impact of insider owners’ on firm 
performance, 0 otherwise 
18.57    23.15 
Endogeneity Dummy, 1 if a model addresses endogeneity, 0 otherwise 
11.42     23.18 
Tobin_s_q Dummy, 1 if a model uses Tobins Q  as a firm performance 
proxy with accounting firm performance measures as a 
benchmark 
20.99     21.48 
Top5 Dummy, 1 if a model uses the percentage of shares owned by the 
five largest shareholders in the model, with studies using the 
HHI†as the benchmark. 
3.89      13.00 
OC Dummy, 1 if a study uses percentage of shares owned by the 
largest shareholder, with studies using the HHI as the 
benchmark. 
17.04      21.45 
OCsquared Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable if shares owned by % largest 
shareholders squared, with studies using the HHI as the 
benchmark. 
5.02      14.65 
OCthird Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable if shares owned by % largest 
shareholders power of three, with studies using the HHI as the 
benchmark. 
2.03      10.8 
OCfourth Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable if shares owned by % largest 
shareholders power of four, with studies using the HHI as the 
benchmark. 
0.13       1.93 
OCfifth Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable if shares owned by % largest 
shareholders power of five, with studies using the HHI as the 
benchmark. 
0.09       1.63 
OClow Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable "if shares owned by x% 
largest shareholders", where x% is some author-chosen low 
threshold, with studies using the HHI as the benchmark. 
1.39  6.73 
OCmedium Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable "if shares owned by x% 
largest shareholders", where x% is some author-chosen medium 
threshold, with studies using the HHI as the benchmark. 
1.16  6.39 
OChigh Dummy, 1 if a study uses variable "if shares owned by x% 
largest shareholders", where x% is some author-chosen high 
threshold, with studies using the HHI as the benchmark. 
1.18  6.42 
 Source: Author 
Note: Due to the number of moderator variables, we do not include the suffix “SE”, nonetheless these 
moderator variables are all divided by the standard error of the partial correlation coefficients. 
* According to Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, p. 15) Amenity “has no prescribed directional role to 
play in the firm performance equation, and it is used in this equation much as would be any industry 
indicator variable. However, amenity purchases made by owners should result in reduced profit.” 
Therefore, we do assume a negative impact on firm performance. 
†
Ownership concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI), calculated on the basis of the 
structure of holdings of major voting rights. 
 An additional set of moderator variables was introduced, aimed to explain the heterogeneity 
of the findings in the primary literature. We introduce a dummy variable for the quality of the 
implemented estimation procedure and presented diagnostics (Robust). In order to distinguish 
the “wheat from chaff” (Stanley, 2001, p. 131) we carefully analyze the robustness checks (if 
any) presented in the empirical literature. The underlying assumption is that those studies that 
presented at least one table with the diagnostics of their estimates, showing their robustness, 
should be more reliable than those that omit this procedure. Furthermore, we introduce a 
dummy variable to control for studies that address the potential endogeneity between 
ownership concentration and firm performance in the model (Endogeneity). We expect a 
significant impact of this variable in the explanation of study hetereogenity. 
 
We were concerned that inclusion of the endogeneity dummy might bring problems of 
multicolinearity, given that econometric techniques used in primary studies to address 
endogeneity are controlled for separately by moderator variables in the meta-regression.  
However, endogeneity is such an important issue in the empirical literature on ownership 
concentration-firm performance that it divides this literature into studies that address this 
issue and those that do not. Furthermore, Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007) strongly 
suggest that this characteristic of the literature is so important that should be used in further 
meta analysis research together with governance system, measurement of performance and 
identity of owners (insiders vs. outsiders). Finally, the endogeneity moderator variable is 
significant across the various regressions presented in the following subsections.  
 
Furthermore, we control for the set of variables that are more or less standard in the 
mainstream literature of interest: namely, market-specific and firm-specific characteristics 
affecting ownership concentration and its relationship to firm performance such as 
advertising expenditures (AdvExp), research and development expenditures (R&D), capital 
expenditures as a proxy for tangible assets (CapExp), firm leverage (Leverage), firm size 
(Size), (Regulation) and (Amenity). Furthermore, market specific uncertainty is captured and 
controlled by (Market risk), whilst firm specific risk is controlled (FirmSpecific), if a study 
controls for any type of firm specific uncertainty proxy. Their impact on ownership 
concentration and the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance is 
thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 4. Accordingly, these moderator variables capture the effects 
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of the inclusion/omission of variables specified by theory on the effects reported in the 
empirical literature. 
 
Concerning definitions of variables describing firm performance, we decided to divide the 
literature into those using market value (Tobin’s Q) and those using accounting measures 
such as accounting profit rate, return on assets (in which the net income is measured after tax 
and before tax) and return on equity (where the net income is calculated before tax, or is in 
the form of a dividend pay-out ratio).  
 
According to Sánchez-Ballesta and Emma García-Meca, (2007 p. 883), there are at least four 
moderating variables that should be taken into consideration with respect to potential sub 
sampling: (i) the nature of the performance measure; (ii) the corporate governance system; 
(iii) the control for endogeneity; and (iv) the measurement of insider ownership. However, 
we start the analysis based on the whole sample comparing the estimates of the bivariate 
MRA models and multivariate MRA models. Table 3.3 reports the bivariate and the fully 
specified multivariate MRA models based on the whole sample.  
 
  
111 
 
Table 3.3: Bivariate and Multivariate model testing for publication bias and authentic 
empirical effect (Bivariate and Multivariate MRA FAT-PET model)–Cluster-robust 
estimates 
 Full Sample Multivariate Full Sample Bivariate 
Variables Cluster-robust Linear 
Regression 
Cluster-robust Linear 
Regression 
The dependent variable is OWNCONC, t statistic on the ownership concentration  variable of interest 
Intercept (FAT) 0.69(2.49)** 
0.45(2.12)** 
1_see_pcc (PET) 0.036(2.60)** 
0.003(0.60) 
Size - - 
Investment 0.02(1.74)* - 
Leverage - - 
Amenity 0.06(2.17)** - 
Control -0.08(-4.25)*** - 
Industry -0.031(-4.10)*** - 
FirmSpecific - - 
MarketSpecific - - 
RnD - - 
CapExp -0.04(-5.83)*** - 
AdvExp 0.01(1.74)* - 
OLS -0.02(-2.37)** - 
PARAM 0.02(1.57) - 
SPARAM 0.01(0.74) - 
GLS -0.02(-2.15)** - 
Wls - - 
2SLS -0.01(-0.99) - 
3SLS -0.02(-1.48) - 
FE -0.01(-1.09) - 
RE 0.03(1.67)* - 
Cross -0.02(-2.52)*** - 
Pooled - - 
Robust -0.01(-1.65) - 
Anglosaxon -0.01(-1.25) - 
Insiders 0.02(2.83)*** - 
Endogeneity -0.003(-0.33) - 
Tobin_s_q -0.006(-1.04) - 
Oc 0.02(2.13)*** - 
Ocsquared -0.04(-3.14)*** - 
Model Diagnostics 
 N 946 946 
R-squared 0.20 0.002 
F TestH0: independent variables are jointly equal 0 F( 23, 922) = 6.43 F(  1, 63) = 0.44 
 P=0.00 P=0.51 
Ramsey RESET Test:H0: Correct Functional  form F(3, 919) = 6.18 F(3, 941) =2.23 
 Prob > F = 0.004 
 
Prob> F =  0.08 
VIF check  6.82  
Source: Calculations of the Author, Stata 11 
Note:  * and ** and ** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. t-statistics are 
in parentheses. 
 
For the resulting multivariate model reported in Table 3.3, the Ramsey RESET test rejects the 
null hypothesis of no omitted variables and a linear specification at the five percent level of 
significance, alerting us that the functional form may not be appropriate. Concerning the 
issue of heteroskedasticity, we report weighted-cluster robust regression, and the estimated 
standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. In spite of the possibility of multicollinearity – 
which is endemic in multivariate MRA because there is potential overlap between some of 
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the moderator variables, especially between those that control for different techniques in the 
primary literature and the one that controls for studies addressing endogeneity – the sample is 
sufficiently large to yield significant estimates for several of the moderator variables 
individually, while the model F-test rejects the null that the estimated effects of the moderator 
variables are jointly insignificant (p=0.00).
33 Multicollinearity is not a problem peculiar to 
our model. Greene (2012, p. 130; emphasis added) makes clear that “… non-experimental 
data will never be orthogonal”. Moreover, multicollinearity is not a threat to the validity of 
regression estimates (Greene, 2012, p. 129): “Multicollinearity leads to imprecision in the 
estimator, though not to any systematic biases in estimation.” 
The resulting bivariate and multivariate WLS–MRA models encompass the FAT–PET 
procedure (i.e. the tests for publication selection and the existence of an authentic empirical 
effect in the literature). Concerning the FAT procedure, it relies on the assumption that 
publication selection is present when the reported effects are correlated with the standard 
errors. Conversely, nonexistence of publication bias can be inferred when estimates and their 
standard errors (SE) are independent, as required by random sampling theory (Stanley and 
Doucioulagos, 2011, p. 23). In the case of larger samples, SEs is smaller, and as the sample 
grows the reported effects approaches to the true effect: i.e. “the amount of the publication 
selection β0Sei, shrinks to zero with zero variance” (Stanley and Doucioulagos, 2009, p. 410). 
PET, i.e. the “precision effect test”, signals the presence or otherwise of an authentic 
empirical effect in the literature. Because 1/  is the precision of this estimate of empirical 
effect, this test (H0: =0) makes the multivariate model a FAT-PET-MRA. According to 
Stanley (2008) PET is very powerful and robust to the intensity of publication selection.  
                                                     
33
In all specifications the F test is calculated using default standard errors instead of cluster-robust standard 
errors for which the F test can not be calculated. The explanation is as follows (provided by Stata 11, Version 
11): “The VCE you have just estimated is not of sufficient rank to perform the model test. This can happen if 
there is a variable in the model that is nonzero for only 1 observation in the estimation sample. Likewise, it can 
happen if a variable is nonzero for only one cluster when using the cluster-robust VCE. In such cases the 
derivative of the sum-of-squares or likelihood function with respect to that variable's parameter is zero for all 
observations. That implies that the outer-product-of-gradients (OPG) variance matrix is singular. Because the 
OPG variance matrix is used in computing the robust variance matrix, the latter is therefore singular as well.” 
However, Cluster-robust standard errors are valid in large samples but not necessarily in finite samples with 
small numbers of groups. An indication of where cluster-robust may not be valid is when default standard errors 
are larger than cluster-robust ones, in which case the conservative approach to inference is to report the default 
standard errors. However, this is not the case in any of the regressions reported in the Tables presented in 
Chapter 3; the cluster-robust standard errors are uniformly larger than the default standard errors. Given this, the 
default F-tests can be regarded as indicative only. However, these F-tests - taking no account of clustering - do 
suggest that the null of joint insignificance of the estimated coefficients is uniformly rejected (p=0.00 in all 
cases). 
 
iSE
0
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The estimation of the bivariate MRA model is used solely as an intuitive tool to assess the 
robustness of the FAT-PET tests in the full multivariate model. Namely, although the 
Ramsey RESET test indicates that the specified (linear) functional form may not 
appropriately model the relationship between the regressors, and in the bivariate modelthe 
small R
2 
value (0.002) indicates that the inverse standard error alone is not sufficient to 
explain the heterogeneity in the empirical literature, the results from the bivariate and 
multivariate MRAs taken together suggest the presence of publication selection bias as well 
as the possible presence of an overall genuine empirical effect. Nonetheless, we should be 
aware that the PET test can be biased in favour of rejecting H0: β1=0 (where β1 –is the 
coefficient on 1_see_pcc (PET)) - hence, concluding that there is an authentic empirical 
effect - in the case of pronounced unexplained heterogeneity and the presence of publication 
selection bias (Stanley, 2008; Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009, p. 416). 
 
In both bivariate and multivariate cluster-robust models the t-statistic for the null hypothesis 
that H0:β0=0 (the test for publication bias) is statistically significant; indicating that the 
positive effect size typically reported in the literature is subject to publication bias. There is 
clear evidence that the ownership concentration-firm performance relationship is skewed (see 
Table 3.3) toward positive values (nonrejection H0: β0=0, tbivariate_fullmodel= 2.12 and 
tmultivariate_fullmodel=2.49), confirming our visual impressions from the funnel graph (Figure 3.1). 
Once we control for publication bias, the PET for the multivariate cluster robust model 
supports the existence of a genuine positive empirical effect (nonrejection H0: β1=0; 
tmultivariate_fullmodel=2.60). On the other hand, in the case of the bivariate cluster robust model 
the PET does not support the existence of genuine positive empirical effect (rejected H0: 
β1=0: tbivariate_fullmodel=0.6). 
 
The following discussion refers to the interpretation of results of moderator variables where 
nine of the thirty moderator variables are estimated with coefficients statistically significant 
at the conventional ten percent level of significance (Egger at al., 1997; Doucouliagos and 
Laroche, 2009). Because the empirical literature is very heterogeneous, the significant 
moderator variables reveal sources and consequences of that heterogeneity. Due to the space 
limitations, we focus on explanation of the significant moderator variables in the Multivariate 
MRA. The obtained results further suggest that those studies that control for the level of 
investment (Investment) are more likely to present a positive impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance. The same stands for studies that control for 
114 
 
advertisement expenditure (AdvExp), and those studies that use insiders as a proxy for 
ownership concentration, and amenity potential (Amenity). On the other hand, the obtained 
results suggest that if a study controls for systematic regulation characteristics of industries 
(Control) it is less likely to report a positive impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance. Similarly, those studies that control for industry characteristics are less likely to 
report a positive impact of ownership control on firm performance. Similarly, those studies 
that control for the level of capital expenditure (CapExp), uses cross section data (Cross), 
uses OLS or GLS, or controls for regulated industries (Control) are less likely to report a 
positive impact of ownership control on firm performance. 
 
Finally, among the 13 moderator variables used to proxy ownership concentration, only two 
yield statistically significant coefficient estimates, indicating that studies using definitions of 
ownership concentration as a percentage of overall ownership are more likely to discover a 
positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance, while those 
studies that also specify a quadratic term as the squared percentage of overall ownership are 
less likely to discover a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. 
 
 
3.4 Subsample MRA specifications 
 
Further investigation addresses the “apples and oranges” issue in MRA – i.e. achieving 
coherent units of analysis - by dividing the overall sample into nine subsamples with respect 
to pronounced dependent variable heterogeneity in the literature. There are at least two 
criteria depicting severe heterogeneity in the literature, urging further investigation. The first 
criterion is the type of owners (Insiders versus Outsiders); and secondly, the type of the 
functional forms explaining the nature of the relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance (linear vs. nonlinear). Given that the empirical literature is divided 
between nonmonotonic and linear modelling of the relationship between ownership and 
performance, the difference in the functional form represent a justified criterion for 
subsample MRA specification. Dalton et al. (2003) in a meta analysis solely examine linear 
relationships among different types of equity characteristics and firm performance. We 
employ a division suggested by Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007, p. 886); namely, conducting 
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the analysis on subsamples, based on different functional specifications of the relationship 
and difference in the identity of the largest owners (insider ownership and ownership 
concentration). 
 
However, unlike Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007) we do not keep the cubic term on 
ownership concentration or any higher level of exponentiation. Namely, from the sample we 
drop observations referring to any nonlinear relationship of a higher term than quadratic. We 
argue that polynomial models with terms higher than two do not have support in the 
theoretical literature on the ownership concentration-firm performance relationship (Figure 
3.2).
34
 If we look at the graphic specification of a potential polynomial model of order three, 
we may perceive that this relationship would imply a very complicated, concave-convex 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. Instead, it seems that 
authors have clear conformity incentives to use higher order levels in order to select for 
submission only estimates of the desired size and/or significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
34
A polynomial model can be appropriate if it is thought that the slope of the effect of Xi on E(Y) changes sign 
as Xi increases. 
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Figure 3.2: Characteristic polynomial models with cubic terms 
 
 
Source: McClendon’s Multiple Regression and Causal Analysis, 1994; SPSS’s Curve fit documentation, 
YPPN (Y=dependent variable, a1=Positive, a2=Positive, a3=Negative), YNPN (Y=dependent variable, 
a1=Negative, a2=Positive, a3=Negative) 
All other aspects which cause the empirical literature to vary across studies such as (i) 
development of the corporate governance environments in which firms are embedded, (ii) the 
technique(s) applied, (iii) controlling for the endogeneity of ownership, (iv) the nature of the 
performance measure and limitations on the ownership and performance measurements (v) 
data quality (Dalton et al., 2003; Ballesta and Garcia-Meca, 2007) are controlled by 
moderator variables. 
 
The first criterion, functional form, divides the full MRA sample into three subsamples, 
according to the functional form of the relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm performance in the primary regressions: (i) pure linear specification (i.e. primary 
regressions specified with a linear relationship between ownership and performance); (ii) 
partlylinear specification (i.e.the linear component from those primary regressions specified 
with a non-linear relationship between ownership and performance); and (iii) quadratic 
specification (i.e. the quadratic component from those primary regressions specified with a 
non-linear relationship between ownership and performance). The corresponding MRA 
specifications are each divided into two further subsamples (Figure 3.3) using the second 
criteria (type of the largest owner). This creates six additional subsamples: (iv) pure linear 
insiders; (v) pure linear outsiders; (vi) partly linear insiders; (vii) partly linear outsiders; (viii) 
quadratic insiders; and (ix) quadratic outsiders. The organisation of our total sample into 
these six sub-samples is set out in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3: The structure of MRA subsamples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once separation of MRA specifications is made, we summarize the major results separately. 
We explain below in Section 3.4.5 why separate MRA models are not estimated for either the 
“partly linear outsiders” subsample or the “quadratic outsiders” subsample. 
 
We proceed with MRA reporting based on guidelines for conducting and reporting meta-
analyses offered by Stanley et al. (2012) and Higgins and Thompson (2002).  
 
 
3.4.1 Initial Strategy – Estimating the full sample with a full set of Interaction Terms 
 
An alternative approach, which is equivalent to partitioning the data, is to estimate the full 
sample with a full set of interaction terms; for example, estimating the Pure-linear Subsample 
effects by interacting each variable with the Pure-linear (Part-linear and Quadratic) 
subsample indicator (a Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the study estimates a 
linear (partly linear or quadratic) relationship, 0 otherwise). The advantage of using 
interaction terms is a clear gain in efficiency arising from the use of all the data to estimate 
the subsample effect. The potential disadvantage of using interaction variables is greatly 
Full sample 
MRA 
specification 
Pure Linear MRA 
specification 
Partly Linear MRA 
specification 
Quadratic MRA 
specification 
 
Pure Linear Outsiders 
MRA specification 
 
Pure Linear Insiders MRA 
specification 
 
Partly  Linear Insiders 
MRA specification 
 
Partly  Linear 
Outsiders MRA 
specification 
 
Quadratic Insiders 
MRA specification 
 
Quadratic Outsiders 
MRA specification 
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increased multicollinearity, which offsets the precision gain from estimating with the whole 
sample. 
 
To assess the extent to which these general observations apply to our particular model and 
data, we use this alternative approach to replicate what was accomplished by partitioning the 
data, conducting it both in the multivariate and in the bivariate context. We do not interact in 
the multivariate context all variables, because of obvious collinearity. Instead, the interactions 
are made with selected variables in each case: (i) the measure of the authentic empirical 
effect (SEE); (ii) the constant; (iii) moderator variable controlling for studies using data from 
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems (Purelinear_AngloSaxon, 
Quadratic_Anglosaxon, Partlinear_AngloSaxon); and (iv) the moderator variable controlling 
for studies treating endogeneity (Purelinear_edogeneity, Quadratic_endogeneity, 
Partlinear_edogeneity).  
 
In Appendix 3.2 we present results from multivariate MRA FAT-PET estimates using 
interaction moderator variables for Pure linear, Part linear and Quadratic estimation. 
However, the results obtained using interaction moderator variables are not very informative 
for several reasons. Firstly, possibly due to the mix of linear and nonlinear relationship in the 
sample, all specifications fail the Ramsey Reset test, indicating miss-specified functional 
form. In addition, inclusion of interaction dummies adds hugely to multicolinearity, which is 
shown by the mean VIF of above 10. Furthermore, similarly to cluster robust estimations 
obtained by partitioning, the F test for joint significance cannot be calculated.   
 
In view of misspecification with respect to functional form and pronounced multicolinearity 
in the multivariate MRA when specifying our MRA model with interaction dummies, and in 
view of our relatively large sample size (for MRA), our preferred result are those obtained by 
partitioning the data set rather than those estimated with interaction dummies. For similar 
reasons, this is the usual practice in MRA, even in studies using much smaller datasets (see, 
for example, Efendic et al., 2011). 
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3.4.2 Pure Linear, Partly Linear, and Quadratic subsamples: Funnel plots 
 
Our empirical investigation of subsamples is  based on two structural differences (functional 
form and the identity of owners), which are possibly reflected in the failure of the linear 
functional form assumption in the full-sample multivariate FAT-PET MRA (Table 3.3) and 
which partly motivated us to create subsamples. Funnel plots from the data used in the 
subsamples are shown in Figures 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Funnel Plot - Pure Linear whole sample (insiders+outsiders) 
00  
 
As already highlighted, in the absence of publication bias, the funnel graph resembles an 
inverted funnel Conversely, “asymmetric and non-random distribution of the estimates 
around the ‘true’ measure of the effect size, in other words a skewed funnel graph, indicates 
the presence of publication bias” (Haile and Pugh, 2011, p. 10). Moreover, a symmetrical 
funnel should converge towards a single point at the top where the largest samples should 
assure the highest level of precision. Clearly, Figure 3.4 is asymmetric, skewed to the right, 
reflecting publication bias in favour of positive estimates.  
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  Figure 3.5: Funnel Plot - Pure Linear Insiders Figure 3.6: Funnel Plot - Pure Linear Outsiders 
 
Figure 3.7: Funnel Plot - Part Linear Full Sample          Figure 3.8: Funnel Plot - Part Linear Insiders 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Funnel Plot - Quadratic Full sample            Figure 3.10: Funnel Plot - Quadratic Insiders 
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The visual evidence of the publication selection, potentially depicted by the funnel plots, 
based on the authors subjective perspective, are summarised in Table 3.4. The data used in 
the MRA subsamples specifications are illustrated in Figures 3.5 to 3.10. According to visual 
inspection, in the case of the pure linear and insiders subsamples there exists clear evidence 
of positive publication selection (Figure 3.4 and 3.5). Conversely, Figure 3.6 appears 
symmetrical, converging towards a single point as the level of precision increases, suggesting 
absence of publication bias. Figure 3.6 suggests that the estimates are randomly and 
symmetrically distributed around the mean, which pinpoints the assumption of the absence of 
publication selection. 
 
In the case of the part linear and the insiders subsamples, moderate skewness of the funnel 
towards positive values reveals potential publication selection in the underlying literature 
(Figures 3.7 and 3.8). Finally, the quadratic and the insiders subsample funnel graphs signal 
heavy skewness towards negative values (Figures 3.9 and 3.10), i.e. asymmetric and non-
random distribution of the estimates around the ‘true’ measure of the effect size, revealing the 
presence of publication selection. 
 
Detailed inspection of these seven Funnel graphs provides evidence of clustering in the lower 
section area with wide variation, indicating the strong presence of small sample studies with 
lower precision. The range of model specifications and estimation techniques in the primary 
literature, captured by the moderator variables detailed in Table 3.2, indicate that researchers 
with small samples have the potential “to search more intensively across model 
specifications, data and econometric techniques until they find larger estimates” (Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2011, p. 23). This is consistent with the presence of publication bias in most of 
the sub samples (Table 3.4), i.e. higher probability that the effect size is correlated with its 
standard error. 
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Table 3.4: Publication bias assessment based on the sub-sample funnel plots 
MRA data 
specification  
Visual Description of the Funnel Plot Evidence of  publication 
bias 
Pure Linear 
Subsample (Fig.3.4) 
Relatively symmetrical with concentration on the lower levels 
(smaller samples), more skewed to the right, pronounced clustering 
on certain levels 
Existence of publication 
bias positively skewed 
Pure Linear Insiders 
(Fig. 3.5) 
Relatively symmetrical with concentration on the lower levels 
(smaller samples), more skewed to the right,  pronounced 
clustering on certain levels 
Existence of publication 
bias positively skewed 
Pure Linear Outsiders 
(Fig.3.6) 
Relatively symmetrical with concentration on the lower levels 
(smaller samples), resembles an inverted funnel. The estimates are 
randomly and symmetrically distributed around the mean. 
Absence of  publication 
bias  
Part Linear 
Subsample (Fig. 3.7) 
Relatively symmetrical with concentration on the lower levels 
(smaller samples), highly scattered (wide variation around true 
effect) mildly skewed to the right. 
Existence of  publication 
bias positively skewed 
Part Linear Insiders 
(Fig. 3.8) 
Relatively symmetrical with concentration on the lower levels 
(smaller samples), highly scattered (wide variation around true 
effect) mildly skewed to the right. 
Existence of publication 
bias positively skewed 
Quadratic Subsample 
(Fig.3.9) 
Relatively symmetrical with concentration on the lower levels 
(smaller samples), highly scattered (wide variation around true 
effect) strongly skewed to the left. 
Existence of publication 
bias skewed towards 
negative values 
Quadratic Insiders 
(Fig. 3.10) 
Relatively symmetrical with concentration on the lower levels 
(smaller samples), highly scattered (wide variation around true 
effect) strongly skewed to the left. 
Existence of  publication 
bias skewed towards 
negative values 
 
Bearing in mind that funnel plots rely on visual observation and subjective judgment, jointly 
with the fact that an asymmetric funnel graph could result from heterogeneity of the true 
effect, regardless of publication selection (Stanley, 2005, p. 317), we need a further 
investigation, which includes objective statistical tests (i.e. the FAT-PET procedure). These 
tests can identify publication selection and genuine effects beyond publication selection 
should it exist (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2011). Accordingly, we continue investigation 
using the FAT-PET procedure as robust, formal and more objective tests for identification of 
the publication bias and underlying genuine empirical effect once publication bias is 
controlled for.  
 
 
3.4.3 MRA tests for publication bias and genuine effects-Subsamples linear relationship 
Insiders vs. Outsiders empirical literature 
 
Following the testing procedure for publication bias and genuine empirical effect that are part 
of meta-regression analysis we preserve a conservative approach to inference, always 
favouring cluster-robust standard errors. Bearing in mind that outliers were not evident as an 
overwhelming problem, a testing down procedure continues by dropping variables with the 
highest p-values and by giving priority to the model diagnostics. Hence, the final step was to 
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eliminate moderator variables whose t-statistic was low (following Doucouliagos, 2005, p. 
376) or suffer a problem of very high correlation and potential multicollinearity (indicated by 
the VIF check).  
 
According to Stanley and Doucouliagos (2011, p. 1) “publication selection bias represents 
one of the most serious challenges to the integrity of empirical economics”. The FAT 
procedure (see Table 3.5) shows a clear sign of publication selection bias (i.e. rejection of 
H0: β0=0) toward positive values in two out of three multivariate specifications: 
tmultivariate_full_sample=2.49; tmultivariate_Insiders=1.44; tmultivariate_outsiders=3.08. For the pure linear 
subsample (Column 1), the result of the multivariate FAT-PET MRA is in line with the 
corresponding funnel plot (Figure 3.4) in suggesting the presence of publication bias. 
However, in the case of the pure linear insiders subsample (Column 3) the suggestion of 
publication bias from the funnel plot (Figure 3.5) is not supported by the multivariate MRA 
estimate. Similarly, in the case of outsiders, although Figure 3.6 indicates an absence of 
publication selection bias, the FAT result (Column 5) challenges the impression given by the 
Funnel plot, showing the clear presence of publication bias at the one percent level of 
significance. 
 
According to Stanley (2008) and Stanley and Doucoulagos (2011) testing H0: β1=0 (in Table 
3.5, the coefficient on 1_see_pcc (PET)) should provide evidence of whether there is or is not 
a genuine empirical effect existing beyond publication bias. The authentic empirical effect is 
estimated only after controlling for sources of heterogeneity in the literature and after we 
make due allowance for publication bias. Bearing in mind that β1 is the coefficient measuring 
precision, the PET procedure in the context of subsample for Pure linear specification 
(Column 1) fails to provide evidence of genuine empirical effect. However, in the case of the 
pure linear outsiders subsample (Column 5), the PET procedure indicates the presence of a 
genuine underlying empirical effect beyond distortion due to publication selection (reject H0: 
β1=0, tmultivariate_outsders=-2.92). In the case of the Pure linear insiders subsample (Column 3) we 
find a genuine empirical effect identifying a positive impact (tmultivariate_Insiders=1.96) of insider 
ownership concentration on firm performance. According to Stanley (2008) and Stanley and 
Doucoulagos (2011) testing H0: β1=0 (in Table 3.5, the coefficient on 1_see_pcc (PET)) 
should provide evidence of whether there is or is not a genuine empirical effect existing 
beyond publication bias. The authentic empirical effect is estimated only after controlling for 
sources of heterogeneity in the literature and after we make due allowance for publication 
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bias. Bearing in mind that β1 is the coefficient measuring precision, the PET procedure in the 
context of the subsample for the Pure linear specification (Column 1) fails to provide 
evidence of genuine empirical effect. However, in the case of the pure linear outsiders 
subsample (Column 5), the PET procedure indicates the presence of a genuine underlying 
empirical effect beyond distortion due to publication selection (reject H0: β1=0, 
tmultivariate_outsders=-2.92). In the case of the Pure linear insiders (Column 3) subsample we find 
a genuine empirical effect identifying a positive impact of insider ownership concentration on 
firm performance. However, diagnostic failure with respect to functional form at the one per 
cent level suggests that this result may be problematic.
35
  
 
 
                                                     
35 We use the five per cent level of significance as the threshold for rejection/non-rejection, 
which is the conventional level in economics and business research. Hence, we reject the null 
of linearity for the models reported in Columns 2 (although we do not reject at the one per 
cent level), 3 and 4 in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5: Comparative Bivariate and Multivariate MRA FAT-PET estimates for the Subsamples Pure Linear Functional Form Insiders 
vs. Outsiders – OLS-weighted cluster robust estimate36 
Variables Pure Linear Sample 
Multivariate 
Cluster-robust Linear 
Regression 
(Column 1) 
Pure Linear Sample 
Bivariate  
Cluster-robust Linear 
Regression 
(Column 2) 
Pure Linear Sample 
Multivariate -Insiders 
Cluster-robust Linear 
Regression 
(Column 3) 
Pure Linear Sample 
Bivariate -Insiders 
Cluster-robust Linear 
Regression 
(Column 4) 
Pure Linear Sample 
Multivariate -Outsiders 
Cluster-robust Linear 
Regression 
(Column 5) 
Pure Linear Sample 
bivariate -Outsiders 
Cluster-robust Linear 
Regression 
(Column 6) 
The dependent variable is OWNCONC, t statistic on the ownership concentration  variable of interest 
Intercept (FAT) 0.92(2.49)** 0.547 (1.93)* 0.61(1.44) 1.07 (2.83)** 1.23(3.08)*** 0.177(0.59) 
1_see_pcc (PET) 0.024(1.3) 0.003 (0.43) 0.14(1.96)* 0.004(0.42) -0.1(-2.92)*** 0.003(0.40) 
Size -0.005(-0.28) - -0.11(-3.86)*** -  - 
Investment 0.03(1.35) -  - 0.023(1.11) - 
Leverage 0.006(0.32) - 0.06(3.92)*** - 0.03(2.78)*** - 
Amenity 0.07(1.59) - -0.11(-2.72)* - 0.07(1.17) - 
Control -0.06(-2.22)** - -0.058(-2.53)** - -0.048(-1.00) - 
Industry -0.05(-2.71)*** -  - -0.05(-2.5)** - 
FirmSpecific -0.001(-0.11) - 0.07(3.24)*** - - - 
MarketSpecific -0.03(-1.27) - -0.17(-5.83)*** - - - 
RnD 0.008(0.48) - 0.04(2.15)** - -0.02(1.28) - 
CapExp -0.06(-5.19)*** - -0.01(-0.81) - -0.05(-4.37)*** - 
AdvExp -0.016(-0.98) - -0.03(-1.32) - - - 
Published37 - -  - - - 
OLS -0.002(-0.16) - 0.03(0.91) - 0.032(3.05)*** - 
PARAM 0.05(1.84)* - 0.15(3.90)*** - 0.09(4.11)*** - 
SPARAM 0.045(1.57) - - - 0.09(4.19)*** - 
GLS - - - - - - 
Wls 0.14(4.34)*** - - - 0.25(12.14)*** - 
2SLS -0.002(-0.02) - - - - - 
3SLS -0.001(-0.23) - -0.56(-1.85)* - - - 
FE -0.01(-0.44) - - - - - 
RE 0.07(2.76)*** - 0.14(4.26)*** - 0.16(6.34)*** - 
Cross -0.03(-1.77)* - 0.04(1.84)* - -0.02(-0.78) - 
Pooled - - - - - - 
Robust -0.01(-0.55) - -0.06(-3.52)*** - 0.04(2.05)** - 
Anglo-Saxon -0.008(-0.62) - -0.07(-3.65)*** - -0.02(-1.52) - 
Insiders 0.037(2.36)** - - - - - 
                                                     
36
Comparative Bivariate MRA FAT-PET estimates for the Subsamples Partly LinearInsiders vs. full sample– OLS-weighted cluster robust estimate - are presented in 
Appendix 3.1. 
37
 According to Stanley et al., (2012, p. 383) research papers that conduct MRAs in economics should include in the process of  literature coding  a dummy of the year of the 
data used and/or publication year. Therefore, a dummy variable for the publication year is included in the model specification. However, in the model specifications this 
variable has a very high VIF value and is statistically insignificant, which incentivizes us to exclude it from the model specifications. 
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Endogeneity - - 0.25(0.72) - 0.05(3.57)*** - 
Tobin_s_q -0.01(-1.12) - 0.006(0.87) - -0.01(-1.06) - 
Top5 - - - - - - 
oc 0.008(0.31) - -0.04(-0.81) - - - 
ocsquared - - - - - - 
ocsthird2 - - - - - - 
ocfourth - - - - - - 
ocfifth - - - - - - 
Oclow 0.031(1.47) - 0.035(1.46) -  - 
Ocmedium -0.036(-1.16) - -0.03(-1.02) - 0.06(5.92)*** - 
Ochigh - - - - - - 
Purelinear - - - - - - 
Partlylinear - - - - - - 
Quadratic - - - - - - 
Model Diagnostics 
N 582 582 301 301 281 281 
R-squared 0.23 0.002 0.281 0.002 0.35 0.016 
F-TestH0: independent 
variables are jointly equal 0 
F( 28, 553) = 9.23 
Prob > F  =  0.00 
F(  1, 53) = 0.18 
Prob > F  =  0.67 
- 
- 
F(1,30)=0.17 F( 19,   261) = 21.1                               
Prob > F      =  0.00 
F( 1,43) = 0.16 
Prob > F  = 0.69 
Ramsey RESET Test:H0: 
Correct Functional  form 
F(3, 550) = 2.38 
Prob > F = 0.07 
F(3, 577) = 3.26 
Prob > F =  0.02 
F(3, 275) = 13.32 
Prob> F = 0.000 
F(3, 296) = 12.22 
Prob> F = 0.00 
F(3, 258) = 2.68 
Prob > F = 0.05 
F(3, 276)=2.49 
Prob> F = 0.055 
VIF 5.25  6.60  6.73  
Source: Calculations of the Author, Stata 11 
Note:  *, ** and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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For the whole pure linear sample (n=582) both multivariate (Column 1) and bivariate 
(Column 2) MRA suggest pronounced positive publication bias (FAT) and the absence 
of an authentic empirical effect (PET). In the pure linear insiders subsample (n=301), 
the FAT procedure yields mixed evidence of publication bias (not suggested by the 
multivariate estimate but suggested by the bivariate estimate), while the PET procedure 
yields mixed evidence of a significant positive authentic empirical effect (suggested by 
the multivariate but not by the bivariate estimate) (Columns 3 and 4). In contrast, while 
multivariate MRA on the pure linear outsiders subsample (n=281) (Column 5) yields 
evidence of publication bias, it yields a somewhat negative authentic empirical effect, 
which contrasts with the positive effect suggested for the pure linear insiders sample 
(although neither effect is found in the bivariate MRA.). This suggests that the overall 
results for the whole pure linear sample (insiders plus outsiders) are potentially 
misleading in that they may aggregate structurally different and offsetting effects from 
the Insiders and outsiders subsamples. In addition, diagnostic failure with respect to 
functional form at the five per cent level suggests that these results may be problematic; 
if the relationship in this sub-sample is non-linear then coefficient estimates will be 
biased and statistical inference invalid. Hence, the Column 3 and 4 estimates must be 
treated as indicative at best. Nonetheless, the multivariate estimates from the pure linear 
insiders subsample (Column 3) contrast with those from the pure linear outsiders 
subsample (Column 5). MRA on the pure linear outsiders subsample (n=281) (Column 
5) yields evidence of publication bias, while a somewhat negative authentic empirical 
effect contrasts with the positive effect suggested for the pure linear insiders sample. 
(Although neither effect is found in the bivariate MRA.) This suggests that the overall 
results for the whole pure linear sample are potentially misleading in that they may 
aggregate structurally different and offsetting effects from the Insiders and outsiders 
subsamples. 
 
3.4.4 Pure Linear Insiders subsample: FAT–PET and meta-regression results 
 
The multivariate pure linear insiders MRA model (Column 3), reported in Table 3.5 
explains 28% of the variation in firm performance, i.e. the overall fit of the regression is 
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moderate. However, the estimates of the multivariate MRA model referring to the pure 
linear insiders subsample can not be trusted. The Ramsey RESET test (p=0.00) clearly 
rejects - at the five percent level of significance - the null hypothesis of correct 
specification with respect to the assumed linear functional form of the model. This 
suggests that the linear specification of the ownership concentration-firm performance 
relationship, in the context of insiders as the largest owners, may be inappropriate. 
Further investigation is needed in the context of the quadratic and part linear 
subsamples, explained in subsection 3.4.6. 
 
Furthermore, existence of nonlinearity in the insiders pure linear subsample makes 
explanation of the estimates at best indicative. Consequently, we only briefly present 
results obtained from the pure linear insiders data set. The FAT procedure for no 
evidence of publication selection bias. The PET procedure indicates the presence of an 
authentic empirical effect beyond the bias of publication selection (reject H0:β1=0, 
tmultivariate_insiders=1.96 (Column 3)).  
 
 
3.4.5 Pure Linear Outsiders subsample: FAT–PET and meta-regression results 
 
 
The multivariate pure linear outsiders MRA model, reported in Table 3.5 (Column 5) 
explains about 35% of the variation in firm performance, i.e. the overall fit of the 
regression is relatively high. The model captures much of the heterogeneity in the 
literature. The RESET test suggests (p=0.05) that linear functional form is a plausible 
assumption; i.e. that problems do not exist with respect to the assumed linear functional 
form of the MRA model. 
The pure linear outsiders MRA subsample FAT procedure shows a clear sign of 
publication selection bias in the multivariate specification (reject H0: β0=0, 
tmultivariate_outsiders=3.08) toward positive values (Table 3.5, Column 5). Once we control 
for sources of heterogeneity in the literature and after controlling for the presence of 
publication bias, the authentic empirical effect is estimated using the PET procedure. 
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The PET procedure shows that – ceteris paribus - there is a negative underlying genuine 
authentic empirical effect (to reject H0:β1=0, tmultivariate _outsiders=-2.92). The direction of 
the β1 coefficient is negative as opposed to the positive estimate for the Insider MRA 
subsample (Column 3).  
 
The results (Column 5) reveal the presence of a set of moderator variables that identify 
key dimensions in the ‘true’ heterogeneity; i.e. moderator variables control for study-
related factors that may explain variation in the results. The following moderator 
variables in the MRA yield positive and statistically significant effects: Re, OLS, WLS, 
Parametric and Semi-parametric approaches (SPARAM), the level of leverage 
(Leverage), the presence of endogeneity (Endogeneity), present diagnostics (Robust) or 
define ownership concentration in the medium range (Ocmedium). These results 
suggest that model specifications in the primary literature with these characteristics are 
more likely to find a positive (or less negative) impact of outsider ownership 
concentration on firm performance. Conversely, those studies that control for Capital 
Expenditures (CapExp) or for Industry specification (Industry) are more likely to report 
a negative (or less positive) relationship between ownership concentration (outsiders) 
and firm performance. 
 
Taking into account that the inverse of SEpcc interacts with the moderator variables in 
the multivariate model, it is the combination of all the explanatory variables and the 
respective reference categories that indicate the existence the size of the authentic 
empirical effect (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009; Haile and Pugh, 2012). In the case of 
multivariate MRA for the Pure Linear outsiders subsample, the effect size in the 
multivariate model is not purely the coefficient estimate on the inverse of SEpcc. 
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Table 3.6: The spectrum of empirical effects of moderator variables- studies with 
specific characteristics - Pure Linear Sample /Multivariate/Outsiders
38
 
Study characteristics  
(other factors held constant) 
Combined 
coefficient 
t-statics p-value 
Studies holding for leverage (H0: 1/SEpcc + Se_Leverage) -0.07 -1.85 0.07 
Studies holding for Industry (H0: 1/SEpcc + Se_Industry) -0.15 -5.18 0.00 
Studies holding for capital expenditures (H0: 1/SEpcc + Se_CapExp) -0.14 -4.2 0.05 
Studies holding for WLS as estimation technique (H0:1/SEpcc + WLS) 0.15 4.57 0.00 
Studies presenting robustness check(H0:1/SEpcc+ Se_Robust) -0.06 -2.43 0.02 
Studies which data gathered from Anglo-Saxon countries (H0:1/SEpcc + 
Se_AngloSaxon) 
-0.12 -3.02 0.00 
Studies which controls for endogeneity (H0:1/SEpcc + Se_endogeneity) -0.05 -1.8 0.08 
Studies which uses cross section sample (H0:1/SEpcc + Se_cross) -0.11 -2.91 0.00 
Note: The results are the combined coefficients and t-statistics of 1/SEpcc and the above variables from 
the cluster-robust linear regression. Estimates were obtained using Stata’s 11 post-estimation command 
‘lincom’. 
 
Taking into account that in multivariate MRA the effect of precision – measured by the 
inverse of SEpcc – on the estimated effect of ownership on firm performance is 
moderated by a range of study characteristics, we combine the estimated precision 
effect with, in turn, the estimated effect of each statistically significant moderator 
variable (plus Anglo-Saxon, which is borderline). In this way, we obtain, ceteris 
paribus, estimates of the empirical effects typically arising from studies with the 
characteristic captured by the particular moderator variable relative to studies with the 
characteristic captured by the particular reference group (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 
2009; Haile and Pugh, 2012).  
 
In the case of multivariate MRA for the Pure Linear Outsiders subsample, Table 3.6 
reports the statistically significant combinations and shows that in all but one case 
(studies that use the WLS estimation technique), the moderator variables capture study 
characteristics tending to yield a stronger (negative) effect size. Of course, it is possible 
to obtain further combinations arising from multiple characteristics relative to their 
respective reference characteristics. However, given that these would compound mainly 
                                                     
38
 Printouts available in Appendix 3.3 
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negative effects, estimates from combinations of multiple moderator variables would 
not add substantially to those reported in Table 3.6. 
3.4.6 Partly Linear and Quadratic subsamples: FAT–PET and meta-regression 
results 
 
Estimates on the partly linear full sample (i.e. insider and outsider ownership) and the 
partly linear insiders MRA subsamples, reported in Table 3.7, explain about 53% 
(Column 1) and 32% (Column 2) of the variation in firm performance, respectively; and 
the quadratic full sample and quadratic insiders MRA subsamples explain about 49% 
(Column 3) and 43% (Column 4) of the variation in firm performance, respectively. In 
relation to MRAs in other empirical literatures in economics (Coric and Pugh, 2010), 
the goodness of fit of these regressions is relatively high. The RESET test suggests that 
linear functional form is not a plausible assumption for Partly linear full specification 
(Column 1), which puts a question mark over the appropriateness of the partly linear 
(insiders + outsiders) specification. For the Partly Linear Insiders subsample, the 
RESET test yields a borderline failure at the five per cent level (p=0.03). However, 
estimation of a slightly more parsimonious model (achieved by omitting the non-
significant influence of the Endogeneity variable) yields a satisfactory RESET (p=0.05) 
and leaves the FAT unchanged (the estimated constant is 1.68 with a t-statistic of 2.07, 
in both cases very similar to the results reported in Column 2). The Quadratic (insiders 
+outsiders) subsample (Column 3) is satisfactory with respect to linearity (p=0.24), 
while the Quadratic Insiders subsample (Column 4) is borderline at the five per cent 
level (p=0.04). 
 
We do not report MRA results for the partly linear outsiders specification for two 
reasons. Firstly, there is at best only a weak theoretical grounding for a non-linear 
relationship between ownership concentration among outside owners and firm 
performance. Those few studies that do assess the relationship between outsider owners 
and firm performance using a nonlinear functional form do not provide any theoretical 
explanation for this approach. Rather, we conjecture that this specification may be the 
result of specification search conducted by researchers to obtain “significant” and novel 
results. Secondly, there are relatively few studies of this type (the partly linear and 
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quadratic specifications account for only three studies, contributing 32 observations, in 
the MRA database). Accordingly, we focus our attention on the results obtained from 
the insider quadratic (Column 4) and insiders partly linear (Column 2) MRA 
specifications. 
 
The most interesting result is that in the literature investigating the hypothesised non-
linear relationship between Insiders’ ownership concentration and firm performance, the 
sign of the publication bias in the estimates of both the linear term and the quadratic 
term reflects the path of the expected, inverted-U shaped relationship. First, in the 
multivariate MRA for the partly linear specification for Insiders (Table 3.7, Column 2) 
the t-statistic for the null hypothesis H0: β0=0 is statistically significant and positive (H0: 
β0=0 is rejected: tmultivariate_partlinear=2.13), which indicates publication bias toward 
positive estimates (Table 3.7, Column 2). Secondly, in multivariate MRA estimation of 
the quadratic insiders subsample (Column 4) the t-statistic for the null hypothesis H0: 
β0=0 is statistically significant and negative (H0: β0=0 is overwhelmingly rejected: 
tmultivariate_quadratic_insiders=-3.94), which indicates the presence of publication bias in 
favour of negative estimates (Table 3.7, Column 4). Together, these results reflect a 
pattern of publication bias precisely in line with the prediction of the prevailing theory 
regarding a nonlinear, inverted-U relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm performance. 
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Table 3.7: Comparative Multivariate MRA FAT-PET estimates for the Subsamples Partly 
Linear Insiders vs. full sample – OLS-weighted cluster robust estimate 
 
Variables 
Partly Linear 
(Insiders+Outsiders) 
Sample Multivariate 
Cluster-robust Linear 
Regression 
(Column 1) 
Partly Linear Sample 
Multivariate -Insiders 
Cluster-robust Linear 
Regression 
 
(Column 2) 
Quadratic (insiders 
+outsiders) 
Multivariate 
Cluster-robust 
Linear Regression 
(Column 3) 
Quadratic  
Multivariate -
Insiders 
Cluster-robust 
Linear Regression 
(Column 4) 
Intercept (FAT) 0.98 (1.74)* 1.72(2.13)** -2.25(-2.13)** -3.22(-3.94)** 
1_see_pcc (PET) 0.074(1.95)* 0.089(1.89)* 0.046 (0.77) 0.077(1.72)* 
Size -0.03(-1.43) -0.03(-1.77)* 0.041(2.49)** 0.029(1.37) 
Investment -  -0.009(-0.30) 0.039(2.58) 
Leverage 0.04(2.13)** -0.017(-0.74) -0.031(-0.88) -0.044(-1.93)* 
Amenity -0.09(-2.74)*** -0.12(-2.61)** 0.241(4.22)*** 0.227(4.45)*** 
Control 0.02(0.64) - -0.147(-3.65)*** - 
Industry 0.008(0.62) - -0.003(-0.13) - 
FirmSpecific - 
- 
- -0.034(-1.24) -0.014(-0.47) 
MarketSpecific - -  - 
RnD - 0.9(0.39) -0.037(-0.93) -0.013(-0.77) 
CapExp - - -0.016(-0.76) -0.014(-0.92) 
AdvExp -0.03(-1.64) - 0.040(1.28) -0.013(-0.40) 
OLS -0.05(-4.43)*** -0.065(-1.81)* - 0.034(1.49) 
PARAM - - -0.029(-0.98) - 
SPARAM 0.011(0.73) - - - 
GLS - -0.07(-1.80)* -0.051(-1.47) -0.034(-1.33) 
WLS 0.11(2.51)*** - -0.214(-4.67)*** - 
2SLS - - 0.013(0.66) 0.026(1.16) 
3SLS 0.096(2.38)** 0.102(1.89)* -0.118(-2.01)** - 
FE -0.018(-1.41) -0.038(-2.16)** - - 
RE - - - - 
Cross -0.113(-3.17)*** -0.09(-1.52) 0.135(2.12)** 0.082(1.37) 
Pooled -0.05(-3.82)*** - 0.049(2.03)** - 
Robust 0.022(1.06) 0.003(0.11) -0.055(-1.54) - 
Anglo saxon -0.029(-1.42) -0.01(-0.38) -0.021(-0.70) -0.083(-2.53)** 
Insiders 0.03(1.00) - 0.006(0.27) - 
Endogeneity  -0.032(-1.10) -0.023(-1.26) - 
Tobin_s_q 0.009(1.04) -0.013(-0.84) 0.013(2.41)** 0.021(3.94)*** 
Diagnostic 
N 150 118 150 118 
R-squared 0.53 0.32 0.49 0.43 
F Test  H0: independent 
variables are jointly equal 0 
F( 18, 131) =13.40 
Prob > F  =  0.00F 
na na F( 13, 104) =3.13 
Prob > F =  0.00 
Ramsey RESET Test:H0: 
Correct Functional  form 
F(3,128)=6.03 
Prob> F = 0.00 
F(3,101)=3.12 
Prob> F = 0.033 
F(3, 125) = 1.41 
Prob> F = 0.242 
F(3, 101) = 2.97 
Prob> F =  0.044 
Vif 9.8 5.82  4.83 
Source: Calculations of the Author, Stata 11 
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Note:  * and ** and ** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. t-
statistics are in parentheses. 
 
The combination of the signs of the publication bias estimated by MRA of the Partly 
linear sample (positive) and of the Quadratic sample (negative) follow the prediction of 
the theory supporting a non-linear, convex relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance; i.e. “the positive effect of a better alignment of 
shareholder and manager interests in the case of very high ownership concentration 
might be small compared to potential negative effects due to private benefits of 
controlling shareholders” (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Han and Suk, 1998; Thomsen 
and Pedersen, 1999; Balsmeier and Czarnitzki, 2010; McConnel et al., 2008; Morck, et 
al., 1988; Wruck, 1989; etc.). Hence, the theory which supports a curvilinear 
relationship between (insider) ownership concentration and firm performance is 
reflected in the hypothesis: 
 
H0: The relationship between firm performance and ownership concentration is 
curvilinear, i.e. in the equation firm performance =a*OC+b*OC
2
, where
 
 a>0 and b<0 
and a<‐2b 
 
As Stanley and Doucouliagos (2008, p. 7) argues, the main source the “publication 
selection found in economics may be the result of an understandable desire to report 
findings that are statistically significant (hence noteworthy) and of the ‘correct’ sign 
(hence perceived to be ‘valid’)”. The findings of separate MRAs on the two components 
of interest specified by models in the primary literature testing the above hypothesis – 
ownership and ownership squared – are fully consistent with this statement. Together, 
these two MRAs reveal the statistical trace of researchers’ specification searches for 
results consistent with the theory of a nonlinear relationship between insider ownership 
and firm performance.  
 
However, it is difficult to assess whether publication selection bias emerges from the 
supply side (authors’ over-reporting of results with the expected sign) or from the 
demand side (editors’ or referees’ reluctance to publish results that are contrary to the 
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expectations). As yet, to the author’s knowledge, this is an issue that has not been 
explored in the meta-regression literature. Hence, the analytic range of MRA does not 
(yet) include differentiating the contributory influences that give rise to publication bias. 
Nonetheless, the MRA methodology adopted in this chapter does enable us address our 
primary aims regarding publication bias: namely, to measure publication bias and so 
identify authentic empirical effects – if any – “beyond publication bias” (i.e. effects 
suggested by an empirical literature after publication bias has been netted out).  
Once we control for publication bias in the Partly linear subsample (Column 2), we find 
evidence for the existence of a genuine positive empirical effect (H0: β1=0 can be 
rejected at the 10% level: tmultivariate_partlinear=1.89). Similarly, once we control for 
(negative) publication bias in the Quadratic subsample (Column 4), we find evidence 
for the existence of a genuine positive empirical effect (H0: β1=0 can be rejected at the 
10% level: tquadratic=1.72).
39
 This suggests, as hypothesised in the primary literature, the 
existence of a genuinely positive effect of the ownership concentration of Insiders on 
firm performance. However, the hypothesised quadratic (“inverted-U”) relationship is 
not supported by this finding. Once we net out publication bias, both the linear and the 
quadratic effects are positive and statistically significant, which is contrary to the 
positive/negative pattern posited by the theory (see the hypothesis set out above). 
 
In the context of the partly linear insiders subsample, the positive authentic empirical 
effect found in the multivariate specification remains positive across various moderator 
variable interactions with the effect size (Table 3.8).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
39
The rejection related to the linear effect in the bivariate model is stronger: tmultivariate Quadratic=2.19. The 
bivariate counterparts to the results reported in Table 3.7 are reported in Appendix 3.1. 
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Table 3.8: The spectrum of empirical effects of moderator variables for studies 
with specific characteristics - Partly Linear Insiders
40
 
Study characteristics (other factors held constant) Combined 
coefficient 
t-statics p-value 
Studies holding for  uncertainity (H0: 1/SEpcc +Se_R&D) 0.11 1.66 0.11 
Results obtained from studies using 3SLS estimation(H0: 1/SEpcc 
+3SLS) 
0.2 2.36 0.03 
Results obtained from studies presenting robustness checks (H0: 
1/SEpcc +Robust) 
0.1 2.06 0.05 
Results obtained from studies  conducted in Anglo-saxon countries 
(H0: 1/SEpcc + Anglo-saxon) 
0.09 1.96 0.06 
Results obtained from studies holding for endogeneity (H0: 1/SEpcc + 
endogeneity) 
0.06 1.74 0.1 
Results obtained from studies using Tobins’ Q as firm performance  
(H0: 1/SEpcc + Tobins’ Q) 
0.08 1.71 0.1 
Note: The results are the combined coefficients and t-statistics of 1/SEpcc and the above variables from 
the cluster-robust linear regression on the extended data set reported in Table 3.7 Estimates were obtained 
using Stata’s 11 post-estimation command. ‘lincom.  
 
In the quadratic insiders subsample (Column 4), a positive authentic empirical effect 
evident in the multivariate specification is also persistent in various combinations of 
significant moderator variables (Table 3.9) with the effect size. A nonpositive effect can 
not be achieved with any pair of the precision effect plus a significant moderator 
variable, nor in a wider combination (Table 3.9, the last row). These results suggest the 
robustness of a positive authentic empirical effect. 
Table 3.9: The spectrum of empirical effects of moderator variables for studies 
with specific characteristics- Quadratic Insiders
41
 
Study characteristics (other factors held constant) Combined 
coefficient 
t-statics p-value 
Studies holding for amenity (H0: 1/SEpcc + Amenity) 0.31 4.48 0.00 
Studies holding for size (H0: 1/SEpcc + Size) 0.11 3.14 0.005 
Studies holding for Investment (H0: 1/SEpcc +Investment) 0.12 2.28 0.03 
Results obtained from OLS estimation (H0: 1/SEpcc +OLS) 0.11 2.73 0.01 
Results obtained from 2SLS estimation (H0: 1/SEpcc +2SLS) 0.1 2.62 0.02 
Studies using TobinsQ as a proxy  for firm performance 
(H0: 1/SEpcc +Tobins’Q) 
0.1 2.12 0.05 
SEE + Size + Se_investment + se_amenity5 + Se_GLS + Se_2SLS + Se_OLS + 
Se_TobinsQ 
0.42 4.43 0.00 
                                                     
40
 Printouts available in Appendix 3.3 
41
 Printouts available in Appendix 3.3 
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Note: The results are the combined coefficients and t-statistics of 1/SEpcc and the above variables from 
the cluster-robust linear regression on the extended data set reported in Table 3.7 Estimates were obtained 
using Stata’s 11 post-estimation command. ‘lincom.’ 
 
Finally, we compare Column 3 in Table 3.5, (the pure linear insiders sample) with 
Column 2 in Table 3.7 (the partly linear insiders sample). In other words, we compare 
the specifications in which only ownership is specified with the specifications in which 
both the level of ownership and ownership squared are specified. Here, we compare the 
results of diagnostic testing for functional form: in the former, the null of linearity is 
clearly rejected (F=13.32 and p=0.000); in the latter, although the null of linearity is still 
rejected at the 5% level it is not rejected at the one per cent level (F=3.12 and p=0.033). 
We now set out an argument as to why this diagnostic improvement may be revealing 
about the literature. In doing so, we believe that we are raising for the first time a 
possible line of enquiry for MRA more generally, which typically does not comment on 
model diagnostics (or, quite commonly, even report model diagnostics). 
 
 
3.4.6 Omitted non-linear terms in primary regressions and non-linearity in MRA 
 
In the primary regressions, we may contrast a stylised true model, in which recent 
theory proposes the inclusion of a non-linear term, with the corresponding model 
actually estimated by many studies in the literature. 
 
True Model: 𝐹𝑃𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖
2 + 𝜀𝑖  (1) 
Model estimated:  𝐹𝑃𝑖 = ?̂? + ?̂?1𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                           (2) 
Hence: ?̂?𝑖 = (𝛽2𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖
2 + 𝜀𝑖)                                                      (3) 
 
In this case, the model estimated suffers from omitted variables bias. Hence: 
 
1. given that Ownership and Ownership2 are correlated, Ownership is correlated 
with the non-linear error term ui, which means that Ownership is endogenous; 
and 
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2. the beta coefficient on Ownership in the (misspecified) estimated model 
measures not only the effect of Ownership on firm performance but also the 
effect of the correlation between Ownership and the omitted non-linear term in 
the regression residual (ui). 
The bias on the estimated 𝛽1coefficient on ownership in the primary regressions is 
given by the following formula: 
 
 
where r12 measures the correlation between ownership and (ownership)
2
 and f denotes a 
function of r12.  
 
The MRA effect size reflects this omitted non-linearity through its introduction into the 
t–statistic on the estimated 𝛽1coefficient on Ownership. Because the regression error 
term (ui) contains the omitted non-linear effect of ownership squared, this omitted non-
linearity is introduced into the calculation of the standard error and so into the 
calculation of the t-statistic (see below). Finally, this non-linearity influences the MRA 
effect size - the PCC – because this is calculated from the t-statistic (see Pugh et al., 
2012, p. 295, for the derivation of the PCC). Hence, the omission of non-linear effects 
in the primary regression may be reflected in non-linearity in the MRA.  
 
Without access to the data for every primary regression, and then re-estimating each 
regression with the non-linear ownership term, it is not possible to be definite as to the 
size or even the direction of the bias in the t-statistic (unless we assume the sign of the 
non-linear effect suggested by theory). Moreover, there is a second dimension of 
difficulty confronting any attempt to be precise as to the size and direction of the bias. 
Because the t-statistic on the estimated coefficient on the ownership variable is subject 
to bias, the behaviour of researchers engaged in specification search will add a source of 
bias that is itself conditional on omitted variables bias. However, although the effect of 
this omitted variables bias in the primary regressions on the direction and, especially, 
the size of the omitted variables bias on our effect size is unknowable, we do know that 
the effect must be non-linear.  
  )(ˆ 12211 rfE  
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This suggested relationship between omitted non-linearity in the primary regressions 
and non-linearity in the meta regression has important implications for the practice of 
MRA in general and for the interpretation of a large part of the literature on ownership 
concentration and performance in particular. Our argument suggests that diagnostic 
failure with respect to the validity of a linear model in the meta regression may reveal 
the trace of a similar specification failure in the primary regressions. Moreover, this 
possibility is particularly relevant when the literature under investigation omits a non-
linear term specified by theory.   
 
The formula for the t-statistic is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The t-statistic is positively related to: 
 
 the size of the estimated coefficient ?̂?𝑖, which in MRA is the effect size from the 
primary regressions; 
 the square root of the degrees of freedom (DF); and  
 variation of each variable Xi around its mean. 
 
and negatively related to: 
 the size of the error terms (the ?̂?𝑖) and  
 the size of correlation between each variable Xi and the other independent 
variables(𝑅𝑖
2). 
 
If we substitute from (3) above for the error term ?̂?𝑖, then – even in the simplest case in 
which ownership and ownership-squared are assumed to be uncorrelated (so that the 
estimated coefficient is not biased) - the t-statistic contains an obvious source of bias: 

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𝑡?̂?𝑖 =
?̂?𝑖
(√∑(𝛽2𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖
2+𝜀𝑖)
2 1
√𝐷𝐹
)
√∑(𝑋𝑖−?̅?)2(1−𝑅𝑖
2)
 
 
We can gain insight into the nature of the bias if we differentiate the t-statistic with 
respect to the omitted term in the primary regression – i.e. the model estimated – set out 
in Equation (2) above: 
 
𝜕(𝑡?̂?𝑖
)
𝜕(𝛽2𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖
2)
=-(?̂?𝑖 ∗ √∑(𝑋𝑖 − ?̅?)2 (1 − 𝑅𝑖
2) ∗ √𝐷𝐹/2)*∑(2𝛽2𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖) /(∑(𝛽2𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖
2 + 𝜀𝑖)2)
3
2 
 
 
The first derivative of the t-statistic with respect to the omitted quadratic term in the 
primary regression is non-linear and negative. In other words, given that the effect of 
the quadratic term “beyond publication bias” is positive, the effect of omitting the 
quadratic term is to impart a downward bias to the statistical significance of the 
estimates of the ownership effect on firm performance. In this case, we can conclude 
that while in the Pure Linear sample the omission of the quadratic term from primary 
studies on the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance may entail some 
quantitative bias (an underestimated positive effect), the effects of such misspecification 
are qualitatively benign in that the positive direction of the effect is unaffected. 
Accordingly, both the Pure Linear and Partly Linear samples gives rise to qualitatively 
similar estimates: namely, a statistically significant positive effect of insider ownership 
concentration on firm performance. 
 
 
3.5. Summary of results –key points 
 
This study applied MRA to the extensive empirical literature on the ownership 
concentration-firm performance relationship. MRA results support the view that the 
empirical evidence concerning the relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm performance is mixed, inconsistent and highly inconclusive (Sanches–Ballesta and 
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Garcia-Meca, 2007). According to Hu and Izumida (2008) there are various reasons 
why ownership-performance relationships vary, such as: (i) quality of corporate 
governance frameworks in which firms are embedded; (ii) differences in estimating 
technique applied; (iii) treatment of endogeneity of ownership; (iv) ownership and 
performance measurements; and (v) data quality, etc. Summarizing results from the 
different MRA specifications reported above, at least four fundamental results can be 
presented. 
 
Firstly, the funnel graphs predominantly suggest publication selection. In turn, this 
suggests that meta-analytic estimates of empirical effects in this literature must control 
for publication bias. MRA is designed to estimate authentic empirical effects together 
with sources of heterogeneity in reported effects "beyond" or net of publication bias. 
 
Secondly, the FAT-PET testing procedure within the framework of multivariate MRA 
confirms that this literature is heavily affected by publication bias. Across various 
specifications publication bias is not only present but appears in the directions posited 
by the prevailing theory. Most interestingly, for the insiders samples we find publication 
bias corresponding to the “inverted-U” relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance favoured by the prevailing theory: i.e. positive values for the 
linear component (ownership concentration) of a quadratic specification (partly linear 
sub-sample; Table 3.7, Column 2); but negative values for the quadratic component 
(ownership concentration squared) of a quadratic specification (quadratic insiders sub-
sample; Table 3.7, Column 4). Here, theoretical assumptions are reflected perfectly by 
the estimated pattern of publication bias. This suggests that researchers responded to 
incentives to conform to mainstream theoretical views. Here, MRA is performing its 
task of detecting the statistical trace of such, otherwise unobserved, selection processes 
(Pugh et al., 2012). 
 
Thirdly, in the full sample multivariate specification (Table 3.3, Column 1) the PET 
procedure does reveal the presence of an authentic positive empirical effect. However, 
the Ramsey Reset yields a clear rejection of the null of linearity (p=0.00). This may 
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suggest that the linear specification of the ownership concentration-firm performance 
relationship is not appropriate. In subsamples of Pure linear Insiders (Table 3.5, Column 
3) and Outsiders (Table 3.5, Column 5 ) underlying authentic empirical effects appear, 
but with opposite signs (positive in the Insiders subsample and negative in the Outsiders 
subsample; Table 3.5, Column 3 and Column 5). Namely, MRA of the Pure Linear 
Insiders sample reveals a positive impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance; yet MRA of the Pure Linear Outsiders sample yields a negative 
underlying empirical effect. This demonstrates primary sources of heterogeneity in this 
literature and, hence, supports sub sampling as a legitimate strategy for MRA analysis 
in the context of this empirical literature. 
 
Moreover, our initial approach, equivalent to partitioning the data, was to estimate the 
full sample with a set of the most interesting interaction terms. Although, in principle, 
there should be a clear gain in efficiency arising from the use of all the data to estimate 
the subsample effects, the disadvantage of using interaction variables is even more 
pronounced multicollinearity. We have acknowledged the likely presence of 
multicollinearity in our estimates, while arguing that this is not so pronounced as to 
prevent informative results from being obtained (Section 3.3.2 above). However, 
estimating with interaction terms gives rise to the situation noted by Stanley and 
Doucouliagos (2012, p. 91), whereby “all-inclusive” MRA models can be greatly 
limited, because “the fog of multicollinearity and and low statistical power virtually 
guarantees the obscuring of much of the existing pattern of research”. More importantly, 
Ramsey RESET testing of all specifications using interaction variables yields a clear 
suggestion that the linear specification, based on the full sample, of the ownership 
concentration-firm performance relationship is not supported by the data. For these 
reasons, our preferred strategy is to exploit the size of our dataset to partition the data 
into theoretically-specified subsamples for separate estimation, which is the usual 
procedure in MRA. 
 
In addition, all the multivariate MRAs reported above include statistically significant 
moderator variables, each one of which reveals sources of heterogeneity in the effects 
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reported in this literature, typically arising either from characteristics of the samples or 
from features of the modelling procedures chosen by researchers. For example, it 
appears that studies using samples from Anglo Saxon countries are less likely to find 
the presence of a genuine empirical effect in various subsamples (with some 
exceptions).
42
 Moreover, the same can be concluded for those studies that employ 
robustness checks for various model estimations. 
 
  
                                                     
42
Our findings are supporting the part of the empirical literature which strongly argues that the overall 
impact of block holders on performance is insignificant in Anglo-saxon corporate governance systems 
such as the USA and the UK (due to pronounced ownership diversification, high share trading frequency 
and strong protection of investors).  
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Table 3.10: Summary of key results from the multivariate MRA specifications 
 
 Multivariate-
Full Sample 
Pure Linear 
Sample 
Multivariate-
Full Sample 
Pure Linear 
Sample 
Multivariate-
Insiders 
Pure Linear 
Sample 
Multivariate-
Outsiders 
Partial  
Linear 
Sample 
Multivariate-
Full Sample 
Partial  
Linear 
Sample 
Multivariate-
Insiders 
Quadratic  
Multivariate-
Full Sample 
Quadratic  
Multivariate-
Insiders 
 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  
Hypothesis 
suggested 
 by the  
Funnel  
Graph  
H0: Existence 
of positive 
publication 
bias (see 
Figure 3.1) 
H0: Existence 
of positive 
publication bias 
(Figure 3.4) 
H0: Existence 
of positive 
publication 
bias 
(Figure 3.5) 
H0: Absence 
of publication 
bias  
(Figure 3.6) 
H0: Existence 
of positive 
publication 
bias 
(Figure 3.7) 
H0: Existence 
of positive 
publication 
bias 
(Figure 3.8) 
H0: Existence 
of negative 
publication 
bias 
(Figure 3.9) 
H0: Existence 
of negative 
publication 
bias 
(Figure 3.10) 
Expectation 
supported 
yes yes no no yes yes yes yes 
FAT +* +* + +* +* +* -* -* 
PET +* + +* -* + +* + +* 
Expectations supported: whether hypothesis from the funnel graph are supported with FAT results 
Sign * denotes whether the effect is significant at the ten percent level of significance. 
Signs +- denotes direction of the publication bias or authentic empirical effect, where + refers to positive and - to negative direction of the publication bias or 
authentic empirical effec
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Table 3.10 presents an overview of our findings on publication bias and authentic 
empirical effect (abstracting from the effects of the various moderator variables) in both 
the whole sample (Column 1) and in all seven sub-sample multivariate MRA models 
discussed above (Columns 2 to 8) together with an indication in each case of how 
accurately the corresponding funnel plot indicated the presence of publication bias and 
its direction. 
 
In essence, from Table 3.10 we may conclude that provisional hypotheses on the 
presence or absence of publication bias, formulated in the light of visual inspection of 
the funnel plots, are to a large extent (in six from eight cases) consistent with the results 
of statistical tests from mainstream MRA methodology. Although Table 3.10 reveals 
overwhelming (Row 3) presence of publication bias in almost all subsamples, there is 
some difference between the assumptions formed from inspecting funnel plots and the 
statistical results obtained from MRA. For example, the two cases of the Pure linear 
subsample for outsiders (Table 3.10, Column 4) and the Pure linear subsample for 
insiders (Table 3.10, Column 3) indicate that funnel plots can be used only as an 
indicative tool for detection of publication bias: in the former case, the corresponding 
multivariate MRA result does not achieve statistical significance; while in the latter the 
impression of the funnel plot is strongly contradicted by the multivariate MRA finding. 
 
 
3.5.1 Robustness check- comparison of MRA and SG MA results 
 
In this Section, we compare our key results and the results obtained by Sanches–
Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (henceforth SG). Given the similar structure of the moderator 
variables and sub sampling procedures of these two studies, comparison of results could 
provide useful insights as well as robustness checks of the results reported above. 
However, we criticize major limitations of SG (2007): first and foremost, they do not 
investigate or control for the presence of publication selection; secondly, they use 
insufficient moderator variables to control for important sources of pronounced 
heterogeneity in the literature. 
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We compare only results from analysing the Insiders subsample, because our research 
and SG (2007) use different definitions of “Outsiders” and “ownership concentration”. 
43 The SG analysis indicates that in primary regressions specifying a linear relationship 
insider ownership concentration positively affects firm performance, which is similar to 
our findings. Table 3.11 summarizes the main comparisons. 
Table 3.11: Summary of key results from SG MA and MRA Insiders specifications 
 SG MA specification MRA specification 
 Sign/ p value FAT (Publication 
selection) 
PET (Authentic 
empirical effect) 
Pure Linear Relationship +* +44 +* 
Partly Linear Relationship +* +* +* 
Quadratic term -* -* +* 
Cubic term  +* na na 
Signs +/- denotes direction of the publication bias or authentic empirical effect, where + refers to positive 
and - to negative direction of the publication bias or authentic empirical effect in columns II and III 
respectively, while in column I +/- refers only to the direction of the relationship between ownership 
concentration (insiders) and firm performance. 
Sign * denotes whether the effect is significant at the ten percent level of significance. 
 
SG (2007) and the present study concur in finding that both the Pure Linear and the 
Partly Linear specifications yield a positive effect of insider ownership on firm 
performance, although SG (2007) estimate this relationship with consistently higher 
levels of statistical significance. Yet the most striking difference is in the estimation of 
the quadratic term: whereas SG (2007) reports a negative quadratic term in line with 
mainstream theory, the present study reports a positive effect. We maintain that the 
reason for these difference in findings is the contrasting (non)treatment of publication 
bias. Whereas SG (2007) omit publication bias in their estimates of the effects of insider 
ownership on performance, the present study controls for and, hence, filters out the 
                                                     
43
 “Ownership concentration” in the SG research refers to the block of the largest owner irrespective of its 
identity (insider or outsider), while the “Outsiders” variable in our research captures solely the largest 
ownership of outsider owners. 
44
 The Ramsey RESET test indicates that the Pure Linear Insiders MRA model is not appropriately 
specified with respect to the assumed (linear) functional form. Given that this invalidates the point 
estimates as well as statistical inference using the t-statistics and F-statistics (Gujarati 2004; Wooldridge 
2008) these results should be taken as indicative. 
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effects of publication bias from the estimated effects of ownership on performance.  
 
Consequently, the SG (2007) findings are impaired by omitted variable bias: by 
omitting the positive publication bias infecting the estimates of ownership in the 
literature it is likely that they attribute this to ownership effects and so overestimate the 
positive effect of insider ownership concentration on firm performance; and, more 
seriously, by ignoring the negative publication bias infecting the quadratic estimates in 
the literature it is possible that their negative finding reflects mainly this bias rather than 
any authentic empirical effect. In contrast, our MRA methodology is designed to reveal 
authentic empirical effects and the heterogeneity of such effects “beyond publication 
bias” (Stanley, 2005). 
 
Although at first the sign and the significance of the relationship in all three MRA 
specifications reported in this chapter correspond to the SG MA results, there are some 
important differences. Firstly, the SG MA is not able to capture the presence of 
publication selection present in the last two specifications (partly linear insiders and 
quadratic insiders, Table 3.7, Column 2 and Column 4). Strong positively skewed 
publication bias detected in partly linear insiders as well as strong negative publication 
bias present in the quadratic insiders MRA subsamples indicate that the SG MA results 
may be driven by publication bias that their approach cannot filter. Once we control for 
publication bias, strong positive authentic empirical effects appear in both nonlinear and 
linear specifications. However, Ramsey Reset test failure in the pure linear Insiders 
MRA model suggests that the purely linear relation may not be appropriate for 
modelling the relationship between insider ownership and firm performance. Yet the 
final contrast between the results reported above and the results reported by SGMA is 
that we find no support for the quadratic (“inverted-U”) effect hypothesized in the 
theoretical literature. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
 
There is an extensive debate in the empirical literature regarding the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance characterized by inconsistency 
in results and conclusions. Namely, a heterogeneity of findings on the subject matter 
seems to be the main characteristic of this literature. Therefore, in Chapter 3 we apply 
MRA to provide an objective and comprehensive quantitative synthesis of the empirical 
economic evidence on the firm performance effects of ownership concentration; i.e. to 
provide at least some generalized answer as to whether ownership structure affects firm 
performance and, if so, how. We used 62 econometric studies from countries with 
developed corporate governance mechanisms, published since 1985, that provide 946 
estimates of the effect size (PCC).  
 
The reason to omit less developed corporate governance economies is a justifiable 
decision, given that in the context of these economies ownership concentration 
represents a substitute for corporate governance mechanisms. Our investigation builds 
on the MA conducted by Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007) by employing the 
methodology of MRA, which entails procedures for filtering out the influence of 
publication bias on estimates of authentic empirical effect. To ensure transparency and 
the quality of MRA, we follow the reporting guidelines developed by Stanley et al. 
(2012). In particular, following these guidelines with respect to the modelling of – and, 
hence, control for - publication bias explains why the present MRA reports results that 
are somewhat different from those of the previous MA. 
 
The primary finding of the MRA suggests that the functional form and the identity of 
the largest owner both matter in assessing the presence of publication bias, authentic 
empirical effects and the relevant moderator variables explaining the heterogeneity of 
the findings in this empirical literature. Thus MRA in the context of this topic requires 
subsampling, using these two criteria. For example, In the Pure Linear sample (Table 
3.5, Column 1) MRA suggests positive publication bias (FAT) and the absence of an 
authentic empirical effect (PET). However, we argue that the absence of an authentic 
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empirical effect (PET) reflects offsetting effects from the Insiders and Outsiders 
subsamples; i.e. the neutral (almost zero) effect is in fact a composition of underlying 
positive (Insiders) and negative (Outsiders) authentic empirical effects from the pure 
linear outsiders and the pure linear insiders subsamples, which divide the pure linear 
subsample into almost equal parts (n=301 and n=281, respectively). Therefore, lack of 
evidence of an authentic empirical effect in the pure linear subsample can be considered 
as misleading. Furthermore, the Ramsey Reset test in the pure linear insiders subsample 
(Table 3.5, Column 3) suggests that linear functional form might not be appropriate; i.e. 
the relationship between concentrated ownership and firm performance in the case of 
Insiders shows potential for non-linear functional form. 
 
We find evidence of persistent publication bias in almost all subsample MRAs. 
Moreover, the pattern of publication bias suggests that researchers have a strong 
incentive to conform to the prevailing theories (alignment and entrenchment). This 
behaviour becomes evident in the cases of the partly linear and quadratic insiders 
subsamples (Table 3.7, Column 2 and Column 4). Namely, MRA on the partly linear 
insiders subsample provides evidence for positive publication bias (H0: β0=0, tmultivariate 
Insiders_partlylinear=2.13), while MRA on the Quadratic Insiders subsample indicates strong 
negative publication bias (H0:β0=0 is rejected, tmultivariate Insiders_quadratic =-3.94). This 
pattern of publication bias (positive for the Partly Linear subsample and negative for the 
Quadratic subsample) follows the hypothesis of entrenchment theory based on the 
assumption of a curvilinear relationship between insider ownership concentration and 
firm performance due to managerial free riding behaviour when significant equity 
(voting power) ensures their position inside the firm. Nonetheless, once publication 
selection is controlled for, a positive authentic empirical effect of insider ownership 
concentration on firm performance emerges, which is consistent with the convergence-
of-interest hypothesis between owners and managers developed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). On the other hand, in the Pure Linear Outsiders subsample, when we 
control for positive publication bias a negative authentic empirical effect emerges in the 
context of the impact on firm performance of outsider ownership concentration. In the 
case of outsider ownership, MRA suggests that the empirical effect supports the 
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hypothesis that the large shareholder can expropriate assets at the expense of other 
shareholders (Thomsen et al., 2006, La Porta et al., 1999). 
 
Concerning the moderator variables that control for sources of pronounced 
heterogeneity in this literature, we focus on the following that have an interesting 
common effect; namely, the sign on each of these moderator variables is almost always 
the opposite of the sign of the estimated authentic empirical effect. For example studies, 
using samples from Anglo Saxon countries are less likely to find the presence of a 
genuine empirical effect in almost all subsamples. Moreover, the same can be concluded 
for the moderator variables controlling for those studies that employ robustness checks 
for various model estimations. In almost each case, these moderator variables act to 
reduce the estimated empirical effect size in absolute value. In almost each case, these 
moderator variables act to reduce the estimated empirical effect size in absolute value: 
in the case of “Anglo Saxon countries”, meta-regression thus points to the influence of 
country/institutional context, which is not possible for primary studies of single 
countries; whereas in the case of “robustness checks”, meta-regression points to the 
effect of an important aspect of good practice in econometric investigation. 
In conclusion, our main finding is that concentrated insider ownership has a positive 
effect on firm performance, while concentrated outsider ownership has a negative effect 
on firm performance. Conversely, the hypothesised non-linear – inverted-U– 
relationship is at best not proven in the case of concentrated insider ownership and has 
no theoretical grounding in the case of concentrated outsider ownership in the context of 
developed corporate governance systems. With respect to the outsider ownership 
concentration - firm performance relationship, MRA suggests that even in developed 
economies the key agency problem is not manager-shareholder conflict but rather the 
risk of expropriation of minority shareholders by dominant or controlling outsider 
shareholders. 
 
Finally, beyond the confines of this particular literature, we have proposed a new line of 
enquiry for MRA methodology; namely, that diagnostic failure with respect to the 
151 
 
validity of a linear model for the meta regression may reveal the trace of a similar 
specification failure in the primary regressions. At present, we offer this as no more than 
a potential line of enquiry. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN 
MONTENEGRO 
 
“Privatization done in the right way, or under the right circumstances, can have huge 
positive effects, but privatization can also be hugely detrimental.” 
Djankov and Murrell (2002, p. 748) 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter provides additional evidence on the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance in the context of the small transition economy of 
Montenegro. In the analysis, we address two main questions: whether there exists a 
causal relationship between ownership and performance; and which type of ownership 
may be considered as “superior” with respect to corporate performance criteria. 
Furthermore, the answer to these questions will enable us to analyze whether there is a 
significant difference in the sign and significance of this relationship between countries 
with developed corporate governance systems (referring to the results provided by the 
Meta regression presented in Chapter 3) and those with a poorer corporate governance 
environment (TEs, including Montenegro). Using panel data from a sample of 204 
Montenegrin joint stock companies listed on the Montenegrin Stock exchanges over a 
five-year horizon (2004-2008), the focus of our research is an assessment of whether 
outsider ownership is associated with better firm performance. In addition, in this 
Chapter we will also investigate whether the the domestic/foreign identity of owners 
affects this relationship, which would provide additional information concerning the 
quality and the effectiveness of Montenegrin privatisation, with respect to the choice of 
privatisation methods and the quality of strategic foreign investors chosen during the 
process.  
 
This Chapter makes two contributions: first, to the understanding of the effects of 
Montenegrin privatisation in particular; and, second, to the understanding of effects of 
privatisation more generally in the context of transition economies.  
 
Firstly, possibly because of its size, or possibly due to the fact that Montenegro obtained 
independence quite late (in 2006)
45
, it has not been in the spotlight of academic interest 
concerning the analysis of the process of privatisation, unlike other transition 
                                                     
45
However, it is important to stress that Montenegro obtained its monetary independence earlier, starting 
in 1999, after adoption of the German mark as legal tender. 
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economies. This applies also to the literature that used comparative analysis of 
transition economies to analyse the process of privatization, ownership characteristics, 
characteristics of corporate governance, etc. A possible explanation might be the lack of 
data, which represented the main challenge confronting this analysis. Thus, without 
further discussion on what is the cause of the lack of an empirical body of work on 
Montenegrin privatisation, we will try to fill the literature gap, assessing the quality of 
privatisation measured by its materialization through the potentially better performance 
of Montenegrin companies.   
 
Secondly, we find that Montenegro is a very interesting setting for analysis of the 
privatization process, changes in ownership concentration and its potential effect on 
firm performance. The core argument is that Montenegro underwent the process of 
privatisation quite late, in comparison to other transition economies (starting from 
1999), due to an unfavourable political setting, accompanied by economic instability 
(financial sanctions, imposed by U.N. countries 1992-1995
46
; hyperinflation in 1993
47
 
and the NATO military operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999). 
The second argument is that Montenegro can be considered as a highly open, small 
country, with a population of 620,858 and an estimated GDP of 3.045 billion Euros in 
2010. This setting on one hand assures a fertile soil for dramatic institutional flexibility 
but, at the same time, the level of external exposure is likewise dramatic. As IMF 
(2010) outlines: “A small and highly open economy like Montenegro is inherently more 
exposed to global ups and downs.”48 Consequently, the policy framework is challenged 
to create sufficient funds which would diminish the exposure of the Montenegrin 
economy to global shocks. Official dollarization (euroization), the monetary strategy 
that Montenegro adopted since 1999, with the aim to anchor inflation expectations, 
                                                     
46
The United Nations imposed financial sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro in May 1992.  Financial 
sanctions were partially suspended in accordance with the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. 
The United Nations lifted all types of financial sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro in October 1996. 
47The government of Yugoslavia tried to finance an enormous budget deficit formed by excessive printing 
money and introducing laws which prohibited companies from discharging employees which created a 
large drop of GDP (in 1993 GDP of Yugoslavia dropped more than 70% due to the war and UN 
sanctions). The result was an inflation rate that peaked at 313,563,558 % per month.  
48 IMF country report Montenegro (2010, p. 11) 
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simultaneously burdens fiscal policy, which is de facto the only viable mechanism for 
conducting economic policy. As the IMF (2010, p. 66) has noted: “In order not to 
overload the fiscal policy tool, a high degree of flexibility in the Montenegrin economy 
is imperative, as is a proactive and effective banking sector policy.” 
 
Montenegro offers an interesting setting to examine ownership concentration-firm 
performance issues. Montenegro is a very small, open economy with a shallow, 
underdeveloped capital market. At the same time, Montenegro also has poorly 
developed corporate governance mechanisms, and extremely high ownership 
concentration. Thus, we would argue that this research adds to the literature on firm 
performance and specific ownership structures through the assessment of whether 
ownership concentration in the environment of poorly developed corporate governance 
mechanisms can be considered as an efficient substitute for management control, in turn 
contributing to better firm performance. Together with findings (conclusions) from the 
previous and following Chapters (2 and 3), we will obtain a sufficient body of empirical 
evidence to establish our final conclusions concerning the effectiveness of the 
privatisation process in Montenegro, and to assess: 
1. changes of ownership structures and its consequence; 
2. whether these contributed to better firm performance; and 
3. whether ownership structure patterns in Montenegrin companies differ, by and 
large, from those in other transition countries and how different types of owners 
(with the focus on state vs. private) affect firm performance. 
 
The fourth Chapter pursues these objectives and is organized as follows. Section 1 
provides a concise overview of the macroeconomic environment in Montenegro, 
focusing on the inflow of Foreign Direct Investments (henceforth FDI) and 
development of the capital market in the post-mass voucher privatisation period ending 
prior to escalation of the financial crisis in 2009. Section 4.3 explains patterns of 
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ownership evolution, i.e. transition of different types of owners in the post Mass 
Voucher privatisation (henceforth MVP) period. Section 4.4 provides information on 
the properties of the data set used for empirical estimation. Model specification and 
description of variables, the main descriptive statistics, together with the issue of the 
endogeneity of ownership concentration will be discussed in Section 4.5. The analysis 
of the main findings of the empirical investigation on ownership concentration - firm 
performance relationship will be undertaken in Section 4.6. The final section (Section 
4.7) concludes and delivers issues for further research.  
 
 
4.2 Macroeconomic overview of Montenegro 
 
Prior to analysing the structure of ownership of Montenegrin companies, its evolution in 
the post mass voucher period (henceforth MVP) period and, finally, assessment of 
whether change in ownership structure had an impact on corporate performance, we 
provide some stylized facts about the Montenegrin economy. There are at least two 
reasons to provide a short note on the Montenegrin macroeconomic environment in the 
period covered by the empirical analysis reported below.  
 
During the first decade of the 21
st
 Century, Montenegro experienced a strong 
improvement in its economic activity with average real GDP growth of 4.2% (see Table 
4.1), which is above the world average (estimated at 4.1%).  
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Table 4.1: GDP growth World vs. Montenegro 
World GDP - real growth rate (%) Montenegro GDP - real growth rate (%) 
2003 2.7 2003 4 
2004 3.8 2004 4.1 
2005 4.9 2005 4.8 
2006 4.7 2006 5.6 
2007 5.3 2007 8.9 
2008 5.2 2008 6.8 
2009 3.1 2009 -5.7 
2010 -0.7 2010 2.5 
Source: CIA Fact-book, MONSTAT, 2010 
 
Figure 4.1 demonstrates that the average GDP growth of Montenegro (4.2%) in the 
period 2004-2010 was higher in comparison to other SEE countries, as well as well 
above the EU27 country average (0.9%).  
 
Figure 4.1: Average real GDP growth, selected countries, 2004-2010 
 
Source: Monstat, Eurostat, CBM 
 
During this period significant adjustment in the contribution of different industries to 
GDP growth occurred, mainly because of a high FDI inflow in real estate and tourism. 
Instead of industrial production
49
, the service sector, principally tourism and related 
services, transport and retail sales and, to a lesser extent, construction emerges as the 
                                                     
49
For instance, the joint contribution of the “KAP Aluminium Plant AD” and the “Niksic Steel Mill AD” 
to the Montenegrin economy declined from 5% of GDP in 2000-2005 to1.7% in 2010. 
4.2% 4.1% 
3.2% 
2.8% 
1.9% 
1.0% 0.9% 
Montenegro Macedonia Serbia Bulgaria Slovenia Croatia EU27
Average GDP growth in % 
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main drivers of the economy. Consequently, the relative share of industries such as 
manufacturing and power production decreased from 14.4% of GDP in 2004 to 11.2% 
of GDP in 2008, while service oriented industries increased: construction from 3% of 
GDP in 2004 to 5.4% in 2008; and tourism from 3% of GDP in 2004 to 5.1% in 2008 
(see Table 4.2). In this way, the services sector increased significantly in its importance 
to the economy; by 2010, it accounted for approximately 75% of total employment and 
over two-thirds of exports, as presented in Figure 4.3. The expansion of service-oriented 
industries resulted in an increase in the number of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), contrary to the evident decrease in the number of joint stock companies.
50
 For 
example, in 2010 the number of employees in companies with 100 employees or less 
was 73,380 comprising approximately 60 per cent of the total private sector workforce. 
 
Figure 4.2: Real GDP per capita in Montenegro in Euro, 2004-2010 
 
Source: The CBM, 2011 
 
 
Comprehensive economic reforms in Montenegro and development based on the 
principles of private ownership, free markets, openness to trade, the free flow of capital 
and competitive tax policies contributed to an increase in the country’s GDP of 
approximately 7.7 per cent in real terms between 2006 and 2008, while increasing GDP per 
capita by 44.6% in the same period (see Figure 4.2). The declaration of independence in 
                                                     
50
According to the Central Depositary Agency of Montenegro (henceforth CDA) data, the number of joint 
stock companies (excluding banks and other financial institutions) decreased from 268 to 218  in the 
period 2004-2010 (i.e. from 268 to 232 in the period 2004-2008). 
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June 2006 had a further positive impact on economic growth. However, as noted 
previously, due to its relative high exposure to external demand, Montenegro was badly 
hit by the global financial crisis, with growth decelerating to -5.9 % in 2009, and 
showing signs of only gradual recovery during 2010 (an increase by 2.5%). Key 
challenges for Montenegro include further restructuring and reforms in the public sector 
and State administration, developing sustainable pension and health systems, reforms to 
the judicial system and legislation, labour market reforms and further improvements in 
the business environment. 
 
Concerning the institutional setting, Montenegro created a very favourable institutional 
environment for attracting FDI, reflected through a favourable tax regime and tariff policy, 
liberal laws on capital and current account transactions as well as through efforts to 
improve the business environment.
51
 It has set up a Council for Eliminating Business 
Barriers in co-operation with the World Bank, with the aim of simplifying administrative 
procedures and reducing red tape. Representatives of the private sector are also 
members of the Council. In addition, Montenegro uses the euro as its legal tender 
(starting to use official “dollarization” as its monetary strategy in 1999, by adopting the 
German mark) which complements a favourable tax environment for attracting FDI, 
taking into consideration that with dollarization the exchange rate risk is mitigated. In 
sum, we would argue that Montenegro, in the period under consideration, became a 
service oriented, highly liberal and open economy, with high exposure towards the EU 
market. Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3 set out data on the evolving structure of, respectively, 
output and exports in recent years. 
                                                     
51
Under the Montenegrin Corporate Profit Tax Law (Official Gazette of Montenegrono. 65/2001, 
12/2002, 80/2004, 40/2008 and 86/2009), a withholding tax of 9 per cent is applicable on all capital 
transactions, allowing overseas investors to remit profits, dividends and interest freely. 
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Table 4.1: Nominal GDP of Montenegro-production side 2005-2008, structure and contribution to real GDP growth 
  
  
current prices 
  
2004 
  
 
2005 
 
 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
 
Mill Eur 
Structure 
of GDP % 
Contribu
tion to 
nominal 
growth 
% Mill Eur 
Structure 
of GDP % 
Contribu
tion to 
nominal 
growth 
% Mill Eur 
Structure 
of GDP % 
Contribu
tion to 
nominal 
growth 
% Mill Eur 
Structure 
of GDP % 
Contribu
tion to 
nominal 
growth 
% Mill Eur 
Structure 
of GDP % 
Contribu
tion to 
nominal 
growth 
% 
 
Agriculture & forestry 159 8.8 0.3 178 8.3 1.1 194 7.2 0.7 230 7.5 1.4 247 8.3 0.5 
Manufacturing & power 261 14.4 (0.4) 282 13.1 1.2 290 10.8 1.2 333 10.8 1.6 335 11.2 0.1 
Construction 54 3 0.3 76 3.5 1.2 155 5.8 0.9 191 6.2 1.3 162 5.4 (1.0) 
Trade  190 10.5 1.2 238 11.1 2.6 357 13.3 4.6 382 12.4 0.9 357 12 (0.8) 
Hotels  54 3 0.3 64 3 0.6 118 4.4 1.3 133 4.3 0.6 152 5.1 0.6 
Transport  171 9.4 0.5 208 9.7 2 239 8.9 3.5 289 9.4 1.9 284 9.5 (0.2) 
Finance & real estate  255 14 0.5 309 14.4 3 359 13.4 7.3 371 12 0.5 372 12.5 0.0 
Government services 378 20.8 3.4 401 18.6 1.2 420 15.7 4.4 547 17.7 4.7 565 18.9 0.6 
Taxes — Subsidies 295 16.3 2.8 396 18.4 5.6 549 20.5 7 230 19.7 2.2 508 17.1 (3.3) 
Total GDP  2.048 100 8.7 2.148 100 18.4 2.680 100 30.7 3.086 100 15.1 2.981 100 (3.4) 
Source: National Statistical Office of Montenegro (MONSTAT), 2010
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Figure 4.3: Structure of Montenegrin exports in % of nominal GDP, period 2005-
2010 
 
 
Source: Monstat and CBM, 2010 
 
 
4.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment in Montenegro 
 
For the purpose of our analysis, we pay particular attention to FDI flows into Montenegro. 
Namely, like other transition countries, Montenegro experienced high FDI inflow, which in 
the period of our sample (2004-2008) found Montenegro as the country with the largest FDI 
per capita inflows in Europe. However, some particular characteristics of Montenegrin FDI 
patterns and flows were not characteristic of other transition economies. Firstly, unlike other 
transition economies (Anghel, 2005) investors in Montenegro were primarily interested in 
service sectors, instead of low technology manufacturing sectors. Similarly, in the case of 
Montenegro, most of the FDI was not in the form of investment in equity or intra-company 
loans. Instead, a significant FDI inflow was observed in the form of investment in real 
estate
52
, where investors from Russia, Ireland and Great Britain had the most prominent 
role. 
                                                     
52
According to the Law on Investments, unlike in other countries, individuals were able to purchase real-
estate in Montenegro. Montenegro, presented as the fastest growing touristic destination by the World 
20.3% 
21.5% 
18% 
14.6% 
9.9% 
11.8% 
18.2% 
19.5% 
21.5% 
24.3% 
22.8% 
24.7% 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Export of goods Export of services
162 
 
The reason for the relative lack of FDI from multinational firms (with a few exceptions 
such as Daido AD, Deutsche Telekom-T mobile AD, CEAC (Central European Aluminium 
Company), possibly lies in the fact that, as Brindusa (2006, p. 12) argues; “FDI is used to 
serve other markets and not only the market of the host country” which coincides with 
Resmini (2000), Filippaios et al. (2003) and Smarzynska (2004). Namely as Janicki et al. 
(2005) notes, in the case of pre-EU, pre-accession countries, the core drivers of FDI inflows 
are: the size of the host economy; host country risk; labour costs in the host country; and 
openness to trade. Although Montenegro has a relatively non-risky business environment 
compared with the other SEE countries
53
 and maintains a very liberal trade policy, 
Montenegrin market size is a limiting factor, because the Montenegrin market of 620,000 is 
substantially smaller compared to other SEE countries. Furthermore, as suggested by 
Resmini (2000), besides the market size, investors are very much interested in the relative 
wage competitiveness of FDI host countries. Investors are equally interested in the low-cost 
unskilled labour as a prominent location-specific determinant as well as in more capital 
knowledge and skill intensive labour (Madarassy and Pfeffermann, 1992; Noorbakhsh et al., 
2001). 
 
Montenegro, in comparison to neighbouring countries is also in an unfavourable position 
concerning its wage competitiveness. Namely, Montenegro experienced rapid wage growth 
well in excess of its productivity growth rates. As presented in Appendix 4.1 (Table A4.1), 
real net real wage growth rates appear to be constantly above the productivity growth rate. 
Simultaneously, due to the economy overheating, the wage growth in Montenegro was 
significantly higher comparing to its neighbouring countries (see Appendix 4.1, Table 
A4.2).  
 
Relatively poor wage competitiveness might impede Montenegro from accomplishing the 
task of rebuilding relative economic competitive advantage, taking into account that 
increased competitiveness is needed to affect external adjustment to a more sustainable 
                                                                                                                                                               
Touristic Organization in 2006, became a very interesting investment destination.  
53
According to the Doing Business Index developed by the World Bank, Montenegro in the context of 
Eastern European and Central Asian countries is ranked in 14th place, above Albania (16), Serbia (18), 
Moldova (19) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (20).  
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current account deficit through export diversification and, to some extent, import 
substitution in agriculture, energy and gas production. On the other hand, extensive 
empirical literature indicates that low wage levels negatively affect FDI inflow (Rahmah 
and Yussof, 2003; Marr, 1997; Holland and Pain, 1998; Resmini, 2000, Kyrkilis et al., 
2010; Amaro and Miles, 2006, etc.). However, the prevailing message that stems from the 
literature on this issue is that the cost of labour in the host country is one of the major factors 
affecting the investor’s decision on locating investment, particularly if investors are 
operating in industries seeking to produce labour intensive products for export.  
 
However, we cannot neglect the fact that due mostly to its natural resources (aluminium, 
steel and untouched nature), in the five year horizon from 2004 to 2008, Montenegro 
recorded consistent growth of net inflows of FDIs (growing from EUR 399 million in 2004 
to EUR 1,066.5 million in 2008), becoming the leading country in Europe in FDI per 
capita, with FDI as a percentage of real GDP ranging between 17% in 2004 to 25% in 2007 
(see Table 4.3). At the same time, the number of foreign registered companies increased 
from 1,145 in 2005 to over 6,000 in 2010.Yet, FDI in real estate was in the range between 
25.1% of overall FDI inflow in 2004 to 50% of overall FDI inflow in 2008. As the IMF 
noted: “FDI targeted primarily the tourism and financial sectors, triggering a cycle of wealth 
effects, as real estate became more valuable, was used as loan collateral, with loans in turn 
again funding construction activities. To the extent that FDI targeted other sectors it was 
either negligible or dependent on exceptionally favourable commodity prices and subsidies. 
”54 
 
  
                                                     
54
IMF-Montenegro: 2010 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report, 2010 
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Table 4.3 FDI Flows in and out of Montenegro 2004-2010 in million euros 
FDI 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Investment in 
equity 
41,783.6 322,392.3 252,076.6 377,676.1 261,393.9 882,928.9 260,970.2 
Intra company 
loan 
0.0 18,078.4 48,116.2 165,602.6 258,085.7 169,974.7 172,801.2 
Real estates 10,868.1 70,333.4 337,879.3 513,888.3 320,130.7 170,525.2 186,769.0 
Rest 0.0 0.0 9,231.1 61.9 7,705.3 571.0 32,295.4 
FDI Inflow  52,651.7 410,804.1 647,303.2 1,057,229.0 847,315.6 1,223,999.8 652,835.8 
FDI outflow  2,084.7 11,805.0 177,619.7 489,446.6 265,363.4 157,503.0 100,728.4 
Net FDI 50,567.0 398,999.1 469,683.6 567,782.4 581,952.1 1,066,496.8 552,107.3 
Net FDI, % GDP 3.0% 22.0% 21.9% 21.2% 18.9% 35.8% 17.8% 
Source: Central Bank of Montenegro (CBM), 2012 
 
However, as presented in Table 4.3 (the row Real estates) in the period 2005-2008, 
investments in real estate were almost one third of all investment inflows (investment in 
equity or intra company loan) in Montenegro. Taking into consideration that the former Law 
of Investments (put out of force in 2007) allowed individual foreigners to purchase all types 
of real estate (including land) under the same conditions as Montenegrin citizens, the impact 
of investments in real-estate was mainly seen in the disposable income of individuals who 
sold their land to foreigners. We would argue that the behaviour of individuals, particularly 
those who obtained significant fortunes through selling their land, is observed primarily 
through enormous Montenegrin current account deficits (CAD).  For instance, the 
Montenegrin CAD was at 39.1% of GDP in 2006, 50.9% in 2007 and 39.8% in 2008 due to 
imports of consumption goods and nondurables. Simultaneously, FDI inflow was followed 
by increase of deposits: in 2006 annual deposit growth was estimated to have been 48.1%; 
in 2007, 112%; and in 2008, 55.3%. In turn, deposit growth was accompanied by increase of 
share prices (explained in the following subsection). 
 
We argue that the FDI boom in Montenegro was accompanied by challenges characteristic 
for transition economies (inflation, growth of structural unemployment, competitiveness, 
etc.), most of which other transition economies have faced. However, as explained in 
subsection 4.1, Montenegro has fewer policy instruments to tackle them. The challenges 
that Montenegro faced during the boom were a creation of the boom in asset markets, 
soaring credit growth and record current account deficits. In the period of boom 2006-
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2008, real estate prices escalated by more than 35%, while credit growth soared to 165% 
in 2007 (see Table 4.4). Namely, as the IMF notes: “The aggressive push for market share 
by individual banks resulted in credit surpassing FDI as the main reason for the 
deteriorating current account deficit.” Imprudent assessment by the young Montenegrin 
banking system of loan quality in the real estate and capital markets during the period of 
boom resulted in a high non-performing loans level, which at the end of 2010 reached 
almost one quarter of the overall credit portfolio.  
 
Table 4.4: GDP growth in% vs. credit growth to the private sector in Montenegro in 
% 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Real GDP growth in % 6.7 8.6 10.7 6.9 -5.7 1.1 
Domestic credit growth in % 46.3 125.5 165 24.6 -14.3 -8.3 
Non-performing loans to total credit 
portfolio in% 
2.3 2.8 3.1 4.2 10.1 12.3 
Source: Monstat, Central Bank of Montenegro, 2010 
 
Simultaneously, we would argue that FDI inflow in real estate had a significant impact on 
the capital market in the post-mass voucher privatization (henceforth MVP) period, which 
unexpectedly affected the creation of “efficient owners” (Simoneti et al., 2001, Pistor and 
Spicer, 1997 and Cole, 2001), through the secondary market. Instead of providing an 
institutional framework promoting the emergence of owners with a long-term business 
orientation, the small capital market in Montenegro became an arena for speculative 
activities. This favoured not potential effective and efficient owners but those who by selling 
land, or by taking loans, were using the capital market to multiply their wealth by 
speculating on “bubbly assets”. In turn, this induced the creation of twin bubbles on the 
capital market and on the real estate market from 2006-2008.  
 
In the next subsection we explain, in brief, the development of the capital market in 
Montenegro with special attention to whether FDI as well as privatization contributed to 
broadening and deepening the capital market, improvement of liquidity and the regulatory 
infrastructure as well as to an enlarged investor base. We show that inward FDI 
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occasioning mass real estate sales together with a credit boom enabled by a banking sector 
prioritising growth above prudence combined to constitute Montenegro’s infant capital 
markets as an arena for speculation. The corollary was that these financial institutions 
were precluded from their functions of price formation, hence the signalling of company 
value, and facilitating the emergence of new owners capable of effective and efficient 
business leadership. 
 
 
4.2.2. Development of the capital market in Montenegro in the post Mass Voucher 
Privatisation period 
 
The process of capital market development in Monetengro started in 1993 with the 
enforcement of  the Law on the capital market and the money market, which created the 
institutional environment to create the Montenegrin stock exchange “Montenegro berza 
AD”. The market was operating under a limited capacity, mostly for trading of T-bills and 
commercal certificates. Due to extreme political and economic instability, further 
development of the capital market was interrupted until 2001
55
. Therefore, in the 
following sections we focus on the period 2001-2008, since the first years of privatisation 
in Montenegro were characterized by severe problems, associated with exogenous factors 
that impeded further development of the capital market in Montenegro.  
 
A milestone in the creation of a viable institutional environment was the passing of the 
Law on Privatization (1999), which was accompanied by the creation of a special 
Govermental institution - the Council for Privatisation (henceforth the Council), with the 
aim of conducting the process of privatisation of the Monetengrin public enterprises in a 
transparent, clear and efficient manner. The Law on Privatisation was followed by a set of 
inter-connected regulations: the Regulation on Private Vouchers; the Regulation on 
Privatization Funds and Management Companies; the Decision on the sale of shares and 
assets by public auction and the sale of shares by public tender; the Decision on 
the purchase of shares by the frozen savings of individuals; the Decision on  Establishing 
                                                     
551995-1999 was a period of high inflation, causing the interest rate on short-term securities to exceed 15% 
per month, affecting the activity at the capital market, which in that period was almost inactive. 
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the Central Depository Agency; and the Decision on the dematerialization of 
securities and privatization vouchers. In parallel, some early models of privatization were 
put out of force, such as the sale of controlling stakes to companies’ management.  
 
According to the Law, mass voucher privatization and tender, as well as direct sales of 
companies to strategic (foreign) partners were established as the dominant privatization 
models. We would argue that the privatization process in Montenegro (explained in the 
Section 4.3) had a significant impact on the development of the capital market in 
Montenegro as well as on the evolution of ownership concentration, especially in the case 
of individual and institutional owners. Mass voucher privatization, conducted in 2001 
(further details of the MVP are provided in Section 4.3) was the primary model. This 
contributed to the creation of new capital market institutions, which at the end of 2002 
consisted of two joint stock exchanges (Montenegroberza AD and Nex-Montenegroberza 
AD), the Commission for Securities, the Central Depositary Agency, twenty broker dealer 
houses and six privatization funds.  
 
Development of the capital market in Montenegro coincides with the end of mass voucher 
privatisation in 2001. After privatisation, the institutional framework was strengthened 
with the set of Laws and complementary regulations, such as: the Law on 
Investment Funds, which was established to ensure efficient transformation of 
privatization funds to investment funds; then the Law on Enforcement procedure, 
providing protection of creditors and their rights, reducing the risk of investing; the Law 
on Takeover of Joint Stock Companies
56
; the Law on the Privatization of the Economy
57
; 
the Law on Ownership and Management Transformation; the Law on Voluntary Pension 
Funds; the Law on Fiduciary transfer of property rights, etc. However, as Stark and Bruzst 
(1998) point out, establishing rule by autonomous bureaucracies and bodies without the 
social nexus “by which policies are negotiated and implemented” does not ensure the 
development of any institution, including the capital market. That is, although the 
institutional framework for enforcement of an efficient and protected capital market was 
                                                     
56
Official Gazette of RM, no.81/05 
57Official Gazette of RM, no. 33/06 
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developed, due to the poor strength of institutional and professional capacities of the 
Commission
58
 and supporting institutions, their implementation was slow and 
inconsistent.    
 
Further weakening of the capital market was associated with the creation of two parallel 
stock exchanges Montenegroberza AD59 and Nex Montenegro AD which, given the 
number of listed companies, seems like a costly and inefficient decision that opened the 
secondary market of Montenegro to serious speculative activities. Namely, empirical 
evidence overwhelmingly shows that in order to survive small exchanges have to deliver 
sophisticated technology and, more importantly, they need to provide liquidity (Rigobon, 
2005). In the case of Montenegro, with somewhat more than 200 joint stock companies 
divided in two stock exchanges, these requirements for survival are very difficult to meet.  
More seriously, in these small markets their size creates an opportunity for the group of 
investors that may have enough funds to disconnect (to some extent) the stock price 
correlate from the fair value. However, there are instances when the prevailing price level 
is too high to be justified by underlying and available public information fundamentals. 
 
However, analysis of the legal framework, which regulated the process of privatisation in 
Montenegro (described in section 4.3), reveals that the regulations were established with 
the primary aim to enforce and contribute to development of the financial markets, rapid 
liberalization of capital flows and reform of the financial sector, with special stress on the 
development of the stock market. Simultaneously, although the Government postulated 
that the regulatory framework on privatisation should assure gradual withdrawal of state 
ownership accompanied by a certain level of state control on the subsequent evolution of 
ownership, in practice the Montenegrin authorities did not have a clear undergirding 
                                                     
58
For example, IMF ROSC for Montenegro (p.3), in the context of auditing supervision quality, describes the 
SEC: “Enforcement of IFRS financial reporting by listed companies by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is not systematic and the SEC  lacks  some necessary powers. The SEC operates  with  a 
relatively small staff and its enforcement  role is hampered as the Securities and Exchange Act does not 
provide a basis for enforcing accounting standards. The SEC cannot levy fines or penalties for improper 
financial reporting.” 
59 The “Montnegroberza AD” Stock Exchange provided the composite indices MOSTE20 and MOSTEPIF, 
while the “Nex-Montenegro AD” Stock Exchange followed two composite indexes, Nex20 and NEXPIF 
(following shares of privatisation funds). These Stock Exchanges finally merged in 2011.  
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philosophy that would result in the creation of “efficient owners”. Namely, similarly to 
Blaszczyk and Woodward (2001, p. 15) in the context of the Slovenian mass privatisation 
scheme, we may argue in the context of Montenegro that the ownership and control 
structures created by MVP were transitional, suboptimal and unable to carry out the 
restructuring of companies. This induced the so-called “secondary privatisation”, which is 
usually defined as a gradual filtration of efficient shareholders through the stock exchange 
mechanism. However, this process was not a straightforward one, mainly because it was 
created by the intention to extensively rely on the “invisible hand” of market forces to 
“remodel” and efficiently channel the initial temporary ownership structure towards a 
more effective one.   
 
The size of Montenegrin companies as well as the size of the Montenegrin capital market, 
accompanied by legislation lacking sensitivity regarding the treatment and role of  specific 
ownership types (privatisation funds and state) and treatment of minority shareholders, 
induced rather uncommon behaviour and choice of investors, i.e. final “efficient owners”.  
That is, although the Montenegrin stock exchange market flourished after the MVP, as 
measured by the boost to the total equity market capitalization and the share price indices,  
we may argue that the success of the MVP should not be assesed by the prices of firms’ 
shares achieved in the process of transitional shares’ “purchase-selling”, but rather on the 
criteria of how these firms performed after the process; i.e. whether the process of finding 
effective owners materialized or not. Unfortunately, in the context of Montenegro, it 
seems that the process of secondary privatisation was exogenously interrupted by the large 
FDI inflow in real-estate, the expansive lending policy of the domestic banking system 
and the limited size of the Montenegrin capital market, which created a fertile soil for 
speculative, short-term investment choices by speculative investors instead of creating 
stable, long-term,  efficient ownership structures. 
 
As shown in Figure 4.4 the capitalization and the number of transactions undertaken in 
both Stock Exchanges both indicate that 2005 represents a structural break in the 
development of stock exchanges in Montenegro. Namely, starting from 2005, Montenegro 
became a very interesting country for foreign direct investors (since, from then onwards, 
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Montenegro respresents the country with the highest FDI inflow per capita in Europe, 
increasing from 17.9% GDP in 2005 to 31.2% GDP in 2009) accompanied by significant 
increase in nominal wages and loan growth. Consequently, the stock bubble accompanied 
by the bubble in the real-estate market started pushing prices far above their real value, 
blurring capital market information on company quality and depriving investors of a long-
term investment perspective. In quantitative terms, the Montenegrin capital market boom 
during 2006 and 2007 was characterized by a 1200% increase (March 2006 - March 2007) 
measured by the level of capitalization. This increase of market capitalization was 
observed in parallel with a steep increase of share market prices, described by the Monex 
20 and Monex PIF composite indices (the Monex20 index increased by 338.0% between 
April 2006 and April 2007) (See Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5).
60
 Moreover, a lot of illiquid, 
poorly performing companies experienced enormous growth of their share prices, 
increasing their Beta value by up a value of 12 or more, which was the product of the 
speculative activities of investors. Nontheless, once the asset price bubble burst in May 
2007, both the Monex 20 and Monex PIF indices recorded a decrease of more than 
1200%, while overall market capitalization dropped by 233% (May 2007/May 2008). 
After that period, the capital market became slow, innactive and illiquid, while companies 
experienced a decrease in their market value by more than 300%, at the end of 2012 
compared to 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
60
The Monex20 Index follows the share prices of the 20 largest A listed companies, while the Monex PIF 
follows the prices of shares in privatization (investment) funds. 
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Figure 4.4: Level of market capitalisation and the number of transactions on the Nex 
and Montenegro Stock exchanges 2001-2012 
 
Source: Montenegrin Stock Exchange, 2012
61
 
 
Figure 4.5 Monex20 and Monexpif indices, 2003-2010 Nex and Montenegro Stock 
exchange
62
 
 
 
Source: Montenegrin Stock Exchange, 2010 
 
                                                     
61
Axis on the left refers to turnover in million Euro; right axis refers to the number of transactions. 
62Monex 20 and Monex PIF ceased to exist after the merger of Nex-Montenegro and Montenegro Stock 
Exchange in 2011. 
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A survey of the rather limited literature examining the impact of privatization on the 
development of capital markets, yields inconclusive opinions, which vary based on the 
country of choice. According to Tanko (2004) in the case of Nigeria, the privatisation 
process positively contributed to the deepening of the capital market, increase of price 
indices and a more flexible institutional environment. A cross-country analysis by 
Megginson and Boutchkova (2000) on a sample of the most developed and developing 
countries (excluding the USA) find similar results concerning the beneficial impact of 
privatization on market capitalization, share trade volume, number of shareholders etc.   
 
With more relevance to the case of Montenegro, Kogut and Spicer (2002) claims that mass 
privatisation negatively affected the development of the capital market in both the Czech 
Republic and Russia. They argue that mass voucher privatisation in an environment of 
poorly developed corporate governance and financial market legal framework induced 
massive trade outside the scores of official stock exchanges (Morgenstern, 1995). This 
negatively affected the liquidity of the capital market, as well as the fair assessment of 
share prices. Similarly, Lastovicka et al. (1994) highlighted the negative impact of the 
mass voucher privatization on the development of the stock exchange in the Czech 
Republic. A strand of their critique, questioning the validity of mass voucher privatisation 
in the process of capital market development, is based on the rationale that price intervals 
between stock exchange share prices and those obtained via over the counter (OTC) 
transactions is relatively high, blurring information on the quality of the company. This 
has led to the diminished attention of international investors and undercapitalization of the 
capital market in the post MVP period.  
 
Moreover, Fungacova (2005) in the context of transition economies finds that MVP has a 
negative impact on the capital market in the short and medium term. Instead “the capital 
market was established and perceived only as a by-product of the privatization process and 
did not serve as a source of capital for the corporate sector”. Similarly Wagner and Iakova 
(2001), Bodin and Wachtel (2002) and Bakker and Gross (2004) establish that capital 
markets in transition economies lack liquidity and are undercapitalized with only a few 
frequently traded securities. Lastly, but not the least, Claessens et al. (2000), examining 20 
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transition economies, concludes that these capital markets are underdeveloped in 
comparison to developed economies, usually lacking basic financial sector infrastructure. 
We tend to agree with these conclusions, in the context of the impact of the MVP on the 
development of the Montenegrin capital market. Of course, MVP did contribute to an 
immediate increase of the number of shareholders. Yet, it is evident that dispersed 
shareholders did not contribute to increased capitalization of the market or increase of its 
liquidity. Namely, unlike other countries that underwent the process of MVP, the choice 
of firms as well as the percentage of offered shares
63
 indicated that the Government did 
not intend to make this process strategic with respect to the desired economic 
development, in comparison to other types of privatisation such as auctions or direct sale 
to investors.  
 
However, due to the weak institutional framework, especially regarding shareholder 
protection, we observe that MVP in Montenegro contributed to an increase of over the 
counter (OTC) transactions, while the FDI increase in real estate induced speculative 
activities of investors, thus indirectly blurring the quality of information about the firms’ 
prospects through highly volatile and unrealistic share prices. In turn, this induced a rather 
limited interest by foreign investors in the Montenegrin capital market (see the next 
subsection) and eventually decreased the number of joint stock companies. 
Simultaneously, as Claessens et al. (2000) noted for the case of the Czech Republic, in 
Montenegro many companies in markets “were not natural candidates for raising capital 
through stock markets and did not see much purpose in being listed”. As shown in the 
following section, a majority of joint stock companies in Montenegro are small to 
medium, with high ownership concentration, whose strategy can hardly be to be listed or 
to acquire more capital through initial public offering of shares.  
 
In essence, the Montenegrin capital market, similar to capital markets in other transition 
economies, was a result of a “made at home” strategy. It was lacking the basic 
infrastructure for the financial sector, stronger legal protection of shareholders and greater 
                                                     
63
Only 9 out of 202 companies listed for MVP offered more than 50% of their capital to be privatized under 
this scheme.  
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disclosure. In addition, in the environment of a very small sized, partitioned stock 
exchange and highly concentrated ownership structure, after the asset boom 2006-2008, 
the stock exchange  (in fact the two stock exchanges) became, to a certain extent, cost 
ineffective, illiquid, with a decreased number of listed firms, and exposed to speculative 
impacts due to negligible size.   
 
 
4.3 Evolution of ownership concentration in the post MVP period in 
Montenegro 
 
In this subsection we provide analysis of the main characteristics of ownership evolution 
of Montenegrin companies in the post- mass voucher privatisation period, focusing onthe 
main trends and the strategic behaviour of different types of owners. Namely, similar to 
Grosfeld and Hashi (2004), Kocenda (2001) and Kocenda and Valachy (2001), we are 
interested in the change of the ownership structure after the MVP in Montenegro. 
Nevertheless, unlike the above mentioned studies we are not just interested on the effects 
of one particular privatisation program;rather, we are interested in how the overall 
privatisation design implemented in Montenegro (including MVP, auctions, direct sales, 
etc.) affected ownership concentration. This will enable us to draw a conclusion about 
whether efficient owners were found in the subsequent process of secondary privatisation 
and whether their activities materialized through better firm performance.  
 
 
4.3.1 Changing patterns of ownership concentration: the extent of ownership 
concentration 
 
The first aspect of our analysis is the assesment of the magnitude of change in ownership 
concentration, measured by the share of, respectively, the largest, the three largest,  the 
five largest and the ten largest shareholders. Secondly, we analyze the change of 
ownership structure from the perspective of different types (identity) of owners. 
Moreover, taking into consideration Montenegrian exposure toward FDI inflows, we are 
especially interested to assess the change of ownership structure between domestic, state 
and foreign owners. Finally, we analyze whether there exists significant difference in the 
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level of ownership concentration between voucher privatized companies and companies 
that were not involved in MVP.  
 
The results obtained from this analysis will be used to create a hypothesis concerning the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance, the analysis of which 
is the main aim of this chapter. Furthermore, we will be able to compare the patterns of 
ownership concentration changes in Montenegro with that in other transition economies, 
primarily the Czech Republic, having in mind the similarity of the MVP schemes in these 
two countries.  
 
To investigate the evolution of ownership structure in the post MVP period, we start by 
analyzing the changes in ownership concentration of single and then the top three, the top 
five and, finally, the top ten largest owners of Montenegrin joint stock companies. The 
data presented in Table 4.5 shows the change in ownership concentration of a panel of 160 
joint stock companies, for which the data on ownership structure is available through 
observing period 2004-2008. The table indicates that although the average holding of the 
largest shareholder was already quite substantial in 2004 (50%), it nonetheless increased 
progressively to 61.6% by 2008. This substantial increase reflects the very dramatic 
changes in the stock markets accompanied by strong FDI inflows, growth of disposable 
income, expansive lending by the banking sector and implementation of privatisation 
programme schemes. 
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Table 4.5: The average share of the largest shareholder in joint-stock companies of 
Montenegro 2004-2008, in % 
 Top1 Largest 
Shareholder 
Top3 Largest 
Shareholders 
Top5 Largest 
Shareholders 
Top10 Largest 
Shareholders 
2008 
Mean 61.6 77.8 81.0 
 
83.9 
Std. Dev 24.1 17.7 16.7 15.4 
Median 64.2 80.4 84.1 86.6 
No. of firms 160 160 160 160 
2007 
Mean 59.1 75.7 79.1 82.3 
Std. Dev 24 18.3 17.1 15.5 
Median 60.3 78.8 81.5 85.1 
No. of firms 160 160 160 160 
2006 
Mean 55.9 74.1 77.8 81.3 
Std. Dev 24.1 18.8 17.6 16.1 
Median 53.3 76.9 79.9 84.6 
No. of firms 160 160 160 160 
2005 
Mean 52.7 71.58 75.8 79.5 
Std. Dev 23.7 18.63 17.7 16.6 
Median 51.3 73.1 77.5 82 
No. of firms 160 160 160 160 
2004 
Mean 50 68.4 72.8 76.3 
Std. Dev 23.1 18.2 17.3 16.4 
Median 50.4 69.3 73.7 77.6 
No. of firms 160 160 160 160 
Source: Author’s calculations using data base sourced from the CBM 
 
Further increases, although none as pronounced as the increase in the share of the largest 
shareholder, are also seen in the shares of the top3, top5 and top10 owners, which 
indicates that the shareholding of other owners was decreasing during the period of 
analysis. To our knowledge, taking into consideration the findings of the empirical 
literature on the ownership evolution in the post privatization period, Montenegro has the 
most concentrated ownership structure among the countries that conducted MVP. For 
example, Hashi and Grosfeld (2004, p. 524) find for the Czech Republic that the average 
share of the largest shareholder in the firms privatized through the voucher scheme was 
38.8% in 1996, increasing to 51.9% in 1999. Furthermore, in the case of the more closed 
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MVP implemented in Poland they find a similar result, where the largest shareholder, on 
average, had a stake of 33.9% in 1996 increasing to 50.3% in 1999. Similarly, according 
to Blaszczyk and Woodward (2001, p. 15), the top five shareholders in Slovenia in 1999 
(after MVP) were holding 61.5% of shares in MVP firms, comparing to 72.8% in 
Montenegro in 2004. Moreover, in the context of the Russian economy, Sprenger (2006) 
finds that the mean ownership of the largest outsider shareholder after conducting MVP in 
1994 was 37.3%, while five years after this the ownership share increased to 52%. There 
are various reasons why Montenegrin companies have a persistently increasing high 
ownership concentration of ownership.  
 
The first reason is the relatively small size of firms, which goes in parallel with the 
country’s size. Namely, the largest Montenegrin company using assets as the criteria - is 
“EPCG AD”, with assets in 2009 of 945 million Euros, while the average assets of the 
joint stock companies in the sample is 1.3 million Euros.
64
 Hence, it is clear that, 
according to financial criteria, Montenegrin joint stock companies are small or medium 
sized companies. Moreover, according to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), ownership dispersion 
happens due to additional issuance of shares, which triggers risk averse behaviour on the 
part of the existing largest owner, who will be willing to purchase additional shares only at 
a lower price. That is, the investor purchasing additional shares of the same company 
increases her risk of potential failure, due to an under-diversified portfolio. Yet, in the case 
of Montenegro, the investor has been able to purchase additional shares easily, in order to 
preserve his ownership stake, given that the size (i.e. the value of the asset) of 
Montenegrin joint stock companies is negligible from the prospective of the international 
capital market. Consequently, purchasing additional shares in the case of small joint stock 
company, may involve a lesser level of risk-averse behaviour compared to the level of risk 
that investor in the large company needs to undertake if he wants to keep its stake in the 
company when company grows. 
 
                                                     
64
Standard &Poor’s statistics for 2009 of the 500 largest companies in Eastern Europe did not contain any 
Montenegrin company. 
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Furthermore, after the “pyramidal banking scam” in 1994, the banking sector was 
“rebuilt” and developed by foreign banks only, whose strategy was to establish 100% 
owned subsidiaries in order to fulfil their lending strategies independently. The banking 
sector in Montenegro, similar to other South-East European (henceforth SEE) countries, 
has a high foreign ownership concentration. Indeed, the banking sector of Montenegro is 
even more concentrated in comparison to other SEE countries (between 2004 and2009, the 
foreign ownership share of the Montenegrin banking system - i.e. in the share of total 
capital - ranged between 95.6% in 2004 to 99.2% in 2009) having only one bank with a 
domestic largest owner, which is not the case in other transition countries. 
 
The third reason, which may hold for all transition economies with a poorly developed 
corporate governance framework and underdeveloped capital markets, is that owners 
(predominantly being individuals or other companies) use ownership concentration as a 
substitute for underdeveloped or non-existing corporate governance instruments, at the 
same time increased the potential for expropriation of minority shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1998).  
 
Finally, a fourth argument is that the MVP in Montenegro was not designed to create 
dispersed ownership as in Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Poland. Instead, as in the case 
of Albania and Russia, only specific types of companies, with a fragment of ownership, 
were offered to citizens through the MVP scheme. Namely, according to Estrin et al. 
(2009, p. 704), MVP in the empirical literature is mostly described as a method that may 
yield “bad ownership structures”, reducing the effectiveness of the overall privatisation 
process. Furthermore, non-randomized selection of companies in the process of MVP may 
have adverse effects, which if not controlled, may distort results in respect of firm 
performance (Gupta et al., 2008).   
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4.3.2 Changing patterns of ownership concentration: types of the largest owner 
 
The second criteria for assessment of the evolution of ownership structure in Monrenegro 
after the MVP is the transition of ownership between different types of shareholders. In 
our analysis we distinguish five types of owners: individuals; other companies; 
privatisation funds; banks and other financial institutions; and the state.The data on the 
share of these five types of owners from 2004 to 2008 is presented in Table 4.6. The 
results in the table shows that the state gradually became less of a presence as the largest 
owner, while individuals and other companies became the prevalent types of single largest 
owner. Privatisation funds decreased their stake as the largest category of owner over 
time, while bank and financial institutions increased their share in the dominant 
shareholder list. 
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Table 4.6: Average share and ownership types of the largest shareholder of  joint 
stock companies of Montenegro, 2004-2008 
Year  Individ
ual 
State Privatizatio
n/Investme
nt Fund 
Other 
Company 
Bank or 
other 
financial 
institution 
Total 
 
2
0
0
4
 
Nr of observations 51 35 16 56 2 160 
Mean  52.57 37.62 41.70 60.51 63.80  
Standard Dev 24.18 21.71 14.99 19.50 30.93  
Min 1.99 16.79 18.97 19.46 41.93  
Max 100 99.56 73.18 99.99 85.67  
 
2
0
0
5
 
Nr of observations 50 27 15 64 4 160 
Mean 54.59 41.69 50.74 62.49 66.73  
Standard Dev 23.73 23.41 24.89 20.56 32.23  
Min 1.99 18.18 18.90 19.46 40.88  
Max 100 99.56 94.52 99.99 87.77  
 
2
0
0
6
 
Nr of observations 57 17 14 68 4 160 
Mean 55.29 49.06 52.27 68.08 64.41  
Standard Dev 25.26 27.02 22.32 20.42 28.43  
Min 1.99 18.18 21.55 22.31 40.91  
Max 100 99.56 80.96 99.99 86.66  
 
2
0
0
7
 
Nr of observations 60 15 14 69 2 160 
Mean 55.29 49.06 52.27 68.08 66.14  
Standard Dev 25.26 27.02 22.32 20.42 31.44  
Min 1.99 18.18 21.55 22.31 42.88  
Max 100 99.56 80.96 99.99 88.55  
 
2
0
0
8
 
Nr of observations 62 12 12 70 4 160 
Mean 57.07 50.43 51.71 67.94 72.29  
Standard Dev 23.91 26.37 19.93 20.86 35.13  
Min 1.99 18.63 21.55 25.94 41.09  
Max 100.00 99.56 80.96 100.00 89.21  
Source:  Author’s calculations using data base sourced from the CBM 
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The stake of the state remains high over time, although the number of companies with the 
state as the largest shareholder decreases. This is in line with the aim of the Government to 
maintain control over companies of special interest. It is important to highlight comparing 
the data from the overall sample with those from the voucher privatisation that the state 
was not using MVP as a tool to cut the ownership link between the state and the private 
sector. Instead, the State was using this tool to assure social fairness and to accelerate and 
deepen the Montenegrin capital market. Simultaneously, the ownership structure of 
privatisation funds is relatively high, but not enough to assure efficient control in firms. 
This would imply that privatisation funds did not want to have a part in the process of firm 
restructuring, as was the case in Poland. Finally, unlike the case of the Czech Republic or 
Poland, banks and other financial institutions do not have a prominent role in firm 
ownership.  
 
In line with Kocenda (2001), we created a so-called “matrix of transition” to investigate 
changes between types of largest owner, from one type of owner to another, for the period 
of our analysis 2004-2008, in companies included in the process of mass voucher 
privatisation, comparing it with those who were not involved in this process.  For this 
purpose, we used a balanced panel that contains full 2004-2008 data for 160 joint stock 
companies. We combine data on the evolution of ownership concentration with the 
identity of the largest owner. Similarly to Grosfeld and Hashi (2003, p. 9) we create three 
thresholds, that is four different groups of ownership concentration. The first group refers 
to the ownership beyond 50% of equity shares, which indicates that the owner has 
absolute control over company decisions. The second group refers to intermediate levels 
of ownership concentration (between 33% and up to 50%) with which the owner still has a 
substantial degree of control over the company. The intermediate-low concentration range, 
ranging between 10% and 33% shareholdings, enables the owner to have a certain level of 
control over the activities and decision making process within the firm. Lastly, the fourth 
group represents a company in which largest owner has less than 10% of the shares, in 
which case the largest shareholder has little control over the firms’ affairs. 
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Table 4.7: Distribution of firms by ownership concentration and by the type of the 
largest shareholder, 2004-2008 
Year  Individual State Privatizatio
n/Investme
nt Fund 
Other 
Company 
Bank or 
other 
financial 
institution 
Total 
 
2
0
0
4
 
Number of 
observations 
51 35 16 56 2 160 
<10% 2 0 0 0 0 2 
10%≤x<33% 13 21 5 5 0 44 
33%≤x<50% 6 6 4 10 1 27 
x≥50% 30 8 7 41 1 87 
 
2
0
0
5
 
Number of 
observations 
50 27 15 65 3 160 
<10% 2 0 0 0 0 2 
10%≤x<33% 10 14 6 8 0 38 
33%≤x<50% 6 5 3 9 2 25 
x≥50% 32 8 6 48 1 95 
 
2
0
0
6
 
Number of 
observations 
52 28 12 66 2 160 
<10% 1 0 0 2 0 3 
10%≤x<33% 11 14 2 4 0 31 
33%≤x<50% 7 5 4 11 2 28 
x≥50% 33 10 6 48 1 98 
 
2
0
0
7
 
Number of 
observations 
57 17 14 71 1 
 
160 
<10% 2 0 0 0 0 2 
10%≤x<33% 8 8 3 0 0 19 
33%≤x<50% 14 1 4 1 0 20 
x≥50% 33 8 7 70 1 119 
 
2
0
0
8
 
Number of 
observations 
62 12 12 70 4 160 
<10% 4 0 0 0 0 4 
10%≤x<33% 7 5 0 4 0 16 
33%≤x<50% 16 2 2 7 1 28 
x≥50% 35 5 10 59 3 112 
Source: Author’s calculations using data base sourced from the CBM 
 
Table 4.7 reveals information concerning the evolution of the ownership concentration of 
the largest shareholder, simultaneously unveiling changes in ownership concentration 
between different types of owners. The first observable characteristic is that the number of 
companies with absolute shareholder control (over 50%) experienced the most 
pronounced growth during the five years (from 54.3% of the overall sample in 2004 to 
70% of the overall sample in 2008). Simultaneously, we observe that the number of firms 
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with intermediate to high concentration did not change over time. On the other hand, the 
number of firms with intermediate to low concentration decreased the most, falling from 
27.5% to 11.9% of the overall sample, while the group with the lowest ownership 
concentration is constant over time (1.3% of the sample). Once more, we stress that the 
ownership concentration in Montenegro after the MVP is significantly higher than in the 
case of other countries, which underwent a similar privatization process (Romania, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Poland).  
 
Secondly, we analyse the reallocation of shares during the observed period between 
different types of owners. From these data, we can obtain information concerning the 
underlying strategy of each type of shareholders. Unlike the Czech Republic (Grosfeld and 
Hashi, 2003, p. 11), privatisation funds in Montenegro never took an active role in 
obtaining significant shareholdings in strategic companies. To wit, privatization funds in 
2004 were the largest shareholder in only 10% of joint stock companies, although during 
the privatization process privatization funds gathered more than 65% of individuals’ 
vouchers. Moreover, in 2009 the number of companies in which privatization funds were 
the largest shareholders fell to 6.9% of the sample. However, there is some indication of a 
strategy by privatisation funds to decrease the number of firms in which they appear as the 
largest shareholders while simultaneously increasing the ownership stake above the 
controlling level of 50% plus one share (from 16 firms in 2004 having a controlling stake 
in 7, to 12 firms in 2008 with controlling stake in 10 of them). Similarly, the role of banks 
and other financial institutions is sporadic. This reflects the strategy of foreign banks not 
to have great exposure to the Montenegrin corporate sector; instead, they rather take a role 
of financial provider or financial intermediary. However, in those companies where 
financial institutions are the largest owners, they insist on a high controlling ownership 
share.  
 
The role of the state diminished gradually. Yet the state significantly improved its control 
potential over time by selling residual state ownership in companies of less importance 
while maintaining a strategic controlling shareholding in companies of special, strategic 
interest. Namely, the remaining firms where the state is the controlling shareholder (9 of 
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them) account for around 35% of the total book value of companies in the sample. This is 
in line with the behaviour of the state in the case of the Czech Republic (Kocenda and 
Valachy, 2001, p. 12), where in the post mass vouchers period the stake in 20 strategic 
companies accounted for more than a third of the book value of companies involved in the 
MVP. Finally, individuals and other companies emerged as the most significant types of 
ownership concentration. Both of them have a similar strategy; to improve and increase 
ownership concentration, toward controlling stakes, which is again in line with the 
experience of the TEs. 
 
 
4.3.3 Changing patterns of ownership concentration: domestic, foreign and 
institutional (state) owners 
 
The third criteria we used in evaluating ownership concentration in Montenegrin 
companies represent the trajectory of ownership change between domestic, foreign and 
institutional (state) owners. According to Djankov and Murrell (2000, p. 10), one of the 
potential reasons why ownership structures across countries differ substantively is due to 
different mixes of implemented privatization schemes. Consequently, TEs provided a 
good context for comparison of different type of owners regarding their effectiveness and 
impact on firm performance. Analysing 23 empirical studies on the experience of 
transition economies regarding the effects of different types of owners on the restructuring 
of firms, Djankov and Murrell (2000) made a comparison matrix of 11 different types of 
owners, assessed according to their relative effectives (Table 4.8). According to Djankov 
and Murrell (2000)
65
, the state appears to be the least effective owner, while managers and 
concentrated individual ownership are the most effective. This Table, although based by 
qualitative and intuitive comparison, using “composite probability judgement”, may 
nonetheless represent a comprehensive quantitative comparison of different ownership 
structure efficiency that we may use as a benchmark in assessing whether the ownership 
structure in Montenegrin companies evolved into a more or into a less efficient state. 
                                                     
65
 For more details on Djankov and Murrel (2000) and Djankov and Murrell (2002), see Chapter 2. 
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Table 4.8: Differences between the effects of different owners on enterprise restructuring 
Category of owner 
Traditional 
state 
Diffuse 
individual 
Insiders Outsiders Workers Banks State Managers Block holder 
Diffuse Individual No                 
Insiders Probably Probably               
Outsiders Probably Extremely No             
    likely               
Workers Probably Probably No No           
Banks Extremely Probably No No No         
Commercialized Extremely Extremely Extremely No No No       
Managers Extremely Extremely Extremely             
Blockholder Extremely Extremely Extremely Extremely Probably Probably Probably No   
Investment funds Extremely 
likely 
Extremely Extremely Extremely Probably Probably Probably No No 
Foreign Extremely Extremely Extremely Extremely Extremely Probably Probably No No 
Source: Djankov and Murrell, 2000. 
 
Key: the cells record judgements as to whether one type of ownership is more effective than another. For example, in the cell defined by “Diffuse 
ownership” and “Traditional state”, the cell entry “No” means that the former is not more effective than the latter; and the cell defined by “Foreign” and 
“Traditional state” suggests that the former is “Extremely” more effective than the latter; and so on.  
Data presented in Table 4.9 suggests that, as expected, over time companies moved from the 
state as the single largest owner to domestic private owners and, especially, to foreign 
owners. The privatisation process is obvious through decrease in the number of firms that 
have the state as the largest shareholder (from 38 in 2006 to 12 in 2008). However, in 
parallel, although state ownership decreases, the percentage of firms under its control, via its 
ownership shares, increased from 37.4% in 2004 to 49.86% in 2008. This implies that the 
state has a strategy to sell residual shareholdings, leaving controlling shares in strategic 
companies of special interest for direct sale to domestic or foreign investors. During the 
privatisation process, migration of state ownership (26 companies) was unevenly distributed 
in favour of private domestic investors-owners. From the average shares of private owners, 
high concentration is present in all years with an upward trend (from 53.4% in 2004 to 60.4% 
in 2008). However, the range of shares of the largest shareholder is much wider (from 2% to 
100% in 2008) in comparison to the other two groups. 
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Table 4.9: Ownership structure with respect to particular types of single largest owner 
in the period 2004-2008 
Year Private 
Domestic 
State Foreign 
 
2
0
0
4
 
Number of observations 112 38 17 
Mean 53.47 37.44 63.27 
Standard Dev 20.97 19.34 27.27 
Min 1.99 16.79 26 
Max 99.99 89.50 100 
 
2
0
0
5
 
Number of observations 120 30 17 
Mean 56.98 39.69 67.94 
Standard Dev 22.55 20.00 23.37 
Min 1.99 18.18 30.02 
Max 100.00 89.50 100 
 
2
0
0
6
 
Number of observations 126 22 19 
Mean 58.36 40.52 69.17 
Standard Dev 22.52 22.84 25.25 
Min 3.23 1.99 18.18 
Max 100.00 89.50 99.99 
 
2
0
0
7
 
Number of observations 123 15 22 
Mean 59.98 44.20 73.30 
Standard Dev 23.24 23.81 21.24 
Min 1.99 18.18 26.00 
Max 100.00 89.50 100 
 
2
0
0
8
 
Number of observations 126 12 22 
Mean 60.38 49.86 68.81 
Standard Dev 21.15 27.81 23.51 
Min 1.99 18.63 25.94 
Max 100 99.56 100.00 
Source: Author’s calculations, 2011 
 
Foreign ownership displays the most stable pattern, with the smallest change of average 
ownership concentration over time (from 63.3% in 2004 to 68.8% in 2008). Simultaneously, 
foreign ownership has the highest ownership concentration in comparison to the other two 
groups, having the narrowest range in all five years. This would imply that foreign owners do 
have a clear strategy of long-term investment in Montenegrin companies, and a general 
inclination to have the means to actively monitor the behaviour of the management. At this 
point, having undertaken only qualitative analysis, it is still not possible to provide any valid 
conclusion concerning the effectiveness of different ownership types with respect to its 
impact on firm performance.  
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Lastly, we may conclude that, in the case of Montenegro, MVP did not provide strong 
dispersion of ownership. Namely: the choice and the share of ownership offered to 
individuals on average was at the level of 39.2%; and only in the case of 22 companies out of 
160 was a controlling package of shares (50% shares+1) offered through the mass voucher 
scheme. However, three years after the MVP, strong ownership concentration reappeared at a 
level uncommonly high in relation to the transition economies that underwent a similar 
pattern of privatization (Slovenia, Bulgaria, Albania, Poland and the Czech Republic). 
Moreover, using alternative privatization schemes, the Montenegro Council for Privatization 
was encouraging foreign and domestic investor to acquire controlling shares packages.  
 
 
In sum, the main characteristics of the “ownership transfer” in Montenegrin companies are:  
 
1. Montenegrin companies have very high ownership concentration, and are usually run 
by other companies or individuals, similarly to the case of the Czech Republic and 
Poland (Blaszczyk and Woodward, 2001, p. 24);  
2. migration of state to domestic and foreign ownership is gradual, characterized by a 
strategy of allowing “non-state” owners to acquire a controlling package of shares; 
and 
3. institutional and financial owners - including privatization (investment) funds - are 
not interested in active control of firms’ management, while the state uses a gradualist 
approach in selling its stakes and retains its controlling stakes in the companies of 
special interest.  
 
The evolution of ownership concentration in the post MVP period in Montenegro to a certain 
extent resembles the evolution of ownership concentration in Poland and the Czech Republic. 
It differs mainly with respect to the level of concentration, which is extremely high, and the 
level of involvement and passive behaviour of banks and privatization funds. 
 
The empirical work consists of the discussion of data, the model specification and the 
empirical results. These are discussed in the next three subsection. In the context of the 
Montenegrin economy, we find accurate useful comparison in Boubakri et al. (2005,) who, 
by studying privatized firms worldwide during 1980-2001, find evidence over time of 
diminishing government control as well as an increase in private ownership concentration. 
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Furthermore as Mathur and Banchuenvijit (2007, p. 106) summarize their findings “the cross-
firm differences in ownership concentration are explained by firm size, firm growth, industry 
affiliation, privatization method, the level of institutional development, and the level of 
investor protection.” This conclusion summarizes also the behaviour of Montenegrin 
companies and, accordingly, suggests that these factors should be controlled in the model 
specification for estimating the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance in Montenegro. 
 
 
4.4 Data 
 
The sample comprises all joint stock companies listed on either or both of the Montenegrin 
stock exchanges –Montenegroberza AD and Nex-Montenegroberza AD - over the five-year 
period from 2004 to 2008.
66
 The data set was created by the author, using individual data for 
each company obtained from the Central Bank of Montenegro. 
 
The “National Agency for Payment and Settlements” of Montenegro (the institution formerly 
responsible for collecting and compiling the financial statements of joint stock and limited 
liabilities companies) ceased to exist in 2001. Instead, three years later, the Commercial 
Court of Montenegro assumed responsibility for collecting financial statements. According to 
the existing Law on accounting and auditing
67
, all joint stock companies together with limited 
liabilities companies whose asset exceeds 100,000 Euros are obliged to submit an annual 
profit and loss account, a balance sheet, a cash flow report and statistical Annex.
68
 Due to the 
poor technical resources of the Commercial Court, compilation of data in electronic form 
could not be undertaken during the period 2001-2006. Consequently, the Central Bank of 
Montenegro (henceforth the CBM) in 2006 initiated the Agreement of Cooperation with the 
Commercial Court in Podgorica in May 2006, taking over the database, creating the software 
for intake, and processing the data from the financial accounts of the Montenegrin corporate 
sector. Unfortunately, data from the financial statements of Montenegrin joint stock 
                                                     
66
Although the author obtained the firm level data for 2009, we decided not to include it in the data set. 
Montenegro was hit by the effects of the global financial crisis in 2009: the overall corporate sector was heavily 
hit by spillover effects from the financial sector to the real sector, leading to heavy losses in the corporate sector 
estimated at the level of 270 million Euros. It is not the purpose of our model to explain this structural break, 
which may be assumed to dominate corporate performance in 2009. 
67Official Gazette of RM, no.81/05 
68Article 5 of the Law on accounting and auditing (Official Gazette no. 6/2002 and 17/2007). 
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companies prior to 2004 could not be recovered. Taking into consideration that data could be 
obtained only at the individual (firm level), the author had to compile the entire data set from 
the beginning. Accordingly, the author constructed the dataset from the balance sheets and 
from the profit and loss statements for each company in each year in the sample. Prior to the 
study reported in this chapter, this data existed only in hardcopies or scattered pdf files. 
 
We started our research using all joint stock companies with shares listed and traded on either 
of the two stock exchanges that appear in the data set.  From the number of companies in the 
sample (204) it is evident some joint stock companies did not submit their annual financial 
reports, while for others annual reports could not be used due to their technical deficiency. 
Simultaneously, we excluded from the sample broker and dealer houses, insurance 
companies, the non-governmental sector and investment funds, together with management 
companies that run investment funds, because of the nature of the activity of these companies 
as well as the type of external supervision of these companies (Schmid and Zimmermann, 
2008, pp. 187). Concerning that part of the database referring to the ownership structure of 
the joint stock companies, the author used data obtained from the Central Depositary Agency 
of Montenegro (henceforth CDA). The CDA provides, on a daily basis, a list of the 10 largest 
shareholders for each company, disclosing simultaneously the origin of shareholders 
(domestic vs. foreign). 
 
We started our empirical investigation with an unbalanced panel, consisting of 936 
observations on 215 companies (for the five years 2004-2008) with shares listed and traded 
on the Montenegroberza AD Stock-Exchange or/and NEX  the Montenegro AD Stock 
Exchange. From this initial sample, we excluded two insurance companies, five broker-dealer 
houses and three insurance companies. As Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006) argue, companies 
from the financial sector have distinctive financial accounts, which make comparison of 
certain variables with the corporate sector impossible: for example, solvency or liquidity 
ratios, which are under special scrutiny for the insurance companies; and the treatment of 
loss.  
 
In addition, we dropped all observations for which financial statements were inconsistent (for 
example, balance sheets that reported a negative value of capital). Furthermore, we excluded 
all companies with financial ratios suggesting that these firms do not operate. Namely, when 
inspecting our dataset, we observed that due to the poor quality of some financial statements, 
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or due to the fact that some joint stock companies are barely operating, their financial ratios 
appeared to be rather odd. In order to prevent inclusion of those companies with dubious 
activities, we implement a set of “rule of thumb” filters for various financial indicators to 
exclude suspect observations from the data used for estimation: a leverage ratio higher than 
0.7; a fixed asset to sales ratio greater than 0.001; and R&D to sales ratio less than 0.3 based 
on the general criteria provided by Lebahar-Friedman (1999). Finally, after initial ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimation, we checked for undue leverage and outliers. According to 
Figure 4.6, showing the leverage versus the squared residuals for each observation, we 
observed that in the case of one company (Crnogorskaplovidba AD) a potential problem of 
high leverage may exist. Accordingly, in order to preclude a likely source of bias in our 
estimates, our strategy was to exclude from the sample the four observations for this 
company. 
 
Figure 4.6: An examination of outliers and leverage points on ownership concentration 
and firm performance (Pooled OLS) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation Stata 2011 
 
These adjustments narrowed the initial database, resulting in a final unbalanced panel 
consisting of 755 observations from 204 companies over the period 2004-2008.  
 
 
4.5 Model specification and description of variables 
 
The choice of variables in the model will build on the model foundations proposed by 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), which have been widely adopted and replicated in the 
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context of different economies (Welch, 2003; Fishman et al., 2008; Himmelberg et al., 1999; 
Hu and Izumida, 2008; Gugler and Weigand, 2003; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007; 
Pedersen and Thomsen, 1999; de Miguel et al., 2004; etc.). The fundamental reasoning to 
follow the choice of variables suggested by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) lies in the fact that these two papers provided thorough and systematic 
theoretical justification of the model specification used to assess the impact that ownership 
concentration might have on firm performance. Namely, taking into consideration that with 
regard to Montenegro, to our knowledge, no similar research has been conducted, the 
systematic and well-justified choice of variables and methodologies provided by Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) is the preferred platform for our own analysis. Nevertheless, besides 
the variables proposed by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), in our model specification we 
include a set of additional variables that mainly reflect the country specific characteristics of 
the Montenegrin economy as a small, open economy in transition.  
 
The initial challenge in the model specification is that we need to choose between four 
different measures of firm performance: Tobin’s Q; Return on assets (henceforth ROA); 
Return on equity (henceforth ROE); and Net profit margin (henceforth NPM). These 
variables can be divided into market based (Tobin’s Q) and accounting based (ROA, ROE, 
and NPM). As Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue, there is a 
significant difference between the market based and accounting type of measure. The first 
dimension is temporal. While Tobin’s Q is forward looking, taking into consideration that, 
through the market, share values reflect the future expectations of investors (optimistic or 
pessimistic), ROA, ROE and NPM are accounting measures of firm performance oriented to 
what the firm has already accomplished. Secondly, both of these measures have limitations 
with respect to how they are calculated.  
 
Accounting profit indicators are limited by accounting practice where, even while applying 
International Accounting Standards (IAS), practice allows for biased and looser assessment 
of, for example, the value of intangible assets or different methods of calculating 
depreciation. In contrast, while calculating Tobin’s Q, the replacement value of the firm’s 
tangible assets, part of the Tobin’s Q denominator, does not include investments that the firm 
has made in intangible assets. This would imply that revenue is generated only from 
investments made in tangible assets, which consequently leads toward overestimation of the 
financial results, i.e. of firm performance. 
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In the context of the Montenegrin economy, both accounting and market value indicators of 
the firm’s profitability can be considered as potentially unreliable. Namely, although the 
Montenegrin Law on Accounting and Auditing
69
 requires accounting practice in Montenegro 
to be in line with the International Accounting and Auditing Standards, there is an evident 
implementation gap with respect to following IAS in domestic practice.
70
 For example, the 
World Bank’s Report on the observance of standard and codes (ROSC, 2007) for Montenegro 
provides an assessment of accounting, financial reporting, and auditing requirements. The 
general view on the accounting practice from this report is clear from the following excerpts 
(ROSC 2007, p. 3):
71
 “The review of financial statements identified some systematic 
accounting issues that need to be properly addressed in practice. In addition to a lack of 
detailed disclosures required under IFRS, the review identified a number  of common 
recognition and measurement issues, such as asset valuation (e.g. the lack  of impairment 
tests), insufficient disclosure  of related party transactions (including those involving the  
State), improper reflection of taxes in  the annual financial statements, and pension 
accounting and practices within  the  enterprise and financial sectors  in Montenegro.”  
 
Moreover:  
 
“...enforcement of IFRS financial reporting by listed companies by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) is not systematic and the SEC lacks some necessary powers.  
The SEC operates with a relatively small staff and its enforcement role is hampered as the 
Securities and Exchange Act does not provide a basis for enforcing accounting standards. The 
SEC cannot levy fines or penalties for improper financial reporting. Although the SEC has 
recently undertaken several concrete corrective measures, issues raised in qualified audit 
reports even in the A and B segment of the securities market were not always followed up.” 
 
Therefore, due to poor quality of accounting standards implemented in the national laws, this 
may imply that ROA, ROE and NPM are, to a certain extent, deficient estimates of firm 
performance. 
 
                                                     
69
Official Gazette of RM, no.41/08 
70Official Gazette of RM, no.69/05 and no.80/08, Article 6a 
71The Republic of Montenegro: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), Accounting and 
Auditing, 2007 
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The market-based alternative, Tobin’s Q, is a future oriented measure reflecting investors’ 
perspective on the company’s quality by comparing the market value of a company's stock 
with the value of a company's equity book value. As explained in section 4.2, during 2006 
and 2007 the stock market prices of shares in Montenegro were distorted due to inflow of 
FDI in real estate, credit growth and nominal wage growth. Therefore, it is hard to believe 
that, in the period 2006-2007, the market value of companies, on average, increased more 
than five times on the grounds of real increase in firms’ profitability, market share, growth, 
etc. Instead, we would argue that the Montenegrin small, underdeveloped capital market 
allowed enormous growth of share prices that reflected speculative activities of investors 
rather than long-term investors’ expectations. Given the enormous share price growth, 
exogenously driven by FDI and buoyant credit growth, that was unrelated to the actual status 
and behaviour of the listed companies, we would argue that Tobin’s Q would also be a highly 
misleading measure of firms’ performance. However, Tobin’s Q is the most frequently used 
measure of firm performance in the literature assessing the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance (Wruck, 1989; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Mehran, 
1995; Kole, 1995; Agrawal and Kroeber, 1996; Craswell, 1997; Cho, 1998; Himmelberg et 
al., 1999; Morck et al. 1988; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Welch, 2003; Chen et al., 2003; 
Mura, 2007; etc.). 
 
Thus, we had a challenging task to choose between two different types of firm performance 
measures, each having serious drawbacks concerning their reliability. Our choice was made 
by the criteria of which measure would create less bias to the estimated results and thus more 
accurately reflect firms’ activities. Comparing the quality of variables, we conclude that 
Tobin’s Q and NPM are the least reliable (Table 4.10) measures of firm performance as 
judged by implausibly high variation and range.
72
 Hence, our choice narrowed to the two 
remaining firm performance variables, ROA and ROE. Given that accounting assessment of 
the asset base might be subject to more bias than assessment of the nominal value of equity 
(reflecting potentially poor assessment of intangible assets, the value of stocks, depreciation 
and changes in the value of land due to the real estate bubble) we finally decided to use ROE. 
 
                                                     
72
Tobin’s Q equal to 1797.24 would imply that the market value of the firm is 1797.24 higher than its replacement 
(nominal) value. This figure reflects overrated values of share prices during a capital market bubble (2006-
2007). 
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An additional argument to use ROE is its better performance regarding the normality of 
distribution compared to other accounting based indicators of firm performance. Namely, 
using an informal approach to checking normality, a histogram, and using all observations in 
the sample, we find an overall symmetric, moderately tailed distribution slightly skewed to 
the right (Figure 4.7 and 4.8). Once we place restrictions on the tails using the criteria that 
ROE should lie in the range of -10<=ROE<=10, the histogram indicates a symmetric, 
moderately tailed distribution with some outliers on both ends of the tail, but maybe right 
skewed.
73
 Further evidence is provided by the qnorm plot (implemented by Stata; Figure 4.7), 
which compares the distribution of a variable with the normal distribution (with deviations 
from the straight line indicating departure from normality). The qnorm plot of ROE in the 
range of -10<=ROE<=10 is mainly coincident with the straight line, which suggests a normal 
distribution. However, there are departures at both tails. Overall, the qnorm plot suggests a 
symmetric distribution with fat tails. Potential outliers (16 observations) that do not conform 
to the range of the above imposed range and which may cause departures from normality are 
separately examined in order to see whether they are valid observations or potentially arise 
from errors in data entry. Careful examinations indicates that most of the potential outliers 
refer to four large real estate and construction companies where, given the type of the 
business and speed of the business cycle, it is possible that annual revenue substantially 
exceeds the capital stock of the firm. Hence, we did not exclude these potential outliers. 
However, the impression of basic symmetry suggests that there is no case for transforming 
the variable. In addition, GMM estimation does not require distributional assumptions as does 
Maximum likelihood estimation.  
 
  
                                                     
73 Once we place restrictions on the tails using the criteria that ROE should lie in the range of -5<=ROE<=5 
(this restriction will be later used as a robustness check of presented results) histogram appears somewhat more 
symmetric but still slightly right skewed. When we used the criteria that ROE should lie in the range of -
2<=ROE<=2, the histogram is more symmetric in comparison to presented histogram (Figure 4.8), but maybe 
left skewed. (See Appendix 4.6.)  
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Figure 4.7: ROE - qnorm plot [-10, 10] 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Histogram of the dependent variable ROE [-10, 10] 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.10: Summary statistics for the proxy variables of the firm performance 
Variable Nr. Of Observations Mean Standard  Deviation Minimum Maximum 
ROA 962 -0.03 0.37 -7.93 4.59 
ROE 962 -0.69 0.203 -5.43 13.62 
NPM 904 -13.25 121.56 -2321.47 92.38 
Tobins' Q 902 13.26 98.07 0.00 1797.24 
Source: Author’s calculation, Stata 2011 
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Although Return on Equity (ROE) is our choice as a proxy for firm performance in our 
preferred model specification, still, we estimated model specifications using the other 
measures of firm performance. We argue that usage of different firm performance measures 
provides useful robustness checks on our preferred results. However, usage of ROA is highly 
questionable, given that its usage would end up specifying a model in which assets appear on 
both sides of the equation. 
 
Four ownership variables are investigated in the model: the shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder (Top1OC); and the shareholdings of the three largest (Top3C), five largest 
(Top5OC) and ten largest shareholders (Top10OC). Comprehensive empirical literature 
examining the impact of different types of owners (explained in Chapter 3) on firm 
performance, addresses the issue of the difference between outsider and insider owners. Our 
empirical investigation was conducted primarily to bring into focus the impact of outsider 
ownership on firm performance. In the case of Montenegro, corporate governance measures 
such as performance bonuses for executives are rarely used to align the interests of managers 
and owners. Secondly, managers rarely appear as large owners in the Montenegrin corporate 
sector. Privatisation in Montenegro hardly supported the development of managerial 
ownership. Namely, unlike other transition economies, Montenegro did not conduct 
“managerial buy-outs” (henceforth MBO) privatization, which were characteristic for Poland 
(1993), Slovenia (1992), Hungary (1993), Croatia (1992) and Russia (1991). In these 
countries, MEBO was considered as a fast and efficient privatisation process in the case of 
small or medium sized companies (Ellerman, 1993).  
 
Consequently, taking into the consideration that we are primarily interested in the impact of 
outsider ownership concentration on company performance, our preferred measure is the 
shareholding held by the five largest shareholders. We acknowledge that this measure has its 
disadvantages. As Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) point out, the fraction of shares held by the 
largest shareholder might not be a convincing  measure of the outsiders’ ownership and of the 
degree to which investors are protected from managerial shirking and self-fulfilling actions in 
the case when management often holds enough shares to be the single largest shareholder. 
Moreover, we are fully aware that in the case where the largest owner is an individual, most 
probably he/she will be the Executive Director, on the Board of Directors and in the senior 
management team. This setting is characteristic for small firms in Montenegro. However, 
searching for managers’ stake in the group of largest shareholders is possible only in the 
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context that the largest shareholder is an individual. As Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, p. 1) 
argue: “the fraction of shares owned by the five largest shareholding interests is more likely 
to be representative of the ability of shareholders, as this term is ordinarily understood, to 
control professional management than the fraction of shares owned by management is to be 
representative of the ability of professional management to ignore shareholders.” Following 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) we also use the fraction of the five largest shareholders as a 
proxy for ownership concentration. 
 
Our general sentiment is similar to the findings of a very rich empirical literature based on 
transition economies’ experience, which generally reports a negative, significant impact of 
ownership concentration on firm performance (Kuznetsov et al. 2011; Aukutsionek et al. 
1998, Balsmeier and Czarnitzki 2010; etc.). These countries usually are characterized as 
economies with a weak, under-developed, poorly functioning legal framework created 
presumably to protect minority shareholders and with underdeveloped, illiquid and shallow 
capital markets, in which share prices do not usually reflect the quality of firms’ performance.  
This reminds us that Demsetz’ theory of corporate value maximization irrespective of the 
ownership concentration is based on the assumption of perfect market mechanisms (“vote” 
and “exit strategy”, developed corporate governance instruments and liquid, developed 
secondary markets), which may not be considered as applicable, or even relevant, for the case 
transition economies, including Montenegro.  
 
Empirical literature on TEs does not face the problem of interconnecting theoretical concepts 
with their empirical findings. Instead, there are numerous theoretical explanations supporting 
the conclusion of a significant negative relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm performance. Castaneda (2006) notes that, in the case when the stock market is illiquid, 
and minority shareholders are not well protected, and share prices do not reflect the quality of 
firm performance, large owners (the ones that bear the most risk) are disabled with respect to 
assessing asset allocation efficiently, resulting in their choice of low-risk, low-productive 
projects, which leads to poorer firm performance. However, we would argue that the negative 
impact of ownership concentration on firm performance in transition economies is 
considerably present due to expropriation of minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). In addition, there is also the problem of insufficient incentives for the largest owners 
to attempt timely and efficiently restructuring of firms to maximize their value over the long–
run horizon. Desai and Goldberg (2000) provide a very critical analysis of Russian and CIS 
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countries which, through MVP, witnessed heavy asset-stripping conducted by poorly 
monitored managers, absence of restructuring due to poor monitoring mechanisms, 
accompanied by distortive contracts between government and investors  in order to assure the 
protection of local employment, even at the expense of company efficiency. Furthermore, 
they argue, given the illiquidity of secondary markets, managers do not have the necessary 
incentive to increase the value of shares; instead, they sell the assets by themselves as a way 
of valorising their control rights.  
 
Still, empirical evidence on the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance in 
the context of transition economies is not uniform in suggesting a negative effect. For 
example, comprehensive analysis by Balsmeier and Czarnitzki (2010) based on the 
experience of 28 transition economies including Montenegro (using the EBRD BEEPS data 
for the period 2002-2008) suggests that, in the case of an underdeveloped institutional 
framework, ownership concentration, as a distinctive feature of lack of the corporate 
governance mechanisms, may substitute for institutional shortfalls. Furthermore, as Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) pointed out, ownership concentration may act as an equivalent to standard 
corporate governance mechanisms, efficiently monitoring managers and contributing to better 
firm performance.  
 
Hence, we are left with two contrasting theories, preventing us from concluding one way or 
the other regarding the expected sign on the relationship between ownership concentration 
and the firm performance. We have strong empirical evidence suggesting the positive effect 
of ownership concentration on firm performance due to diminished agency costs. Conversely, 
especially in the case of highly concentrated ownership, missed investment opportunities and 
high private benefits of control might lead to a negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. Therefore, in the context of the Montenegrin economy, 
given its uncommonly high ownership concentration, we are not sure concerning whether the 
impact might be positive or negative. Whether the argument of better monitoring potential of 
ownership concentration or escalation of the private benefits of control will emerge, at this 
point of analysis is difficult to anticipate.  
 
Without further discussion, we tend to agree with the conclusion of La Porta et al. (1999) 
that, in the contexts of small countries, with highly concentrated firm ownership by families 
or individuals, owners of those firms might gain significant political power. Additional 
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political power may be used for expropriating additional sources and mitigation of potential 
business barriers that can be used to obtain better firm performance. 
 
In the model we control for the firm’s leverage (Leverage), calculated as the debt to asset 
ratio. According to Demsetz and Villalonga (1985), Himmelberg et al., (1999) and Welch 
(2003, p. 294) leverage has a negative impact on firm performance. In line with the pecking 
order theory, there is an inverse relationship between the financial results of the firm and the 
level of its debt.
74 In contrast, according to the agency theory higher leverage leads toward 
better performance, through additional monitoring of managers by institutions that provided 
external finance, or through threat of liquidation, which leads to a more responsible attitude 
of managers who are afraid of losing salaries, reputation or bonuses (Grossman and Hart, 
1982 and Williams, 1987). Moreover, according to agency theory, a higher leverage ratio 
might mitigate potential conflicts between owners and managers concerning the choice and 
the level of risk of additional investments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). That is, the agency 
theory would support the hypothesis that an increasing leverage ratio triggers diminishing 
“agency costs of outside equity and improvement of firm performance, all else held equal” 
(Berger and di Patti, 2002). 
 
In addition, in the model we control for the size of the company (Ln_Asset). According to 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985, p. 1185), in larger firms, a smaller share stake is needed in order to 
obtain the desired level of control. Consequently, we would hypothesise that firm size would 
have a negative impact on ownership concentration. They argue that in the attempt of 
shareholders to preserve the same level of ownership concentration, they would be willing to 
purchase additional shares only at a lower - risk compensating - price i.e. they will have risk-
averse behaviour.  
 
                                                     
74
“The pecking order theory of capital structure is based on the assumption that firms have a preferred hierarchy 
in financing decisions. The first choice is to use internal financing (retained earnings) before deciding to use any 
form of external funds. Namely, internal funds incur no flotation costs and require no additional disclosure of 
proprietary financial information that could lead to more severe market discipline and a possible loss of 
competitive advantage” Myers and Majluf (1984). However, if a firm is forced to use external funds, there is a 
gradual list, based on managerial will to maintain control over the firm’s decisions, concerning which funds will 
be used first: debt; convertible securities; preferred stock; and, finally, common stock (Myers, 1984). This scale 
is based on the incentive of financial managers to preserve control of the firm (since only common stock has a 
“voice” in management), reduce the agency costs of equity, and avoid the negative market reaction that will be 
raised with a new equity issue (Hawawini and Viallet, 1999).     
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Concerning the impact of firm size on firm performance, a large empirical literature on this 
issue is equally as inconclusive as the literature assessing the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. A limited literature review (taking into consideration 
that exhaustive assessment of this relationship is beyond the scope of this thesis) examining 
the link between ownership concentration and firm’s size supports the idea of its pronounced 
inconclusiveness. The additional information that might be obtained from this variable is to 
assess whether firm size really matters in the context of the Montenegrin economy, consisting 
as it does in large part of small and medium enterprises. 
 
The literature on this issue starts with the famous Gibrat’s law (1931), or the so-called “Law 
of Proportionate effect,” which argues that firm performance is proportionate to firm size, 
growing independently. This is supported by findings of Hymer and Pashigian (1962) and 
Mansfield (1962). Bhattacharyya and Saxena (2009) argues that this applies only in the case 
of large firms “that have overcome the minimum efficient scale of a given industry”. On the 
other hand, we would argue that a sea-change occurred with Baumol (1959), supported later 
by empirical findings of Hall and Weiss (1967), Gale (1972), Shepherd (1972) and Punnose 
(2008), who find a positive impact of firm size on firm performance. According to Power and 
Reid (2003), firms that are considered as small (which is the case for most joint stock 
companies in Montenegro) need to remain small i.e. firms “need to adjust downwards in size” 
in order to achieve better firm performance and to be long lived. Contrariwise to previous 
findings, Marcus (1969), Evans (1987) find a weak negative impact of firm size on firm 
performance arguing that larger firms would have lower profit rates because of diminishing 
returns to the fixed factors of production. However, these studies were relying on the cross 
sectional databases, neglecting the dynamics existing between a firm’s size and a firm’s 
performance. Thus, in our model specification we cannot provide a definite hypothesis 
concerning the sign and significance of the relationship between firm size and firm 
performance in the context of Montenegrin economy, taking into consideration the widely 
varying empirical evidence on this relationship. Nonetheless, assessing the dataset 
characteristics, the general impression is that large privatized companies achieve better 
performance, taking into consideration that they have easier access to international capital 
markets. 
 
In like manner, we intended to include variables to control for firm risk (Firm_risk) and 
market specific risk (Market_risk). However, for reasons explained below, eventually these 
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variables were not included.These variables control for the fact that different levels of risk are 
attached to investment in different companies. According to Demsetz and Lehn (1985) the 
profit potential of one company is related to the instability of its market environment. The 
noisier the environment, the more difficult it is to ensure efficient managerial behaviour and 
profit maximization. Changes in prices, changes in market structures, technologies, etc. will 
induce increase of ownership concentration, as a reflex of owners to ensure satisfactory 
management monitoring. Thus, we need to control for two effects, changes in the firm’s 
environment measured by the market risk and reaction of the firm to the changes in the 
market environment, i.e. firm specific risk.   
 
The variable we use to capture the effect of the Market risk represents the value of the beta 
coefficient obtained from regressions of monthly stock returns of a particular company on 
monthly market returns. Because the Montenegrin Stock Exchange does not provide beta for 
any of the listed joint stock companies, these coefficients had to be calculated by the author, 
for all 204 joint stock companies present in our sample for the period 2004-2008. The beta 
coefficients were obtained using OLS estimation from 1020 regressions of monthly stock 
returns on monthly market prices, which are approximated by the MONEX20 cumulative 
stock exchange index.  
 
According to Demsetz and Lehn (1985, p. 1160) we need also to control for firm specific 
risk, arguing that the firm specific risk is “the factor most strongly associated with the type of 
instability for which control is most useful”. In other words, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) claim 
that the owners believe that they can control the success (firm performance) of their firms. 
However, in the case when the firm’s environment is noisier- i.e., more uncertain (due to 
price changes, technological changes, changes in the market positions, etc.) - monitoring of 
managers becomes more difficult, because the signals with respect to the behaviour of the 
firm are difficult to monitor, becoming “non-readable” due to the changes in the company’s 
environment. Thus, with increase of the firm’s uncertainty and noisiness of signals from the 
market, ownership concentration increases, as a reaction to the increased difficulties faced by 
owners of efficiently monitoring managers; i.e. we expect that with the increase of firm 
specific risk ownership concentration will increase.  
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As a proxy for the firm specific risk, we use the variable Firm_risk, which is the standard 
error obtained from the regression used to estimate the beta coefficient (i.e. market risk). 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest two other measures: the standard deviations of annual 
accounting profit rates; and the standard deviations of monthly stock market rates on return 
(Pedersen and Tomsten, 1997; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001; Siqueira, 1998; Rogers et al. 
2008). However, we decided to use the measure considered as “mainstream” in the empirical 
literature dealing with this topic (Perrini et al., 2008; Welch et al., 2003; etc). Moreover, in 
the case of Montenegro, fluctuations of the standard errors of the beta coefficient are less 
pronounced in comparison to the standard deviation of the monthly stock market rates of 
return of Montenegrin joint stock companies. We use this variable with caution.  
 
As explained in Subsection 4.2, the Montenegrin capital market experienced dramatic 
expansion during the period 2004-2008, due to an exogenous shock triggered by extensive 
FDI inflow in real-estate, credit growth and nominal wage growth. Consequently, during this 
period the capital market (measured by market turnover volume) increased by more than 14 
times, accompanied by the bubble on the real-estate market where prices increased by more 
than 147% over two years. Accordingly, the calculated values of the beta coefficient for this 
period do not reflect changes of firms’ performance, or the noisiness of the “normal” business 
environment, somuch as they may reflect the speculative activities of investors (usually 
individuals who obtained money from selling real-estate on the Montenegrin coast) who 
typically were completely unaware of the real status and performance of the companies in 
which they were investing. Therefore, in the Specifications presented in Table 4.14 these two 
risk variables were not included, given that they did not yield informative results when 
included in the model. 
 
Although we concluded that in our particular context the risk variables could not fulfil their 
intended function, we did include additional firm specific variables in the model 
specification, RD_Sale and Fix_Sale, which are, respectively, proxies for research and 
development expenditures (R&D) and gross fixed assets as a fraction of annual revenue. 
These two variables in the model specification, proposed by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), 
are used for two reasons. Firstly, to control for the extent to which the firm invested in 
intangible capital (R&D to sales ratio) andto control for accounting differences stemming 
from different approaches to fixed assets depreciation (Fixed asset to sale ratio). In particular, 
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the proxy for the level of intangible assets is used to control for distortion of Tobin’s Q, 
taking into consideration that the book value of assets, which represents the denominator of 
Tobin’s Q, usually does not include the value of all intangibles. Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001, p. 14) argues that it is necessary to include fixed assets to take into consideration that 
accounting decisions affecting Tobin’s Q originate from poor assessment of fixed asset 
depreciation. Given, that we do not use Tobin’s Q in our model as a proxy for company 
performance, due to the severe distortion of share prices during the credit boom in 2005, 
2006 and 2007, we decided to include those variables for the first set of reasons provided by 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). Simultaneously, we use the RD_Sale variable as an 
alternative to the potentially unreliable beta coefficient as an indicator for the firm specific 
uncertainty, as suggested by Hashi and Grosefeld (2001).  
 
As already accentuated, in line with Demsetz and Lehn (1985), in the case when a firm 
operates in a less certain environment, it faces various external factors such as market 
competition, technology changes, government policy shifts, etc., which magnifies the 
importance of the control of management. Namely, as we argue in relation to a noisier 
environment, owners will have incentives to monitor more closely managers by increasing 
their ownership share. Thus, assuming that large ownership would not affect managerial 
initiative, which might lead toward a worsening of the firm’s results, we may argue that, in 
the context of the Montenegrin economy, a positive relationship can be expected. As Hashi 
and Grosefeld (2001) argue, it is difficult to find a good proxy for the degree of uncertainty in 
the firm environment. As noted, due to overheating of the Montenegrin economy, followed 
by creation of price bubbles in the capital and real estate markets, firm levels as well as 
market Beta coefficients obtained for the period 2004-2008 are of a very poor quality. 
Namely, prices were driven primarily by speculative demand, fluctuating independently of 
the real quality of listed companies. Consequently, the beta coefficient is very much 
misleading as a proxy for firm specific risk, although often used in similar research. Instead, 
we use R&D expenditure as an alternative proxy of firm specific environmental noise. We 
are fully aware that this proxy is of a poor quality, which might be reflected through its low 
precision in the estimated regression; yet we argue that it is a preferable option to the Beta 
coefficient.  
 
As previously explained, in our model specification, instead of Tobin’s Q, we use alternative, 
accounting measures of firms’ profitability: Return on Asset (ROA); and Return on Equity 
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(ROE). Still, we are interested to see how intangible assets might affect firm performance. 
The literature on R&D and its impact on firm performance and productivity are very rich, 
covering both macro and micro levels. According to Holak et al. (1991) and Morebey (2003), 
R&D might have either a positive or a negative impact on firm performance, depending on 
the level of investment in R&D; i.e. it is necessary that firms exceed a certain threshold in 
investing in R&D in order to have a positive impact on firm performance. Similarly, 
O’Mahony and Vecchi (2009), Griliches, (1979); Grossman and Helpman (1991); Coe and 
Helpman (1995), Cuneo and Mairesse (1984); Mairesse and Cuneo (1985); Grifﬁth et al., 
(2006); Bloom and Van Reenen (2002); Harhoff (1998), etc., find in the context of various 
countries (the OECD countries, USA, France, UK, Germany) that investment in knowledge 
based capital positively affects firms’ productivity. However, it is necessary to emphasize 
that the impact of R&D investment on firm performance, or its spill over effects on the 
economy (Romer, 1986), is not the focus of our research. Instead, in our model specification 
we control for intangible assets, using the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales, with the main 
aim to use this variable as a potentially valuable proxy variable, which at the same time 
captures accounting distortions in evaluating the level of firms’ intangible assets. 
 
Concerning the Fixed assets to annual sales ratio, we include this variable to control for 
distortions in the accounting evaluation of fixed assets (level of depreciation) and its impact 
on firm performance. Namely, at present there is evident debate among managers, investors, 
accountants and capital market regulators about “disclosure and recognition of long-term 
nonfinancial assets at estimated value, rather than at depreciated historical cost” (Aboody et 
al., 1999). As stated in their work, upward revaluations of fixed assets significantly positively 
affect changes in future performance in the context of UK firms. Simultaneously, fixed assets 
indicate capital intensity, which would imply that those companies with higher capital 
intensity might have better firm performance (Chhibber and Majumdar, 1998) due to the fact 
that  firms “operating with higher capital-to-sales ratio impose entry barrier and enjoy better 
control over the market, than it would have been otherwise” (Kumar, 2004, p. 13).   
 
In addition, we include a Regulation dummy, which controls for the regulation effect on the 
financial sector in a setting where regulation severely circumscribes what management 
(insiders) and outsiders can do with the assets owned by firms. Namely, according to 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985, p. 1161), in industries which are under special supervision due to 
their importance for the financial stability of a country, additional regulation is provided, 
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which on the one hand restricts the behaviour of owners, but on the other hand provides 
stricter monitoring of the management, relaxing the necessity for ownership concentration. 
Indeed, the Law on Banks of Montenegro consists of articles that directly affect the identity 
and the structure of owners
75
 as well as the behaviour of managers
76
 in line with its purpose 
of ensuring the financial stability of Montenegro.Strict regulation environment affects the 
magnitude of management manoeuvre when it comes to investment decisions, revenue 
generation and profit allocation. Therefore, a general expectation is that a strict,risk averse 
regulatory environment might have a negative impact on profitability. The same conclusion 
stands for certain types of utility industries controlled by strict rules concerning other types of 
sensitivity ( eg. environmental), which are controlled by the Utility_dummy.  
 
Following the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) specification we include another indicator variable 
Media_dummy, in order to control for “amenity potential” in the media industry. According 
to Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, p. 222) “amenity potential” is described as “a characteristic 
of the good produced by the firm that allows for the creation of non-profit related utility for 
owners of the firm” or creation of the “the private benefits of control” (Grossman and Hart, 
1988). Namely, according to Djankov et al. (2001, p. 5) who assessed the ownership structure 
of media firms around the globe, the amenity potential reflects potential non-financial 
benefits, such as fame and indirect influence, obtained by controlling a newspaper or a 
television station. These nonfinancial benefits for controlling a media company or a famous 
sport team must be considerably higher than those from controlling a firm of comparable size 
in, say, the hotel or the pottery industry. However, this “non-pecuniary benefit of control” 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2010, p. 876) can not be utilized if the ownership structure is diffuse. 
Therefore, it is expected that owners will be more concentrated for those special firms that 
have a potential to exhibit high amenity potential; with the aim to enjoy in it. Simultaneously, 
                                                     
75
According to Article 9 of the Law: “No legal or natural person may acquire qualified participation in a bank 
without prior approval of the Central Bank. A party with qualified participation may not further increase 
participation in capital or voting rights in a bank, on the basis of which it acquires 20%, 33%, or 50% or more of 
participation in voting rights or in the capital of the bank, without the prior approval of the Central Bank. A legal 
person that is engaged in non-financial activity and in which a bank has participation in capital or voting rights 
of at least 20%, may not acquire participation in  capital or voting rights in that bank of 5% or more.” 
76If the Central Bank establishes irregularities in the bank’s operations, it may take one of  the following 
measures:  “....order a bank to discharge a member of the Board of Directors, an executive director or an official 
with special powers and responsibilities and set the timeframe for conducting the procedure of their relieving of 
duty and, as a rule, prohibit these persons to further perform their functions until the completion of the ordered 
procedure; revoke the previously granted approval to a board of directors member; order the bank to reduce 
overhead expenses, including the imposing of  restrictions to salaries and other benefits of the bank's executive 
directors and other officials with special powers and responsibilities”; etc. 
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amenity purchases made by owners, are driven not purely for profit maximization, but 
forgiven benefits that arise from exploiting amenity potential, and should result in reduced 
profit (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001, p. 223). 
 
As mentioned, although our aim is to include those variables suggested by Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), we include an additional set of variables that 
might have impact on corporate performance, along with a set of variables that should control 
for country specificities of the ownership concentration patterns of Montenegrin companies. 
We include the variable Liquidity to control for the effect of a company’s financial position 
on performance. According to Couderc (2005) and Gitman (1984), excessive cash holdings 
within the firm - i.e. putting too much focus on liquidity – causes poorer firm performance 
due to underinvestment. On the other hand, Kim et al., (1998), argue that those companies 
that want to achieve better financial results need to have higher liquidity, in order to fund 
their operations and sales growth. Thus, we would expect either a negative or a positive 
impact of liquidity on firm performance; or a non-significant effect if both theories are valid 
and so offset one another in their practical realisation. We can make an argument for potential 
simultaneity, i.e. potential reverse impact of firm performance on liquidity. The same issue 
arises in relation to firm solvency as an addition to the core variables of Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). 
 
Moreover, in the model specification we introduce the solvency ratio (Solvency). Taking into 
consideration that solvency is usually defined as the ability of a firm to meet its long-term 
fixed expenses and to accomplish long-term expansion and growth, or as the ability of a 
business to have enough assets to cover its liabilities, we may argue that solvency is the 
condition sine qua non in achieving better firm performance (Yu and Liang, 2011; Hu and 
Izumida, 2008). However, the versatile empirical literature on this issue denotes 
simultaneously that better firm performance might be achieved with firms that have lower 
solvency ratios. For example, Collin (1998, p. 29) argues that firms with a low solvency 
levels will be under pressure to allow their debt holders to impose their actions on the 
managers and a “stable but not an exceptionally high profit could be expected”. On the other 
hand, Rajan (1992) argues that those companies that have solvency problems may be the 
subject of excessive rent extracting enforced by their lenders that, in the case when 
company’s debt capacity is reached, have stronger negotiating power.  
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Although the solvency ratio is not part of the core model introduced by Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001), we include the solvency ratio within the model specification. Analysing 
the database we observed that there are numerous companies with poor financial ratios 
(solvency, liquidity and profitability), supporting the impression that these companies have 
problems in maintaining their business activity at a satisfactory level. Similarly to liquidity, 
we can hypothesise potential simultaneity (endogeneity) between firm performance and 
solvency ratio. In the event, however, attempting to instrument these variables either singly, 
together or in combination with size – another potentially endogenous variable – demanded 
too many instruments in relation to the number of observations. (We discuss the problem of 
“too many instruments” in the context of system GMM estimation below). This was evident 
in poor model diagnostics and the failure of the model to yield useful results (the respective 
regressions are reported in Appendix 4.4). Accordingly, we instrument only what is essential 
(ownership concentration, our variable of interest) rather than what in principle might be 
desirable (i.e. instrumenting, in addition, liquidity, solvency and size). In doing so, we follow 
the usual practice in the literature of instrumenting ownership concentration but not other 
potentially endogenous variables in the model. 
 
In addition, as noted by Mura (2007), it is important to distinguish between different types of 
large block-holders in assessing the quality of firm performance. Namely, following Djankov 
and Murrell (2002), Frydman et al. (1999) and Anderson et al. (2000), transition country 
ownership was, in large part, exogenously determined by political and administrative 
processes. These processes contributed to creation of many different types of owners, 
examined by a large empirical literature. The prevailing sentiment in the empirical literature 
for transition economies is that privatisation, resulting in change in ownership patterns, 
contributes to economic growth, faster transformation and restructuring and, finally, better 
performance of companies. This is supported by Carlin et al. (2001) in the case of 25 
transition economies; Djankov (1999) in case of Georgia and Moldova; Earle and Estrin 
(1997) in the case of Russia; Estrin and Rosevear (1999) in the case of Ukraine; Grigorian 
(2000) in the case of Macedonia; Roberts et al (1999) for the case of Kirgiz Republic, etc. 
Thus, in the model, similarly to Djankov and Murrell (2002), in order to assess the relative 
effectiveness of different types of owners, we include five different variables controlling for 
different types of owners: Individual_dummy (taking value of one if an individual is the 
largest owner, zero otherwise); Other_Company_dummy (taking value of one if another 
company is the largest owner, zero otherwise); Financial_Institution_dummy (taking value of 
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one if the bank is the largest owner, zero otherwise; Privatisation_Fund_dummy (value of 
one if a Privatisation fund is the largest owner, zero otherwise); and State_dummy (taking 
value of one if the state is the largest owner, zero otherwise).
77
 Each of these controls for 
different types of owners. However, unlike Djankov and Murrell (2002) instead of eleven 
overlapping groups
78
, we tried to make a division that avoids overlapping, which may induce 
problems of multicollinearity in the model specification. According to Pound (1988) and 
Almazan et al. (2005), institutional investors are more efficient monitors, due to their better 
expertise and analytical capacities. This would imply that institutional investors on average 
have a stronger (positive) impact on firm performance. 
 
We introduce a set of dummy variables to control for the type of controlling owner with 
respect to whether they are foreign (Foreign_own), domestic (Domestic_own), or state 
owners (State_dummy). We want to explore how different identity of owners may affects firm 
performance. As it can be noticed, the State_dummy variable overlaps with the previous set 
of dummies that controls for different type of investors. Therefore, we will investigate two 
separate specifications, the first one exploring the impact of different type of owners; and the 
second one exploring the impact of different owners’ identities. As previously explained, 
Montenegro, due to political issues and economic sanctions during the nineties of the last 
century, was left almost without domestic capital. The strategy accentuated in the milestone 
document “Development of Montenegro 2002-2006” created a tax environment that resulted 
in a high level of FDI inflow. Extensive literature on this issue predominantly argues that 
foreign owned firms, on average, experience better firm performance (Alan and Steve, 2005; 
Piscitello and Rabiosi, 2005; Douma et al., 2006; Aydin et al., 2007, etc.). Moreover the 
EBRD Transition Report (1999, p. 33) findings supports the idea that “unambiguously 
positive results have been found only for those enterprises privatised to strategic foreign 
investors or to other types of concentrated outside owners”. 
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In our empirical investigation, we control for the identity of the largest owner, no matter what is the 
percentage, i.e. instead of using a threshold e.g.: Estrin and Rosevear, (2003)>=0%; Jones and Mygind, 
(1999)>=50%); or Classens and Djankov, (2002)>=33.3%. 
78Djankov and Murrell (2002) identified eleven different types of owners, some of which overlap: traditional 
state ownership (100% state that have not been the part of a privatisation program);commercialized state-
enterprises that underwent the process of privatisation and where there is no infliction of the state in the 
management decisions of the enterprise, enterprise insiders-includes workers and managers; outsiders-a group 
consisting of non-employee and non state owners; workers; managers; foreign owners of all types; banks; 
investment funds; block-holders-concentrated outsider ownership; and diffuse outsider-dispersed outsiders. 
210 
 
The general argument supporting the idea is that foreign investors provide better corporate 
governance practice, increase productivity, and ensure cheaper sources of financing, higher 
value added to output and greater capital intensity (Willmore, 1986), transfer of knowledge 
and know how (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998), which translates to better firm performance of 
foreign owned companies in comparison to domestic owned ones. According to Yasar and 
Paul (2007) foreign owned companies in Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic have better performance in comparison to domestic owned companies, due to 
higher productivity, export shares and capital intensity. However, although we would assume 
that this hypothesis is particularly correct for transition and less developed economies, 
empirical literature regarding the effectiveness of foreign ownership is not so conclusive in 
the case of developed economies (Ayedin et al., 2007, p. 106). For example, Barbosa and 
Louri (2003) do not find evidence that multinational corporations perform better than 
domestic firms in the case of Portugal and Greece. Similarly, Konings (2001) fails to support 
the argument that foreign ownership is superior to domestic ownership in the case of the 
Czech Republic and Bulgaria, although this is the case for Poland. On the other hand, 
Mickiewicz et al. (2005) in the context of Poland, while arguing that privatisation has a 
positive impact on the employment growth three to six years after the process of 
privatisation, provide evidence that State owned companies are achieving lower sales growth. 
 
Conversely, Lizal and Svejnar (2002) find that foreign owners do ensure better performance 
of firms. Similarly, Smith et al. (1997) in the case of Slovenian companies find that foreign 
ownership is associated with higher increase of value added in comparison to ownership of 
employees. However, Mickiewicz et al. (2005) argue that there is a reasonable doubt that 
behaviour (i.e. performance) of newly privatised companies would be affected by inherited 
labour surpluses or by the privatisation contracts which, usually, prohibits lay-off of workers 
for a considerably long period after privatisation. This practice holds for most companies sold 
to strategic investors in Montenegro. Conversely, the privatization scheme in Montenegro 
was created on the “cherry picking” principle79, with the aim that the best strategic companies 
                                                     
79
One of the issues not fully covered is the fact that the design of privatization methods and their impact 
(success) on corporate performance is that firms are not chosen for the process of privatization randomly. A 
“cherry-picking” strategy was characteristic forfirms’sales to strategic investors (using tenders, auctions or 
direct negotiation).This issue may contribute to bias when assessing effectiveness of the privatization methods. 
For example, Szenpeteri and Telegedy (2010, p. 298) argue that in the process of firm selection for the state, 
“employment concerns played akey role, even if efficiency gains had to be sacrificed.”The empirical survey of 
Gupta et al., (2008) reveals that the absence of controlling for the problem of non-randomized choice of firms 
that are going to be privatised,creates biased results of empirical research that are estimating effectiveness of 
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should be sold to strategic domestic or foreign investors. We assume that in the context of the 
Montenegrin economy foreign ownership should contribute to better performance.  
 
Given the poor institutional environment and corporate governance environment we 
introduce three dummies to control for the type of controlling owner with respect to whether 
they are state (State_50), foreign (Foreign_50), domestic (Domestic_50). Controlling owner 
in the context of Montenegrin legislation regarding corporate governance is the one that has 
more than 50% of votes, i.e. a large enough percentage of shares such that no one share 
holder or a coalition of stock holders is able to block decisions by the controlling owner.  
 
Although it is not the primary focus of our empirical analysis, we want to highlight that the 
literature in the case of transition economies faces problems in creating a definite theoretical 
concept concerning the impact of different privatization programs on ownership structure 
evolution. Possibly the most comprehensive analysis was provided by Dyck (2000), who tried 
to compare how different privatisation designs contributed to growth at the national level as 
well as to creation of the legal framework on corporate governance protection.  
 
Similarly, Estrin et al. (2007) provide a very extensive examination, based on a review of the 
existing literature, which assesses the impact of ownership structure changes in the post 
privatization period of transition economies and the impact of these evolutions on firm 
performance. A thorough summary of the relevant studies, dealing with the impact of 
different privatisation processes on ownership structure and the consequent impact of 
ownership on firm performance or speed of restructuring provides compelling evidence that 
private ownership outperforms state-ownership in the context of firm performance. Therefore 
we have at least an implicit indication, following experiences of other countries, as to what 
we may expect as a finding of our model with regard to efficiency of private vs. state 
ownership. With this brief assessment of this transition-related empirical literature, we want 
to highlight the profound differences among empirical findings regarding the effectiveness of 
varied ownership identities with respect to firm performance (in most cases state ownership 
                                                                                                                                                                     
different privatisation designs. Djankov and Murrell’s (2002) Meta analysis survey indicates that one-half ofthe 
studies do not treat the issue of selection bias at all, whilst Hanousek, Kocenda and Svejnar (2007, p. 17), who 
managed to capture nonrandomized selection of companies,claim, “the other half suggests thatmany treat the 
issue in a relatively haphazard way.” In contrast (and we are supportive of this premise in the context of 
Montenegrin economy), Hamm, King and Stuckler (2012) argue that non-randomized choice of companies for 
privatisation is a delusional task due to dubious quality of financial data. 
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vs. private ownership), and then compare/ check the robustness of our  findings. As noted, 
almost all the studies refer to the period prior to 2005, when privatisation processes in almost 
all transition economies had been finished and outcomes were available to be summarized 
through analytical research. 
 
As explained in the introductory section, Montenegro undertook its process of privatisation 
one decade later (starting in 2001) in comparison to most transition economies from (CIS and 
EEC countries). To our knowledge, the existing empirical literature lacks evidence on the 
impact of privatisation on ownership structure and consequent firm performance for 
Montenegro. Thus, this research contributes to filling a knowledge gap, with assessment on 
how different ownership identities affect firm performance, and whether certain types of 
privatisation affected the current performance of the Montenegrin economy. 
 
Consequently, we include an MVP_dummy, a dummy variable to control for the impact of 
MVP on firm performance. Namely, the extensive empirical literature remains vague 
concerning the effectiveness of this privatisation method with respect to economic growth 
and creation of effective corporate governance. According to Megginson and Netter (1999), 
the MVP, on average, performed worse in comparison to other privatization programs. Yet, 
they argue that voucher privatisations at the same time “foster free and efficient markets, and 
promote effective corporate governance.” Similarly, Miller (2006) argues that in the case of 
Bulgaria MVP have performed less well than firms privatized by other privatisation methods. 
Pistor and Spicer (1996) provide extensive grounds for critique of MVP, finding that citizens 
in Russia and the Czech Republic became owners of the worst privatized firms, while 
insiders became owners of the best performing firms. 
 
Our general sentiment is that we may expect a negative coefficient on the MVP variable. 
Namely, in the context of the Montenegrin economy it is evident that different privatization 
processes resulted in a very mixed yet concentrated ownership structure. According to 
Shleifer and Blasi (1996), in the absence of a developed capital market, as was the case in 
Montenegro, which prevents fast re-trading of shares,  the ownership structures created after 
the MVP have a more persistent effect on enterprise actions and consequently on its 
performance. Taking into consideration that the main downside of the MVP is creation of 
granulated, ineffective and unskilled shareholders (Gray, 2001), delayed or insufficiently fast 
re-trading of shares due to the underdeveloped capital market may additionally worsen the 
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performance of companies that were the subject of MVP. In addition, according to 
Megginson and Netter (2001), privatisation tends to have a positive impact on firm 
performance, including the state owned companies, in an environment with readily 
competitive markets. In contrast, the rationale for privatisation is less compelling in markets 
where monopolistic behaviour is prevalent. This is the case in Montenegro, which can be 
described as a small, highly monopolized market, where certain sectors are occupied by only 
one to four companies; i.e. we would argue that some industries are to a certain extent 
monopolized. For instance, the energy sector consists of only one company
80
, the 
construction industry consists of eight large companies, around 75% of the  retail trade  
consists of three large retail trade chains
81
, while telecommunication services are provided by 
two companies
82
. Lastly, we introduce a set of industry dummy variables to control for 
industry effects. 
 
Table 4.11 sets out the list of variables used in our model specification, their corresponding 
symbols and expected signs, according both to existing theories and to the distinctive 
characteristics of the Montenegrin economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
80“ElektroprivredaCrne Gore AD Nikšić” 
81“Voli DOO”, “MEX DOO”  
82 “Pro Monte–Telenor AD” and “T-Mobile AD Podgorica" 
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Table 4.11: Symbols and description of variables used in the empirical analysis 
Symbol Description Expected 
Sign 
Dependent variable 
 
  
ROE Firm Performance – Return on Equity  
Independent variables 
 
  
lnSize Size- natural logarithm of the average book value of assets  +/- 
Leverage Leverage-the ratio of year-end debt to the year-end book value of 
assets 
- 
lntopOC5 Ownership concentration - ln(OCTOP5 / (100 – OCTOP5)), where 
OCTOP5 is the percentage of ordinary shares owned by the top 5 
shareholders. Following established practice in the literature, this 
variable is specified as a natural logarithm 
+/- 
Liquidity Liquidity ratio– (Liquidity indicator: cash +accounts receivable + short 
term investment)/current liabilities 
+/- 
FixSale Fixed asset to sales ratio - the ratio of the gross fixed assets to annual 
sales 
- 
Solvency  Solvency ratio–Solvency indicator used to measure a company's ability 
to meet long-term obligations, measured as the ratio of the after tax net 
profit plus depreciation to long and short term liabilities 
+ 
R&DSale R&D to sales ratio-the average ratio of annual research and 
development expenditure to annual sales 
+ 
Media_dummy Dummy for  media and sport clubs companies (equal to 1 if the firm 
operates in the media or sport industry, and 0 otherwise) 
+ 
Utility_dummy Dummy for  utility company (equal to 1 if the firm operates in the 
utility industry, and 0 otherwise) 
+ 
Finance_dummy Dummy for  finance company (equal to 1 if the firm operates in the 
finance industry, and 0 otherwise) 
+ 
Individual_dummy Dummy for investor’s identity (equal to 1 if the firm’s largest owner is 
an individual, and 0 otherwise) 
+ 
State_dummy Dummy for investor’s identity (equal to 1 if the firm’s largest owner is 
the state, and 0 otherwise) 
- 
Other_company Dummy for investor’s identity (equal to 1 if the firm’s largest owner is 
another company, and 0 otherwise) 
+ 
Bank_dummy Dummy for investor’s identity (equal to 1 if the firm’s largest owner is 
a bank or other finance company, and 0 otherwise) 
+ 
PF_dummy Dummy for investor’s identity (equal to 1 if the firm’s largest owner 
isa privatisation fund, and 0 otherwise) 
- 
State_50 Dummy for investor’s identity (equal to 1 if the firm’s 
controlling((larger than 50%) owner is state, and 0 otherwise) 
- 
Foreign_50 Dummy for investor’s identity (equal to 1 if the firm’s 
controlling((larger than 50%)owner is foreign, and 0 otherwise) 
+ 
Domestic_50 
 
Foreign_dummy 
 
Domestic_dummy 
Dummy for investor’s identity (equal to 1 if the firm’s controlling 
owner ((larger than 50%)is domestic, and 0 otherwise) 
Dummy for investor’s identity (equal to 1 if the firm’s largest owner is 
foreign investor, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy for investor’s identity (equal to 1 if the firm’s largest owner is 
domestic  investor, and 0 otherwise 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
MVP Dummy for type of privatisation (equal to 1 if the firm was involved in 
the MVP process, and 0 otherwise) 
- 
Industry Dummies (1-
15) 
Dummy for industry that a firms main activity is grouped (equal to 1 if 
the firm’s activity belongs to a certain industry, and 0 otherwise83 
/ 
 
                                                     
83
Industries are sorted according to MONSTATs division (which does not corresponds to NACE industry 
aggregation) where 1-Agriculture, forestry and water management; 2 –Fishery; 3- Mining and quarrying; 4-
Manufacturing Industry; 5-Production of electricity, gas and water; 6-Construction; 7-Wholesale and retail;8-
Hotels and restaurants; 9-Transport, storage and communication; 10-Financial intermediation; 11-Real estate 
activities; 12-Public administration and social security; 13-Education; 14-Health and social work; 15-
Community, social services. 
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Table 4.12 provides descriptive statistics for the continuous explanatory variables, while 
Table 4.13 provides descriptive statistics for the categorical (nominal) variables. The 
inclusion of these variables in an empirical specification may produce significant coefficients, 
taking into consideration very pronounced variation between companies. Descriptive 
statistics of quantitative explanatory variables reflect on the one hand the level of financial 
stability of the Montenegrin economy, and on the other lack of good accounting practice. 
That is, Montenegrin companies from the mean values presented in Table 4.12 may be 
considered as relatively indebted (Mean Leverage ratio=0.49), solvent (Mean Solvency 
ratio=2.2) but insufficiently liquid (Liquidity ratio=0.81). Simultaneously, they do not invest 
enough in Research and Development (mean R&D to sale ratio=0.03), while, on average, 
they inefficiently utilize their fixed assets to generate revenue (mean Fixed Asset to Sales 
ratio=6.99). An underlying characteristic of the data set is the poor quality of accounting 
practice used for financial reporting of companies used in the sample. Namely, we are very 
suspicious that certain companies do not have any fixed assets (minimum Fixed Asset to Sale 
ratio=0.0), or record a negative value of the Liquidity ratio (minimum Liquidity=0.0). 
Consequently, starting with an unbalanced panel, we introduced filters to exclude 
observations with unusual values of financial indicators, where these are included in the 
model specification. The criteria for thus cleaning the data set are explained in Subsection 
4.4.  
 
Table 4.12: Descriptive statistics of quantitative explanatory variables, 2004-2008 
Explanatory Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Return on Equity -0.63 19.00 -587.45 13.42 
Size 14.95 2.13 7.60 20.85 
Ownership Concentration 
Lnoctop5 1.9 2.17 -2.86 9.210 
Liquidity 0.81 7.95 0.00 185.6 
Leverage 0.49 0.93 0.000 12.34 
Solvency 2.22 7.28 -463,5 2,050.1 
R&D to sale ratio 0.027 0.08 0.000 0.98 
Fixed Asset to sale ratio 6.99 8.92 0.000 41.11 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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As noted, Table 4.13 shows the descriptive statistics for the categorical (nominal) variables 
used in our preferred model specification. A compelling characteristic of the data set is that 
there are no missing observations in the quantitative explanatory variables. Descriptive 
statistics demonstrates that the majority of companies (71.0%) are domestically owned, while 
the rest are almost equally divided between state owned companies (14.9%), of which almost 
half had a state ownership higher than 50% (8.7 p.p.), and foreign owned companies (14.6%) 
of which 10.6 p.p. refer to shareholdings higher than 50%. Furthermore, 38.1% of the sample 
refers to companies that underwent the mass voucher privatisation process.  
 
Table 4.13: Descriptive statistics of categorical explanatory variables, 2004-2008 
Explanatory Variables Taking value 1 (%) Missing 
Media_Dummy 0.52 0.00 
Utility_Dummy 0.52 0.00 
Finance_Dummy 4.98 0.00 
Individual_Dummy 31.5 0.00 
State_Dummy 15.6 0.00 
Privatization_fund_Dummy 7.2 0.00 
Other_company_Dummy 40.1 0.00 
Bank&Finance_Dummy 5.5 0.00 
Domestic__Dummy 70.9 0.00 
Foreign_Dummy 13.5 0.00 
Domestic50_Dummy 44.7 0.00 
State50_Dummy 9.6 0.00 
Foreign50_Dummy 9.9 0.00 
MVP 38.1 0.00 
Industry 1 2.5 0.00 
Industry 2 
 
1 0.00 
Industry 3 
 
3.5 0.00 
Industry 4 
 
24.1 0.00 
Industry 5 
 
0.5 0.00 
Industry 6 
 
5.4 0.00 
Industry 7 
 
28.8 0.00 
Industry 8 
 
12.7 0.00 
Industry 9 
 
9 0.00 
Industry 10 
 5 0.00 
Industry 11 
 
3.1 0.00 
Industry 12 
 
0 0.00 
Industry 13 
 
0.5 0.00 
Industry 14 
 
1.5 0.00 
Industry 15 
 
2.3 0.00 
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Lastly, although Media_dummy is included to control for the amenity potential, and the 
Utility_dummy to control for the presence of industries with special regulations affecting 
ownership concentration and firm performance, in the context of our sample, these two 
variables are capturing individual company effects (i.e. a fixed_ effect), rather than the 
particular impact of amenity potential or regulation. Namely, in the sample, there is only one 
company in each of these two categories (respectively, Pobjeda-Daily AD and 
Elektroprivreda EPCG AD). Consequently, we may find a high value of the coefficients for 
these two variables, which are capturing unobserved company fixed effects.  
 
 
4.5.1 Endogeneity of ownership concentration 
 
Prior to concluding the model specification, we firstly need to address the controversial issue 
of potential ownership structure endogeneity. Namely, the existing literature dealing with the 
ownership concentration - firm performance relationship is profoundly divided on how 
empirical analysis treats ownership structure: as a potentially endogenous variable (Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985; Hermalin and Weisbach (1988); Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; 
Hermalin, 1998; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Miguel et al. 2004; 
Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Bergstrom and Rydqvist, 1990; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; 
etc.) or as a variable determined “outside” the firm (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Leech and 
Leahy, 1991; Crespí, 1998; Morck et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Although the 
issue of ownership concentration is discussed in Chapter 3, at this point we want to pay it 
additional attention in order to interlink it with our preferred estimation choice, explained in 
the following subsection. This is a most important issue: endogeneity if not adequately 
addressed produces biased and inconsistent parameter estimates, leading to seriously 
misleading hypothesis tests. 
 
Early empirical literature supports the core assumption developed by Berle and Means (1932) 
that managerial behaviour diverts the firm’s resources towards fulfilling their own interests, 
which usually diverge from profit maximization. In that setting, ownership concentration is 
an exogenous substitute for this institutional weakness, thereby exerting a positive impact on 
firm performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 
1988, etc.). In contrast, the separation of ownership and control in illiquid capital markets 
with a weak institutional framework may subject minority shareholders to diversion of profits 
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to majority shareholders (Atanasov, 2005; Claessens, et al., 2002; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; 
Nenova, 2003) thereby weakening firm performance.  
 
Demsetz is the most prominent advocate of the endogeneity of ownership concentration. 
Demsetz (1983, p. 384) argues: “...the ownership structure of firms is the endogenous result 
of competitive selection in which the advantages and disadvantages in costs are balanced to 
achieve a balanced organisation in the firm.” 
 
For Demsetz, a firm’s ownership structure, no matter whether it is concentrated or dispersed, 
maximises the value of the firm, arguing that the self-interested behaviour of concentrated or 
dispersed shareholders will ensure both maximum return on assets (performance) and 
effective control of managers (agents). In this case, the source of potential endogeneity is 
joint determination of both the dependent variable (performance) and the variable of interest 
(ownership) by omitted variables that may be unobservable. Similarly, Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) as well as Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, p. 1) postulate that the ownership structure 
of a corporation is seen as “an endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the influence of 
shareholders”. Moreover, there are numerous factors such as company size, the regulatory 
framework, amenity potential, uncertainty of the environment (market) in which the company 
operates, that affect both ownership structure and company performance. The potential 
endogeneity of ownership concentration might affect seriously the estimated relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance. Most studies, which considered 
ownership structure as exogenous, found a significant impact of ownership concentration on 
firm performance. Yet, once potential endogeneity is addressed, this relationship appears 
insignificant.  It is observable that recent literature predominantly treats ownership 
concentration as an endogenous variable, using econometric techniques that address the issue 
of potential endogeneity, including traditional instrumental variables (IV), fixed effects (FE) 
and GMM. 
 
If ownership concentration endogeneity exists, then what might be its cause? We need to 
determine our estimation strategy in the light of answers to this question. Himmelberg et al. 
(1999) provide extensive evidence in favour of the hypothesis that ownership concentration is 
endogenous due to unobserved, firm-specific heterogeneity (such as intangible assets, quality 
of monitoring technique of managers or market power). These affect both firm performance 
and ownership structure, thereby giving rise to an apparent yet, nonetheless, spurious 
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relationship. At the same time, they model unobserved heterogeneity as a “firm fixed effect” 
which, when included in an econometric specification, gives rise to an insignificant 
relationship between ownership and firm performance. On the other hand, Zhou (2001) 
argues that one-year changes in ownership are usually negligible and sporadic, which in turn 
are not likely to be reflected by within-year changes in firm performance. Instead, he 
highlights the cross-sectional characteristic of (managerial) ownership structure: while 
ownership structure differs substantially from firm to firm, it hardly changes over time. In 
this case, because the fixed effect estimator uses only within-group variation, it is inherently 
unable to yield efficient estimates of relatively unchanging ownership effects.
84
 
Consequently, Himmelberg et al. (1999), in effect, predetermine the non-significance of 
ownership concentration; it is a corollary of their choice of estimation technique rather than 
compelling evidence of endogeneity. We conclude that fixed effect estimation can not 
provide decisive evidence against the hypothesis that (managerial) ownership affects firm 
performance.  
 
Using two stage least squares (2SLS) Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find no relationship 
between the firm performance and the fraction of shares owned by the five largest 
shareholders, where ownership structure is treated as an endogenous variable. Conversely, 
when they assessed this relationship using OLS, they find a positive, significant impact of 
ownership concentration on company performance. Although the IV approach successfully 
solves the errors-in-variables problem (Wooldridge, 2000, p. 461), an important drawback of 
performing IV estimation when x and the error term are uncorrelated is that the asymptotic 
variance of the IV estimator is always larger than the asymptotic variance of the OLS 
estimator (Wooldridge, 2000, p. 466). Hence, the standard errors on IV estimates are likely to 
be larger than OLS estimates, and even more so if the excluded instrumental variables are 
only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors. This would imply that the 
coefficients estimated with IV would be less significant, if at all, in comparison to 
coefficients estimated by OLS. Consequently, the disappearance of the significance of the 
relationship assessed with IV approach might just reflect flaws in its application, rather than 
genuine lack of a relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. 
Moreover, if we take into consideration that the empirical literature using IV fails to provide 
the appropriate diagnostic evidence - i.e. tests for the validity of the chosen instruments 
                                                     
84
This insight is at the heart of recent controversy surrounding fixed effects estimation; see Plümper and Troeger 
(2007) and the subsequent papers published in Political Analysis, Spring 2011.  
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(using, for example the ﬁrst-stage F-statistic) - then the validity of the chosen instruments 
remains open to doubt. Baum et al.(2003) and Baum et al. (2007), provide an accessible 
overview of the problems of IV estimation, in particular the problem of “weak instruments”, 
together with the full range of diagnostic tests and estimators for IV estimation currently 
available to applied researchers. In turn, the “state-of-the-art” in IV estimation puts into 
question the validity of the “no relationship” findings reported in Demsetz and Lehn (1985); 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001); Welch, (2003); etc. 
 
Recent empirical literature has made significant progress in providing robust evidence of 
ownership concentration endogeneity, and in controlling for it in the model specifications (Al 
Farooque, 2010; Chen, 2012; Grosfeld, 2006; Javid and Iqbal; 2008; Lee, 2008; Dzanic, 
2012; etc.). These are necessary steps in the assessment of the ownership concentration-firm 
performance relationship. However, from our empirical critique of Himmelberg et al. (1999), 
building on Zhou (2001), we conclude that sometimes certain estimation techniques 
predetermine desired results. Consequently, we need to implement an appropriate estimation 
technique, from which we can draw valid conclusions on the nature of the ownership 
concentration–firm performance relationship.  
 
 
4.5.2 The estimation strategy, selection of an appropriate estimator and model 
specification 
 
Having defined the sample and the variables used, we now outline the econometric 
methodology employed to complete the reasoning for our preferred empirical specification. 
Our baseline empirical specification can be implemented by different estimation strategies 
(techniques). Recent empirical literature, analysing unbalanced panels to assess the impact of 
ownership concentration on firm performance employs various estimation strategies. Firstly, 
the linear OLS regression model assuming homogeneity across time and units. It continues 
with the one-way fixed effects model (FE) ignoring the between-firm variation and focusing 
only on the within-firm variation (Himmelberg et al., 1999; Lopez-Iturriaga and Rodriguez, 
2001; Chen et al., 2003; Fernandes, 2005; etc.); the two-way FE model considering group and 
time effects simultaneously; random effects (RE) models; and, finally, general method of 
moments (GMM) estimation of dynamic panel models. 
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Although recent empirical literature emphasizes GMM dynamic panel estimation, we start 
our investigation by estimating the more traditional model specification in this literature, 
namely the one-way FE model. Yet, as we have emphasised, significant limitations arise from 
this estimation strategy:   
 
1. FE estimation is not able to estimate coefficients for variables that have no within-
group (firm) variation, which in the present study includes the impact of amenity 
potential and excess regulation on firm performance; and  
2. estimation of variables such as ownership concentration with relatively little within-
group variation compared to their between-group variation cannot be estimated 
efficiently.  
 
This second limitation of FE estimation by design biases the investigation against finding a 
non-zero effect of ownership concentration. This may apply a fortiori to Montenegrin 
companies. 
 
Two-way FE models suffer from the same problem; namely, because FE estimates arise only 
from “within-group” variation, and ownership structure is generally slowly moving at most, 
lack of variation in the data may make efficient estimation – hence, a non-zero effect of 
ownership concentration - difficult to achieve. Moreover, while RE estimation does make 
efficient use of both with-group and between-group variation it does so on the very strong 
assumption that the group (in this context, company) fixed effects are not correlated with any 
of the independent variables. Moreover, in random effects estimation this assumption is by 
construction violated in dynamic models (the lagged dependent variable must be correlated 
with the time-invariant group effect in the error term). Yet we have sufficient time dimension 
in our panel dataset and it is a reasonable assumption that present company performance at 
least in part reflects the history of company performance, especially in the recent past. 
Accordingly, our preferred modelling approach is to estimate a dynamic panel model. Hence, 
our preferred estimation strategy is to use dynamic panel model using a GMM estimator.  
 
By construction, dynamic specification – defined by inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable among the regressors - removes otherwise omitted dynamics from the error term and 
introduces them into the estimated part of the model. To estimate a dynamic panel model, we 
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apply GMM estimation, given that its principles apply to the properties of our preferred 
model specification (Bond, 2002; and Roodman, 2006).  
 
Both the “difference” and “system” GMM estimators developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) are appropriate for the 
characteristics of our sample and variable of interest: relatively large N (204 companies) and 
small T (5 years); with an independent variable of interest that is not strictly exogenous 
(ownership concentration), with persistence effects in the dependent variable (firm 
performance); and possibly displaying heteroskedasticity. 
 
Firstly, in the empirical literature there is sufficient indication to expect persistence effects 
with respect to the influence of the past values of a firm’s performance on its current value. 
Damijan et al. (2004, p. 13) argues that this persistence effect: “… is especially true for 
financial performance of firms since owners require persistent growth of profits and firm 
value, where present financial performance is correlated with the past performance of the 
firm.” 
 
Moreover, the lagged values of ownership concentration might have impact on the current 
firm performance, given the fact that it takes time for changes in ownership concentration to 
affect the monitoring process, managerial behaviour and, finally, actions, which might result 
in altered firm performance (Hu and Izumida, 2008; Alonso-Bonis and Andres-Alonso, 
2007).
85
  As Alonso-Bonis and Andres-Alonso (2007, p. 210) argue:“... the dynamics of the 
panel enables an examination of the response processes over time and an observation of the 
variation of the dependent variable in the face of changes in its own determining factors over 
the time horizon.” 
 
By estimating the effect of the lagged dependent variable, we capture the effects of the entire 
history of the process-giving rise to the dependent variable, firm performance (Greene, 2000, 
p. 307). In addition, the estimated coefficient on the variable of interest, ownership 
concentration, reveals any contemporaneous effect beyond the already settled effects of 
history. Finally, the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables and on the variable of 
                                                     
85
As Prasnikar et al. (2004, p. 13) argue: “... this is especially true for financial performance of firms since 
owners require persistent growth of profits and firm value, where present financial performance is correlated 
with the past performance of the firm. In other words, notwithstanding the static specification of our model we 
might observe a strong autoregressive financial component when dealing with the panel structure of the data.” 
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interest may be combined to measure the long-run accumulated impact on firm performance 
of changes in ownership concentration (if any).  
 
As discussed in the previous subsection endogeneity of ownership concentration, stemming 
from reverse causality or unobserved heterogeneity may affect both firm performance and 
ownership concentration and so should be addressed. In the empirical literature, researchers 
have used IV approaches to treat the problem of endogeneity: mainly 2SLS or 3SLS 
(Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Demsetz and Lehn 1995; Cho, 1999; Welch, 2003; etc.). 
2SLS estimates typically find an absence of any relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance, which complements the theoretical hypothesis that firm 
performance is the endogenous outcome of market forces. Yet, as Wooldridge (2000, p. 102), 
remind his readers “… Another potential problem with applying 2SLS and other IV 
procedures is that the 2SLS standard errors have a tendency to be large. What this statement 
typically means is either that 2SLS coefficients are statistically insignificant or that the 2SLS 
standard errors are much larger than the OLS standard errors. Not surprisingly, the 
magnitudes of the 2SLS standard errors depend, among other things, on the quality of the 
instrument(s) used in estimation.” 
 
We argue above that insignificance of the relationship in the empirical literature using 2SLS 
might stem from weak instruments. Staiger and Stock (1997) in their analysis of the 2SLS 
estimator with weak instruments conclude that, even in the case of large sample sizes, weak 
instruments - i.e. instruments that have a low partial correlation with an endogenous 
explanatory variable - may lead to biases in 2SLS estimation. Given that the theoretical 
setting explaining the determinants of ownership concentration and firm performance 
provides a rather limited number of determinants, while providing a very little theoretical 
advice on the choice of valid instruments, we face the problem of finding suitable instruments 
for conducting 2SLS estimation. Conversely, GMM estimation addresses this problem by 
exploiting the time-series depth of panel data to create “internal” instruments: the difference 
GMM estimator uses lagged values of the levels of variables to instrument the differences 
values; and the system GMM estimator combines the instruments used in difference 
estimation with lagged differences of variables to instrument levels values. Both GMM 
estimators may - but need not - use additional “external” instruments from outside the initial 
dataset. Moreover, in two-stage least-squares (2SLS), as ordinarily practiced, “there is a 
trade-off between the lag distance used to generate internal instruments and the depth of the 
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sample for estimation” (Roodman, 2009, p. 137), while difference GMM (Holtz-Eakin et al., 
1988) avoids the trade-off between instrument lag depth and sample depth by including 
separate instruments for each time period. Consequently, we utilize the properties of the 
GMM estimation, designed to estimate efficiently the model where independent variables, 
including the predetermined lagged dependent variable, are not strictly exogenous. 
 
Given the discussed theoretical analytical framework inspired largely by the Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) model specification, and augmented by a set of transition and country-
specific variables, we specify our preferred dynamic panel-data model, to be estimated by 
GMM, as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑥_𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅&𝐷_𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜋 ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
2008
𝑡=2004
+ 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 
where subscript i denotes the cross-sectional units and t denotes time period, so that 
i=(1,2,3,.....,204) and t=(2004, 2005,… ,2008); β1,2,...12 are parameters to be estimated; 
πdenotes the vector of year effects to be estimated; ui represents the group-specific error term, 
which controls for unobserved firm specific sources of heterogeneity affecting firm 
performance that can be assumed to be constant over the period of observation (or, at least, 
slowly moving); and, finally, vit stands for the observation specific  error term. The year 
dummy variables are included to control for period effects that affect all the banks in the 
sample in much the same way. These dummies may be informative economically – e.g. in 
capturing effects of events not specifically modelled such as the global financial crisis – but 
are also required for the statistical purpose of minimising the possibility of cross-group 
correlation among the observation residuals (Roodman, 2009). 
 
 
4.5.3 Diagnostic tests 
 
Before starting a discussion of the estimates we undertake thorough model diagnostic testing 
in order to assess the validity of the GMM approach for estimating the relationship between 
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ownership concentration and the firm performance. In particular, we need to consider that 
GMM, by creating a great number of moments (hence, potential instruments) might have 
questionable reliability in the case of a finite sample. The GMM estimator enables the 
generation of many potential instruments, whose number grows quadratically in T (Roodman, 
2007, p. 1). This entails a trade-off: on the one hand, a larger number of instruments means 
using more information in estimation, which leads toward more statistically significant 
results; on the other, this at the same time increases the risk of over fitting the model (with 
biased results) and reduces the power of the diagnostic tests. The corollary of this trade-off is 
that the maximum number of instruments is not necessarily the optimum number. 
Unfortunately, as Roodman (2007, 2009) argues, the literature does not provide rules and 
procedures for optimising the number of instruments in different sized samples. 
Consequently, we pay special attention to assessing the number of appropriate instruments, 
using the overriding criterion of obtaining the best possible model diagnostics and thus the 
greatest possible assurance concerning instrument validity and the corresponding integrity of 
our estimates.  
 
Our final choice of model specification with respect to the instrument set was guided by the 
standard diagnostic tests: (i) tests for first and, most importantly, second order serial 
correlation among the differenced residuals (the m1+m2 tests); and (ii) the Hansen test, which 
is a heteroskedasticity-robust version of the Sargan test of the over-identifying restrictions.  
 
(i) First, we test for residual autocorrelation. Although GMM estimation does not require 
distributional assumptions (normality) and allows for heteroskedasticity (Pugh, 2009, p. 27), 
still it is based on the assumption that the differenced error terms are not autocorrelated. 
Taking into consideration that GMM estimators use lagged values as instruments, the residual 
independence assumption is a crucial condition for the exogeneity and hence validity of the 
instruments (Roodman, 2009, p. 97).  
 
The GMM estimator is considered to be consistent if there is no second-order serial 
correlation in the error term of the first-differenced equation; i.e. it requires that
. A test for the validity of the instruments (and of the corresponding moment 
restrictions) is a test of second-order serial correlation in these residuals, m2.
86
 If this 
                                                     
86
For detailed explanation for testing first- and second-order serial correlation, see Arelanno and Bond (1991) 
0][ 2  itit eeE
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condition does not hold, there is a reasonable doubt that the instruments may not be valid. As 
presented in Table 4.14, in all three specifications the m2 test does not reject the null 
hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation of the residuals (p=0.14 in Specification 1 and 
Specification 3 and p=0.15 in Specification 2), which is consistent with the validity of the 
instruments introduced in the model specification.  
 
However, there is an argument that full confidence in the m2 test requires also rejection of the 
null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation in the differenced error terms (meaning that 
there is first order autocorrelation in the differenced error terms). In different model 
specifications estimated by the GMM estimator, presented in Table 4.14, this problem arises, 
i.e. the m1 test fails to provide sufficient evidence that there is serial autocorrelation in the 
differenced error term. Because this issue is not much considered in the literature, we will 
consider it at some length. 
 
Smith (2010, p. 13) argues that the m1 statistic has an assisting function in assessing the 
robustness and reliability of the m2 test. In the case when the levels error terms follow a 
random walk, it is impossible to reject second-order correlation of the differenced errors. If 
the errors in the levels follow a random walk, i.e. if ρ=1 in eit=ρeit-1+vit, then (suppressing the 
pure white noise vit) eit=eit-1=eit-2=...eit-n. In this case, eit-eit-1=0, eit-eit-2=0,...., eit-eit-n=0. Thus, 
in the specification of the m2 test, Δeit=λΔeit-2 resolves to 0=λ0. Hence, because λ can take any 
possible value, the null λ=0 cannot be rejected. In this case, the m2 test loses power. 
Conversely, first-order serial correlation in the first differenced errors, i.e. 0<λ<1in Δeit=λΔeit-
1, excludes a random walk in the first-order levels errors: because, in turn, eit-eit-1≠0, eit≠eit-1 
and 0<<1. Accordingly, the m1 test for first-order serial correlation in the differenced errors 
is a check on the validity of the m2 test. However, if genuinely there is no serial correlation at 
any order in the differenced error terms, then λ=0 is an authentic result. In this case, the 
crucial m2 test remains valid. For example, if ρ=0, in which case each levels residual is pure 
white noise, then the differenced errors by definition are independent from each other: if eit= 
ρeit-1+vit then, when ρ=0, eit=vit, eit-1=vit-1,..., eit-n= vit-n, in which case Δeit=eit-eit-1=vit-vit-
1,....,Δeit-n=eit-eit-n=vit-vit-n. Given that the difference between two white noise terms is also 
white noise, the successive lags of the differenced errors must be completely independent; 
i.e., λ=0. Unfortunately, we are unable to identify the reason of the lack of serial correlation 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and Pugh (2009). 
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in the first differenced error terms: it may be a random walk in the levels errors, which 
invalidates the m2 test; or it may reflect a lack of serial correlation at any order among the 
first differenced error terms, which is consistent with the m2 test.  
 
Unfortunately, the literature concerning the function and importance of the m1 test, and its 
implications in the case when the m1 null does not hold is scarce and divided. On the one 
hand, we have developed the argument that the m1 tests can indicate the possibility of a 
random walk in the levels error term, which puts a question mark over the non-rejection by 
the m1 test of the null of instrument validity. On the other, Roodman (2006, p. 33) is 
dismissive of the m1 test:“...negative first-order serial correlation is expected in differences 
and evidence of it is uninformative.“ To our knowledge, this issue has not yet been resolved. 
However, to date, Roodman’s view seems to prevail and may explain why the m1 statistic is 
typically not reported. Consequently, our approach is to note the potential problem with the 
m1/m2 procedure given the test results reported in Table 4.14 and, correspondingly, to lean 
more heavily on the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions in our discussion of model 
diagnostics as well as on a standard procedure to check the validity of dynamic panel 
estimates obtained by GMM approaches, which is reported below.
87
 
 
Finally on this issue, in our model specification the m1 test is sensitive to the upper and lower 
limits placed on ROE. So far, we filtered our sample by imposing a very minimal restriction 
on ROE, removing only observations with ROE values greater than 10 or smaller than -10. If 
we take only a slightly less conservative approach to removing outliers, by modifying the 
ROE range to between -5.0 and +5.0, we reduce the sample size by only seven observations 
(from 755 to 748, i.e. by fewer than one per cent). Yet, in the first two specifications of our 
model, the m1 test now rejects the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation in the 
differenced error terms (i.e. suggesting the anticipated presence of first order autocorrelation 
in the differenced error terms) at the 5% and/or 10% levels of significance (see Appendix 
4.3). Given that estimation within a more restricted range of ROE yields results similar to 
those presented in Table 4.14, we conclude that these preferred results are not invalidated by 
the associated m1 statistics.  
                                                     
87 The theory of dynamic panel modelling is still developing, which means that issues can be raised that have no 
agreed solution or even implications. The common indication of first-order serial correlation by the m1 test is 
one such issue. Another, which is at the frontiers of current debate on dynamic linear modelling, is the issue of 
“weak” instruments. The available diagnostics, which we implement in this Chapter, test the validity of the 
overidentifying instruments. As yet, tests for weak instruments have not been developed for dynamic models 
estimated by GMM methods.  
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(ii) Given that GMM models can generate an enormous number of potentially “weak” 
instruments that can cause biased estimates, Roodman (2006) recommends reporting the 
number of instruments. Although there is no straightforward rule to answer the question as to 
how many instruments is “too many” (Roodman, 2006; 2007), we need to rely on rule of 
thumb procedures that can be specified and replicated. Firstly, in the specifications presented 
in Table 4.14 the number of instruments range from 42 to 45, i.e. substantially smaller than 
the number of observations (n=755). Moreover, the number of groups - 204 firms - exceeds 
the number of instruments in each model (between 42 and 45), which satisfies the “minimal” 
rule of thumb suggested by Roodman (2006, p. 13). 
 
Furthermore, Hansen's J is a robust alternative to the Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions. Indeed, Sargan's statistic can be considered as a special case of Hansen's J, under 
the assumption of homoscedasticity. The choice depends on whether we suspect non-
sphericity in the errors (e.g. in the case of heteroscedastic errors), which will generally be the 
case in panel datasets (Roodman, 2006, pp. 11-12). Therefore, for robust GMM the Sargan t-
statistic is inconsistent, which supports our choice of the Hansen J as the preferred diagnostic. 
In the results reported in Table 4.14 below, the Hansen test consistently yields p-values 
ranging between pSpecification1=0.51 to pSpecification2=0.82, which are neither too low (of at least 
0.25, suggested by Roodman, 2007, p. 10, as a rule of thumb for valid instruments) nor too 
high (approaching p=1, which suggests a weakening of the test; see Rodman, 2008, p. 10). 
We conclude that the estimated models reported in Table 4.14 are statistically well specified. 
 
(iii) Furthermore, good practice suggested by Roodman (2006) is to report the approach used 
to obtain the “optimal” number of instruments. In practice, we employ the strategy suggested 
by Roodman (2006), and implemented using his xtabond2 user-written programme for 
STATA, to investigate the potential problem of “too many instruments”. We investigate the 
robustness of our results, giving priority to the model diagnostics, by starting with the 
maximum (default) instrument set and then successively decreasing the number of 
instruments: first, we reduce the number of lags used to create the “internal” instruments; 
and, second, we use the command >collapse<, which reduces the instrument count still 
further by creating instruments for each variable only, instead of creating instruments for 
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each time–period (T), variable and lag distance.88 As noted by (Pugh, 2009, p. 22), in large 
samples >collapse<would reduce statistical efficiency. However, in the case of small 
samples, it can help to address the problems arising from “too many instruments”.  
 
Our sample of 755 observations could be regarded as small for GMM estimation, given that 
we have hundreds of observations rather than thousands. As previously noted, the number of 
groups - 204 firms - exceeds the number of instruments in each model (between 42 and 45), 
which satisfies the “minimal” rule of thumb suggested by Roodman (2006, p. 13). Moreover, 
the number of groups (firms) in our sample exceeds the 140 firms in the benchmark sample 
of Arellano and Bond (1991), which is used also by Roodman to demonstrate the capabilities 
of both difference and system GMM estimation of dynamic panels (2006, p. 14). Because we 
cannot a priori be certain as to whether the number of firms in our dataset is “small” or 
sufficiently large in relation to the number of instruments, we experiment with a number of 
other regressions in which we increase or decrease the number of instruments, including the 
use of the collapse approach to decrease the number of instruments. However, using this 
sample, we are unable to improve the model diagnostics; in particular, the collapse approach 
only worsens the diagnostics. The resulting pattern of instrumentation can be seen in 
Appendix 4.2, where the xtabond2 printout is provided in full. 
  
                                                     
88
 Thorough explanation of how the >collapse< command works is provided by Roodman (2009, pp. 107-108). 
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Table 4.14 Model diagnostics  
 
 
 
Specification 1 
 
Specification 2 
 
Specification 3 
 
Number of observations 
 
755 
 
755 
 
755 
Number of companies 204 204 204 
Wald test Wald chi2(26) = 402.24  
Prob> chi2  = 0.00 
Wald chi2(27) = 736.17 
Prob> chi2  = 0.00 
Wald chi2(26) = 527.51 
Prob> chi2  = 0.00 
Number of instruments 42 43 45 
Hansen test (H0 ; over-
identifying restrictions are 
valid) 
Prob > chi2 = 0.51 Prob > chi2 =  0.82 Prob > chi2 =  0.82 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences 
z =  -1.14  Pr > z = 0.26 z =-1.12  Pr > z =0.26 z = -1.12   Pr > z =  0.26 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences 
z =   1.47  Pr > z = 0.14 z =1.44  Pr > z =0.15 z =  1.48  Pr > z = 0.14 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of 
exogeneity of instrument 
subsets 
   
GMM instruments for levels 
Hansen test excluding group 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.700 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.752 
 
Prob > chi2 =  0.710 
Difference (null H = 
exogenous): 
Prob > chi2 = 0.256 Prob > chi2 = 0.650 Prob > chi2 =  0.737 
gmm(L.roe, lag(1 2))    
Hansen test excluding group: Prob > chi2 = 0.373 Prob > chi2 = 0.395 Prob > chi2 =  0.739 
Difference (null H = 
exogenous) 
Prob > chi2 = 0.581 Prob > chi2 = 0.950 Prob > chi2 =  0.694 
gmm(lnoctop5, lag(2 2))    
Hansen test excluding group Prob > chi2 = 0.937 Prob > chi2 = 0.927 Prob > chi2 = 0.890 
Difference (null H = 
exogenous) 
Prob > chi2 = 0.194 Prob >chi2 = 0.519 Prob > chi2 =  0.536 
Fe  coefficient Roe(-1) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
OLS coefficient Roe(-1) 0.002 0.0015 0.0025 
OLS coefficient Roe(-1) 
upper confidence range 
0.005 0.005 0.005 
GMM coefficient Roe(-1) 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(iv) Furthermore, we are interested in the difference-in-Hansen tests of the exogeneity of 
instrument subsets. In the results reported in Table 4.14, the critical values of the difference-
in-Hansen tests applied to the differences used to instrument the levels equation find 
insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of valid over-identifying restrictions, 
suggesting that the system GMM is preferred to the difference GMM estimator and that the 
model satisfies the steady state assumption (Roodman, 2007).  
(v) A checking procedure on the validity of dynamic panel estimates suggested by Bond 
(2002) and Roodman (2009) argues that if we compare the values of the estimated coefficient 
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on the lagged dependent variable (ROE(-1)) with the same coefficient from both OLS and FE 
estimation, the true estimator of this coefficient should be lower than the coefficient obtained 
from OLS but higher than the coefficient obtained from FE esti00mation. Although – as 
required - in all three specifications the coefficient from FE estimation (See Appendix 4.5) is 
significantly lower compared to the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable from system 
GMM (FEspecification1=-0.006 and FEspecification2, FEspecification3=-0.0034 and < GMM=0.002), in 
all three Specifications the coefficient from OLS estimation (provided in Appendix 4.5) is a 
little lower compared to the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable from system GMM 
(GMM=0.002 > OLSspecification 1,2,3=0.0018). However, according to Roodman (2007, p. 18) 
“Good estimates of the true parameter should therefore lie in the range between these 
values—or at least near it, given that these numbers are themselves point estimates with 
associated confidence intervals.” Our estimates satisfy this guideline: in all three 
specifications, the upper confidence range of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
in OLS estimation is substantially above the system GMM estimate 
(OLSupper_confidence_range_Spec.1,2,3 =0.005 > GMM=0.002). 
 
Summing the results of the various diagnostic tests, we conclude that the estimated model is 
sufficiently well specified as a statistical generating mechanism to support economic 
interpretation. A possible exception is that the m1 test fails to provide evidence that there is 
serial autocorrelation in the differenced error term. However, the relevance and interpretation 
of this test is contested (to the point where it is often not reported). Moreover – and most 
important - further investigation reveals that taking a less conservative approach to removing 
outliers entails the loss of only a few observations but results in the m1 test rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation in the differenced error terms while, otherwise, 
yielding similar diagnostics and estimates to those reported in the main text of this Chapter.  
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4.6 Discussion of the main empirical findings 
 
 
The results of our preferred model specification estimated by GMM are presented in Table 
4.15, following a standard testing down procedure. The differences between the three variant 
specifications arise from the inclusion of different sets of dummy variables that control for 
the different identity of the largest owner: in Specification 1 (Column 1) we introduce a set of 
dummies controlling for different types of owners according the institutional criteria 
(individual, other company, state, privatization fund, etc.); in Specification 2 (Column 2) we 
introduce a set of dummy variables controlling for the origin of the largest (top 10) owner 
(domestic, foreign and state); and, finally, in Specification 3 (Column 3) we introduce a set of 
dummy variables to control for the variation in the identity of the largest shareholder (state, 
domestic or foreign) if its shareholding exceeds the controlling limit of 50% of shares. 
 
All three dynamic specifications reveal the presence of a small (0.002, in each case) but 
highly significant persistence effect (p=0.00 in Specification 1 and 2 and p=0.01 in 
Specification 3). The positive coefficient on the first lag of the firm performance variable 
captures the partial adjustment of firms’ performance in each period, suggesting that past 
values of firm performance affect current values of the firms performance positively, which is 
in line with findings of Prasnikar et al., (2004) in the context of the Slovenian economy. 
Thus, the obtained result would suggest that, ceteris paribus, a change in the ROE in the 
previous year (ROEt-1) of a little less than one standard deviation (0.20 percentage points, see 
Table 4.10) leads to a 0.0004 percentage points increase in the return on equity ratio in the 
current year. Even allowing for a non-marginal one percentage point increase in the return on 
equity (ROEt-1) ratio in the previous year contributes only a 0.002 percentage points increase 
to the return on equity ratio in the current year. These small persistence effects suggest that 
company performance can change quickly from year to year so that the long-run effects on 
firm performance of changes in the independent variables are not much different from the 
estimated short-run effects reported in Table 4.15 (for example the estimated long-run effect 
of changes in ownership concentration on economic performance is 0.1102 compared to a 
short run effect of 0.11).89 
                                                     
89The long-run effect on company performance of changes in any of the independent variables is calculated by 
dividing the estimated short-run effect by (1-the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable), which 
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Table 4.15: Dynamic Panel System GMM estimations ownership concentration and 
firm performance in Montenegro – Short Run effects 
 
Dependent variable: Return on Equity (ROE) 
 
 Specification 1  
(short run effects) 
Specification 2 
(short run effects) 
Specification 3 
(short run 
effects) 
Lagged dependent variable (ROEt-1) 0.002*** 
(0.00) 
0.002* 
(0.00) 
0.002*** 
(0.01) 
LnTOPOC5-Top 5 largest owners90 0.11** 
(0.04) 
 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
0.10* 
(0.09) 
Leverage-Debt of the firm -0.05 
(0.339) 
-0.02 
(0.64) 
-0.002 
(0.96) 
LnSize – the size of the company 0.03 
(0.46) 
0.05 
(0.31) 
0.05 
(0.26) 
Solvency-Solvency ratio 0.003*** 
(0.00) 
0.003*** 
(0.00) 
0.003*** 
(0.00) 
R&D_Sale- Uncertainty measure - 0.0001** 
(0.04) 
0.0002** 
(0.02) 
Liquidity-Liquidity ratio - 0.00 
(0.67) 
0.0008 
(0.48) 
Fixsale_asset- Uncertainty measure - 1.35*10-6** 
(0.06) 
 
- 
Media_industry-Amenity potential - - - 
Utility_industry-Regulation impact -6.85 
(0.2) 
-8.12 
(0.16) 
 
-7.96 
(0.11) 
 Finance_industry-Regulation impact -0.12 
(0.6) 
-0.21 
(0.38) 
-0.36 
(0.19) 
Dummy_2008 -0.10** 
(0.04) 
-0.14*** 
(0.01) 
-0.16*** 
(0.01) 
Dummy_2007 -0.22 
(0.46) 
-0.05 
(0.15) 
-0.07* 
(0.074) 
Dummy_2006 0.014 
(0.76) 
-0.02 
(0.77) 
-0.02 
(0.68) 
MVP-Mass Voucher Privatisation 0.05 
(0.7) 
0.02 
(0.40) 
0.01 
(0.89) 
Individual-Individual as the largest owner 0.008 
(0.95) 
- - 
State-dummy-State as the largest owner 0.46*** 
(0.01) 
- - 
 
Privatization_fund- Privatization_fund as the largest owner 0.11 
(0.21) 
- - 
Other_company- Other_company as the largest owner 0.085 
(0.32) 
- - 
Foreign_ownership-Foreign investor as the largest owner  - -0.58 ** 
(0.01) 
 
 
- 
Domestic_ownership-Domestic investor  as the largest owner - -0.42** 
(0.04) 
- 
State_50- State as the controlling owner>50% - - 0.24 
(0.14) 
Domestic_50-Domestic investor as the controlling owner>50% 
 
- - -0.31*** 
(0.00) 
Foreign_50-Foreign investor as the controlling owner>50%  
 
- - -0.37*** 
(0.01) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
in the case of Specification 1 is (1-0.002). In this case, the adjustment makes little difference. 
90
Ownership concentration is potentially endogenous. In each of the three specifications the differenced variable 
in the system estimator is instrumented as follows: in Specifications 1 and 3, with the minimum number of 
levels instruments (the second lag only); and in Specification 2, with all available lagged levels. Full details on 
the pattern of instrumentation for both ownership concentration and the lagged dependent variable are reported 
in Appendix 4.4. 
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Constant -0.65 
(0.32) 
-0.38 
(0.54) 
-0.61 
(0.35) 
Industry1-Agriculture and Forestry 0.13 
(0.58) 
 0.21 
            (0.32)   
0.12 
(0.62) 
Industry2-Fishing industry -0.04 
(0.68) 
 -9.60 
           (0.15)   
-12.37* 
(0.07) 
 Industry3-Mining industry -0.06 
(0.77) 
 -0.02 
            (0.91)   
-0.05 
(0.82) 
Industry4-Processing industry -0.24** 
(0.02) 
-0.28*** 
(0.01) 
-0.29** 
(0.02) 
Industry6-Construction 0.25 
(0.41) 
0.21 
(0.38) 
-0.03 
(0.90) 
Industry7-Trade -0.03 
(0.76) 
-0.06 
(0.57) 
-0.04 
(0.71) 
Industry8-Reatil sales -0.22* 
(0.06) 
-0.26** 
(0.04) 
-0.21 
(0.11) 
Industry9-Tourism -0.06 
(0.51) 
-0.11 
(0.33) 
-0.12 
(0.36) 
Industry11-Realestate services 0.1 
(0.8) 
-0.22 
(0.71) 
-0.07 
(0.91) 
Industry13-Educationservices 
 
9.31* 
(0.09) 
 
21.9* 
(0.08) 
26.03** 
(0.04) 
 Industry14-Utility, Social services 
 
-1.1 
(0.60) 
 
-0.23** 
(0.04) 
-0.24* 
(0.08) 
 
Note: p-values in brackets where ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level of significance respectively. The p-values are obtained from two-step dynamic panel estimation with 
Windmeeijer's corrected robust standard errors. 
 
The estimate of special interest is the coefficient on the ownership concentration variable 
(lnOCTop5). In all three model specifications, we find a significant (p=0.04 in 
Specification1, p=0.04 in Specification 2=0.04 and p=0.09 in Specification 3) and positive 
impact of ownership concentration on firm performance. Moreover, this relationship seems to 
be robust across different model specifications based on the inclusion of different variables 
regarding the identity of the main shareholder. In the preferred model specification, the 
coefficient on the ownership concentration variable indicates that, on average, increase of 
ownership concentration by 1% is estimated to be associated with the increase of the Return 
on Equity (ROE) by 0.11 (Specification 1), by 0.1 (Specification 2) or by 0.1 (Specification 
3) percentage points. Firstly, we would argue that the magnitude of the impact is relatively 
strong, which may imply that ownership concentration might, after all, successfully play the 
role of control of managerial behaviour. In the context of TEs our findings are similar to 
Grosfeld (2006) and Claessens and Djankov (1999), even after controlling for the 
endogeneity of large ownership; namely, we find a positive impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance.  
 
Conversely, this result does not coincide with the evidence provided by Pervan, Pervan and 
Todoric (2012), Dzanic (2012) and Suljkanovic (2007), who in the case of Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina find a negative impact of the ownership concentration on firm 
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performance. Therefore, we may claim that strong extraction of benefits (private benefits of 
control) conducted by large shareholders at the expense of (poorly protected) small 
shareholders evidenced in the literature of SEE countries does not apply in the case of 
Montenegro.  
 
The estimated coefficient on ownership concentration suggests a positive and significant 
impact of the largest shareholders on firm performance. Accordingly, we argue that, in the 
context of the Montenegrin economy, the largest owners act as a “buffer” to offset the lack of 
institutional framework, supplementing the effectively nonexistent corporate governance 
mechanisms for management control as well as the underdeveloped capital market. In line 
with our expectations, ownership concentration is an efficient substitute for the corporate 
governance mechanisms. This conclusion is consistent with Banchuenvijit (2011, p. 101), 
who argues that “a positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is larger 
in countries where investor protection is weak”. 
 
Our results suggest that the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
conclusion - that ownership concentration is not related to the firm performance, but rather 
that both are driven by market forces - should not be considered as a stylised fact across 
different countries (and corporate governance frameworks). Namely, in the case of countries 
that have not experienced a long tradition of corporate governance protection and liquid, deep 
and developed secondary markets, ownership concentration can not be an endogenous 
“amalgam of shareholdings owned by persons with different interests” unrelated to firm 
performance as Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, p. 211) claim. As suggested by our Meta 
Regression Analysis (Chapter 3), country specific factors do play a prominent role in 
determining how ownership concentration affects firm performance.
91
 This applies to the case 
of Montenegro. As explained in subsection 4.4, similarly to the case of Russia (Kuznetsov et 
al., 2011), firms are highly concentrated (block-holder ownership) with dominant owners 
who seek direct control over the firm usually taking positions as managers and board 
members. Simultaneously, we assume that among dominant shareholders insiders are present, 
given that almost half of the sample refers to individuals as the largest owners. 
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In various subsample MRA specifications, in the context of developed corporate governance systems, provided 
in Chapter 3, Anglo-Saxon countries report underrepresentation of the authentic empirical effect.  
236 
 
Solvency (Solvency) appears to be an important indicator of firm performance in the context 
of the Montenegrin economy. The coefficient appears positive and significant in all presented 
model specifications (p=0.00). The obtained results lead to the conclusion that, on average, 
increase of the solvency ratio by 1 percentage point leads toward increase of the firm 
performance (ROE) by 0.003 percentage points (across all three Specifications). However, 
because – as we note above – an argument can be made that this variable is potentially 
endogenous, precise quantitative interpretation may not be valid. 
 
The estimates of the ownership identity effect reveal very surprising and contrasting results in 
comparison to the mainstream findings of the comparable empirical literature assessing the 
impact of various shareholder types on company performance, after the process of 
privatisation in transition economies. In the preferred Specification 1 presented in Table 4.15, 
we use banks and other financial institutions as the base for comparison with other types of 
owners. State owned companies (State_dummy) is associated with a statistically significant 
positive effect on firm performance (p=0.01). This suggests that, on average, those companies 
that have the state as its largest owner perform better than those companies that are led by 
banks or other financial institution. In the case of Montenegro, unlike the case of the Czech 
Republic or Poland in particular, financial institutions were not actively involved in the 
process of privatisation. Their primary interest was to take the role of debt holder rather than 
equity holder in Montenegrin corporations; even though the latter may give banks additional 
power in the disciplining of firms (Baert and Vennet, 2009). Similarly, although both 
insignificant, the positive signs on the coefficients on Other_company and Privatization_fund 
are consistent with this reasoning. 
 
The significant negative coefficient on the year dummy, Dummy_2008, reflects the presence 
of strong exogenous factors adversely affecting firms’ performance in Montenegro during 
2008 (p=0.00). We would argue that the significant coefficient confirms the negative impact 
that the global financial crisis had on the performance of the corporate and financial sector in 
Montenegro.
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The coefficient on the level of R&D to sales (R&D_Sale) is as expected positive and 
significant in Specification 2 and 3, implying that on average companies that invest more in 
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According to aggregate data in 2007, the aggregate profit of the corporate sector in Montenegro was estimated 
at 125 million Euros, diminishing to 12 million Euros in 2008. Source: Central bank of Montenegro, 2011. 
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R&D achieve better firm performance. Thus, the obtained result would suggest that, ceteris 
paribus, a change in R&D to sales of a one standard deviation (0.08 percentage point, see 
Table 4.12) leads to a 0.000008 in Specification 1 and 0.000016 in Specification 2 percentage 
points increase in the return on equity ratio in the current year. Although statistically 
significant, this is not an economically substantial effect.  
 
The findings with respect to industry differences are robust across specifications. Processing 
industry (Industry 4) in all three specifications, and utility service (Industry 14) in 
Specifications 2 and 3 perform worse, on average, compared to energy and water production 
(the reference category). On the other hand, education services (Industry 13) appears, on 
average, to perform substantially better than the energy and water production benchmark. 
However, no conclusion can be drawn from this result, given that Industry 13 refers to only 
one firm. 
 
In model Specification 2 we used a set of ownership variables referring to the identity of the 
owner in respect of their origin (state, private or foreign), using State_ownership as the base 
category. We find results that are unexpected, taking into consideration the findings of 
similar empirical research conducted in other transition economies (Djankov and Murrell, 
2002; Frydman et al., 1999; Damijan et al. 2004; etc.). Namely, the results suggest that state 
ownership performs better in comparison to private domestic or foreign ownership. The most 
surprising is that, ceteris paribus, companies under foreign ownership (Foreign_ownership) 
on average yield a ROE 0.58 percentage points lower than do state owned firms. We argue 
below that this apparent anomaly reflects well the specific conditions in Montenegro during 
the sample period 
 
In Specification 3 we introduce three dummy variables to control for the variation in the 
identity of the largest shareholder (state, domestic or foreign) if its shareholding exceeds the 
controlling limit of 50% of shares. In this case the reference category for, say, foreign 
ownership (Foreign_50) is comprised of all firms under different types of ownership (state 
and private domestic) as well as firms in which foreign owners have less than 50%+1 of the 
shares. Introducing these variables we want to check the robustness of the results in 
Specification 2, by accentuating the decision making power of these three type of owners, i.e. 
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considering a 50%+1 share as the threshold to define the existence of an owner with full 
potential to make decisions. The results support the findings in Specification 2. Firstly, in 
Specification 3, the coefficient on the dummy Foreign_50 suggests that controlling 
companies with controlling foreign shareholders perform worse compared to companies with 
other types of owners (p=0.01) irrespective of whether they are controlling shareholders or 
not. Results in Specification 3 indicate that, ceteris paribus, companies with foreign owners 
(holding above 50% of shares), on average, record lower firm performance (ROE) by 0.37 
percentage points compared to other companies. Similarly, controlling domestic shareholders 
(Domestic_50) perform worse compared to other types of large shareholders, irrespective of 
whether they have a controlling block of shares or not. Specification 3 indicates that, ceteris 
paribus, companies with a domestic owner holding above 50% of shares, on average, have 
lower firm performance (ROE) by 0.31 percentage points compared to the companies in the 
base category. Finally, the coefficient for state as the controlling shareholder (State_50) is 
positive, yet insignificant. Nonetheless, it is consistent with the finding in Specification 2; 
ceteris paribus, the state as largest shareholder outperforms other types of owners. 
 
As previously explained, state ownership is generally considered less effective for various 
reasons. As Barberis et al. (1996) argue, managers appointed by the state may work as a 
bureaucracy fulfilling primarily social responsibilities rather that fulfilling the aim of profit 
maximization. In addition, as Vin Le and O’ Brian (2006) argue, managers appointed by the 
state may follow instructions which are politically driven or financially imprudent. Chang 
and Wong (2004). Dharwadkar et al. (2000), explain that the expropriation of the minority 
shareholders by the state as the largest owner arises from the power discrepancy between the 
state and minority shareholders as well as because transition economies largely have weakly 
developed instruments for the protection of minority shareholders. 
 
In the context of transition economies, the prevailing empirical evidence provided by 
Friedman et al. (2003), likewise yields conclusions supporting the superiority of private 
ownership. Moreover, Murrell and Djankov (2002) denote that privatisation programs 
conducted so as to involve privatisation funds or foreigners are, on average, more productive 
by five and three times, respectively. Furthermore, the World Bank produce some of the most 
comprehensive assessments regarding the efficiency of private ownership versus state owned 
companies, with respect to the speed of restructuring. In a comparative assessment of 
31empirical studies covering transition economies (CIS countries versus other transition 
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economies), the main question of interest was which type of ownership contributes more to 
firm restructuring. A general impression is that, on average, at the aggregate level, it is 
extremely likely that private ownership contributes more to restructuring of companies in 
comparison to state ownership. The results do not change when greater “weight” is attributed 
to studies that are more thorough or conceptually stronger in comparison to those that did not 
provide such firm empirical evidence. 
 
Conversely, evidence provided by Anderson et al. (2000) suggests that outsider and insider 
private owners perform poorly in comparison to state ownership. Similarly, Beugre (2005) 
argues that transfer from state to private ownership in emerging economies, per se, does not 
lead toward better performance of the firm if the process of ownership transfer is not 
followed by the transfer of good managerial and leadership skills. Nellis (1999, p. 17) argues 
that transfer of ownership leads toward "stagnation and decapitalization” rather than “to 
improved financial results and enhanced efficiency”.  
 
According to our results, State-owned firms appear to perform better in comparison to other 
types of shareholders (individuals, other companies, bank and finance and privatisation fund). 
Taking into consideration this evidence that, in the context of the Montenegrin economy, 
state ownership is superior to other type of owners, we analyse this issue further. To explain 
this apparently puzzling result, we need to examine the data at the micro level. In doing so, 
we find two potentially parallel explanations. The first is that restructuring of companies is a 
time consuming and complex process. Usually, privatization investment programmes include 
4-5 year planned programmes. Consequently, ownership transition from state to private, 
especially in the case of large companies with substantial inherent problems concerning their 
efficiency and solvency sold to foreign investors, might not produce an effect reflected in 
firm performance within the sample period. An additional reason for the non-appearance of 
the anticipated (positive) effects is that the largest companies were the subject of a 
controversial privatization based on direct sale negotiated between the Government and the 
foreign owner. At times, the choice of investors was debatable. For example, the second 
largest exporter – Steel Mill AD Niksic, changed hands through three different controlling 
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foreign owners, while this company was the subject of heavy asset scrapping, resulting in 
bankruptcy in April 2011.
93
 
 
Finally, with respect to Specification 1, 2 and 3, a number of our control variables are 
estimated with the anticipated sign but are not statistically significant: the coefficient on the 
Leverage ratio (Leverage) displays the anticipated negative sign in all model specifications, 
supporting the pecking order theory; the coefficient on the Liquidity ratio (Liquidity) suggests 
a positive impact of the level of liquidity on firm performance; those companies that 
underwent the process of MVP perform, on average, better than those who were not the part 
of the process (which is inconsistent with Simoneti et al., 2005), which may indicate that the 
process of MVP did help in faster ownership concentration after all which, in turn, led to 
better firm performance. 
 
The positive, yet insignificant effect of Size (LnSize) is not consistent with the assumption 
that risk averse investors are reluctant to invest more in the same company and preserve their 
stake. In the context of small markets, this hypothesis by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) is offset 
by the fact that large companies have better access to domestic and international capital 
markets, positively affecting firm performance. 
 
4.7 Concluding remarks 
 
The literature on the effectiveness of privatization argues that privatization replaces state 
control with private control by outside investors. Consequently, in Chapter 4, the aim was to 
assess the quality and the effectiveness of privatization in Montenegro, given that the 
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The last (third) owner is MNSS from Netherlands. Dutch-based MNSS B.V. (MNSS), the majority stakeholder 
in Montenegro's sole steel plant Željezara Nikšić AD (ZN Steel), announced that MNSS and Montenegro's 
Government have reached an agreement on a refinancing plan to guarantee ZN Steel's future and role as a 
leading Montenegrin exporter, after several months of intensive negotiations and planning. Accordingly, MNSS 
has agreed to invest an additional €10.0 million to ZN, on top of the €40 million it has already committed, and 
the Government has agreed to provide a loan guarantee for €25 million to support ZN's modernization, funding 
and working capital needs. However, in the end, the controlling owners MNSS were left heavily indebted by the 
connecting MNSS companies, which represents further, obvious asset scrapping of the Steel Mill Niksic AD. 
The Government after the process of bankruptcy plans an additional, fourth privatization. 
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implemented privatization design created highly concentrated private ownership. Namely, 
Mass Voucher Privatisation, accompanied by other types of privatisation (Auction and Direct 
Sale) led to ownership concentration levels substantially higher than in other transition 
economies.  
 
The efficiency of the MVP is measured primarily through firms’ results, where firms’ 
performance represents a measurement for whether private controlling shareholders are good 
substitutes for the state. We argue that the capital market failed to be a catalyst of efficient 
ownership, taking into consideration that from mid-2005 to mid-2007 the capital market in 
Montenegro experienced overheating and “bubble” dynamics, which led to speculative 
activity ruining the informative power of share prices. In addition, Montenegro is 
characterized by a poorly developed institutional framework for investor protection, from the 
effective enforcement of the legal framework to obvious lack of capacity.   
 
Consequently, we investigated the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance, 
after controlling for endogeneity, under conditions of a poorly developed capital market and 
corporate governance instruments. We anticipated that this impact could be either positive or 
negative:  
 
 positive in the case that high ownership concentration enables effective monitoring by 
outsider investors to protect their interests efficiently;  
 negative should the largest shareholders (as outsiders)either pursue their own interest 
at the expense of minority shareholders, i.e. extract “private benefits of control”, or 
display entrenchment behaviour in the case when the largest shareholder (as an 
insider) is at the same time the manager.  
 
In order to assess how pronounced ownership concentration affected firm performance in 
Montenegro in the early post-privatisation period, we estimate a dynamic panel model. 
 
We find, firstly, that our dynamic model reveals a small persistence effect in firm 
performance, whereby the current values of ROE are driven by past values of ROE. This is in 
line with the recent literature, which highlights the need to take into account potential 
dynamics in the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. 
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However, the small size of the persistence effect suggests that firm performance in 
Montenegro could change very quickly during the period under investigation; i.e. one in 
which companies are very sensitive to external markets. This conclusion is reinforced by the 
result that suggests a strong negative impact of the financial crisis in 2008. 
 
Secondly, the empirical results suggest a significant positive impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance. The coefficient on the variable of interest is significant 
and positive across different model specifications, yet small. This would imply that in the 
context of the Montenegrin economy, ownership concentration is an adequate (efficient) 
supplement to still underdeveloped corporate governance mechanisms.  Unfortunately, due to 
lack of data on insider ownership structure, at this stage we are unable to explain in which 
ways concentrated ownership contributes to better firm performance. 
 
We estimated the effects of a wide range of control variables with results in line with 
expectations, although not always with acceptable levels of precision. An unexpected result 
that contradicts the mainstream literature on the effects of state vs. private ownership, is that, 
on average, state ownership performs better than foreign ownership or domestic ownership. 
However, this result is consistent with developments in the early post-privatisation period in 
Montenegro. On the one hand, the state may have been conservative in retaining interests in 
better-performing companies; while, on the other, in this period the majority of “large losers” 
had been only recently privatized. In some cases, these companies were the subject of 
dubious privatizations, under the control of controversial foreign investors, engaged in 
vigorous asset stripping, and ended in bankruptcy. In other cases, agreements between the 
state and investors to restructure privatized companies often covered periods of four to five 
years, thereby planning to realise performance benefits on a time scale stretching beyond our 
sample period. 
 
We conclude that the robustness of the reported results, especially concerning the impact of 
different owner identities on firm performance, should be reassessed once privatisation is 
fully complete and the restructuring plans of privatized firms have been fully executed. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm performance in both developed and transition economies, with a particular focus on 
Montenegro, a country where this particular issue has not been previously studied. Using the 
Meta Regression Analysis methodology to supplement the critical narrative literature review, 
we were able to establish broad outlines of the impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance, paying attention to the specific characteristics of the wide range of literature in 
the field. Based on the insight developed in the first three chapters of the thesis, we employed 
an original dataset prepared by the author to investigate this relationship in the Montenegrin 
economy. 
 
This Chapter summarises the research conducted in this thesis, highlighting broad policy 
implications and contributions to knowledge. We begin by reprising the most prominent 
findings of the research undertaken in the dissertation (5.2) and continue with a section that 
outlines the main contribution to knowledge (5.3), followed by a discussion of some policy 
implications and recommendations from the research (5.4). The inevitable limitations of the 
empirical work are reported in Section 5.5 while suggestions for the further research are 
offered in Section 5.6. The final section 5.7 concludes the thesis.  
 
5.2 Main findings of the research 
 
In Chapter 1 we assessed a set of fundamental concepts that led to the development of the 
concept of corporate governance and its mechanisms. This included the analysis of different 
aspects of the theory of the firm that perceive the firm as a nexus of incomplete contracts 
between different entities subject to bounded rationality and acting in an environment of 
asymmetric information and uncertainty where information is costly. Consequently, the 
agency problem emerges as a result of the diverging goals of various entities. We are 
interested in the properties of agency theory in the context of the principal-agent (owners-
managers) relationship and whether incentives can be adjusted in order to overcome the 
agency problem. Therefore, we analysed the theoretical background and the empirical 
evidence on the incentives-risk trade-off. Diminishing the agency problem entails costs 
(monitoring cost, bonding cost and residual loss), to which we dedicated separate 
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subsections. In analysing corporate governance structures, processes and cultures, we 
especially assessed various internal and external corporate governance mechanisms from the 
perspective of their effectiveness in aligning the interest of managers and owners. It was 
shown that the effectiveness these mechanisms and their use as substitutes for ownership 
concentration vary across countries. Ownership concentration seems to be widely used as a 
mechanism to overcome the problem of undeveloped corporate governance framework in 
TEs. However, the discussion in this chapter showed that, in the circumstances of a market 
economy with characteristics expounded by Coase, Williamson and others, it is very difficult 
to formulate a contract that could potentially eliminate the agency problem. 
 
In Chapter 2, we outlined the properties of ownership concentration as a supplementary 
corporate governance mechanism used in resolving the owner-manager conflict. Reviewing 
the empirical literature exploring “Whether ownership concentration affects firm 
performance in developed economies?” we analysed the properties and differences of the 
Alignment, the Entrenchment and the Neutrality theories, which differ in their understanding 
of the importance, direction and repercussions of ownership concentration in the context of 
firm performance. The most pronounced divergence point among these theories is the 
efficiency of ownership concentration as an instrument for, if not the resolution, the 
amelioration of the agency problem between shareholders and managers. These theories are 
supported by different underlying hypotheses: from the perception that ownership 
concentration is a viable mechanism providing strong monitoring of managers by 
strategically oriented investors (owners), to the view that concentrated managerial ownership 
enhances the moral hazard behaviour by managers pursuing their own interests that diverge 
from value maximization, to the view that ownership structure is an endogenous outcome of 
shareholders’ decisions. In Chapter 2 we also analysed the empirical literature on the subject 
in the context of TEs, which are characterized by the implementation of different 
privatisation programmes which although led to structural changes of ownership rights, 
usually failed to develop a reliable corporate governance environment to resolve the problem 
of expropriation of minority shareholders by large shareholders. We find, on the one hand, 
great diversity and richness of empirical research, including differences in model 
specification and estimation techniques; different corporate governance frameworks within 
which research is conducted; variable specifications of ownership and firm performance; 
varying approaches to the potential endogeneity of ownership concentration; and so on. Yet, 
and more importantly, we find no agreement on the nature of the relationship between 
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ownership concentration and firm performance. From these contrasting findings, we conclude 
that a narrative review of the literature is not sufficient to develop qualitative generalization 
concerning this relationship.  
 
Accordingly, in Chapter 3 we introduced meta-regression analysis (MRA) to supplement the 
narrative review and investigate the question: “Whether, and how, does ownership 
concentration affect firm performance in developed economies?” 
 
MRA results support the view that empirical evidence concerning the relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance are mixed, inconsistent and inconclusive. 
Summarizing the results from the MRA in this chapter, at least four groups of fundamental 
results were presented. 
 
1. Both funnel plots and multivariate MRA confirm that this literature is heavily affected 
by publication bias. Moreover, publication bias appears in the directions posited by 
the prevailing theory. Most interestingly for the “insiders’ subsamples”, we find 
publication bias corresponding to the “inverted-U” relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance favouredby the prevailing theory, i.e.: 
 
 Positive values for linear effects, whether estimated in linear primary models 
(purely linear) or as the linear component of a quadratic specification (partly 
linear); but  
 Negative values for quadratic terms in quadratic specifications.  
 
Here, the theoretical assumptions are reflected perfectly by the estimated pattern of 
publication bias. This suggests that researchers responded to incentives to conform to 
mainstream theoretical views. MRA detects the statistical trace of such otherwise, 
unobserved selection processes (Pugh et al., 2012) which in turn, suggests that 
previous meta-analytic estimates of empirical effects in this literature are limited 
because they do not control for publication bias. For this reason, in the context of this 
literature, we argue that MRA is superior to simple meta-analysis because it is 
designed to estimate authentic empirical effects together with sources of heterogeneity 
in reported effects "beyond" or net of publication bias. 
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2. Full sample MRA revealed that once we control for publication bias, the empirical 
literature fails to support the existence of any genuine empirical effect of ownership 
concentration on firm performance. Yet further investigation revealed that: (i) the 
functional form of the estimated relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm performance, and (ii) the identity of the largest owner are both primary sources 
of heterogeneity in this literature. Hence, both matter in assessing the presence of 
publication bias, authentic empirical effects and the relevant moderator variables 
explaining the heterogeneity of the findings in this empirical literature. Thus MRA in 
the context of this topic requires sub-sampling using these two criteria. In subsamples 
of ‘Insiders’ and ‘Outsiders’, underlying authentic empirical effects with opposite 
signs appear. Therefore, our main findings include the following: 
 
 MRA of the Pure Linear Insiders sample – i.e., studies specifying a purely 
linear relationship between insider concentration and firm performance - 
reveals a positive impact of ownership concentration on firm performance; yet  
 MRA of the Pure Linear Outsider sample – i.e., studies specifying a purely 
linear relationship between outsider concentration and firm performance - 
yields a negative underlying empirical effect.  
 
Conversely, in the context of developed corporate governance systems, the 
hypothesised non-linear – inverted-U– relationship is at best not proven in the case of 
concentrated insider ownership while, arguably, having no theoretical basis in the 
case of concentrated outsider ownership. With respect to ownership concentration, 
and firm performance relationship, MRA suggests that in developed economies the 
key agency problem is not manager-shareholder conflict but rather the risk of 
expropriation of minority shareholders by dominant or controlling outsider 
shareholders. These examples demonstrate that sub sampling is an appropriate 
strategy for MRA analysis in the context of this empirical literature.  
 
3. Statistically significant moderator variables revealed additional sources of 
heterogeneity in the effects reported in this literature typically arising either from 
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characteristics of the samples or from features of the modeling procedures chosen by 
researchers. For example: 
 
 The endogeneity theory that argues for a neutral effect of ownership 
concentration on firm performance is not evident when we control the MRA 
for those studies that address the econometric issue of endogeneity;  
 In all subsamples, studies using samples from Anglo Saxon countries are less 
likely to find the presence of a genuine empirical effect of ownership 
concentration on firm performance; moreover,  
 The same can be concluded for those studies that employ robustness checks 
for various model estimations. 
 
These results should inform the empirical strategy in future studies by making 
researchers aware of potential biases entailed in the choice of sample, model 
specification and approach to estimation.  
 
4. We analysed the likely direction of omitted variable bias in primary specifications that 
do not include the ownership and ownership-squared variables. In the course of this 
analysis, we hypothesised and found evidence consistent with a relationship between 
the omitted non-linearity in the primary regressions and non-linearity in the Meta 
regression. Although still provisional, this finding has important implications for the 
practice of MRA in general and for the interpretation of a large part of the literature 
on ownership and performance in particular: 
 
 In general, our argument suggests that diagnostic failure with respect to the 
validity of a linear model in the Meta regression may reveal the trace of a 
similar specification failure in the primary regressions. Moreover, this 
possibility is particularly relevant when the literature under investigation omits 
a non-linear term specified by theory.   
 In the Pure Linear sample in the particular literature under investigation, the 
omission of the quadratic term from primary studies on the effect of ownership 
concentration on firm performance may entail some quantitative bias (an 
underestimated positive effect, though the positive direction of the effect is 
249 
 
unaffected). Accordingly, both the Pure Linear and Partly Linear samples give 
rise to qualitatively similar estimates, namely, a statistically significant 
positive effect of insider ownership concentration on firm performance. 
 
Montenegro is one of the few transition countries for which a systemic analysis of the quality 
of corporate governance and its institutional framework has not been undertaken. A strong 
motivation for investigating the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance arises from the gap in knowledge about the case of Montenegro. Therefore, in 
Chapter 4 we tried to fill this gap in the empirical literature by answering the questions: 
“Does there exists a causal relationship between ownership and performance; and, which 
type of ownership may be considered as “superior” with respect to better corporate 
performance mechanism in Montenegro?” Using a new panel database gathered by the author 
for a sample of 204 Montenegrin joint stock companies listed on the Montenegrin Stock 
Exchanges over a five-year period (2004-2008), our econometric estimates suggested a 
significant, yet small, positive impact of ownership concentration on firm performance. This 
implies that in the context of the Montenegrin economy, ownership concentration can be 
considered a viable supplement to the still underdeveloped or non-existent corporate 
governance mechanisms. Furthermore, concerning the effectiveness of privatisation 
programmes, we found that those companies that underwent the process of MVP, on average, 
perform worse than those that were not part of this process. The underlying rationale may lay 
in biased selection of companies that were included in MVP, or due to the fact that MVP did 
not ensure stable and efficient owners.  
 
Furthermore, the estimates of the effects of ownership identity revealed very surprising and 
contrasting results in comparison to the mainstream findings of the comparable empirical 
literature. This is mainly reflected in the finding that challenges the superiority of private 
ownership over state ownership in respect to firm performance. This result is especially 
puzzling since our findings also show that foreign owned companies, on average, perform 
worse than those that are privately owned. We explain this through two complementary 
arguments. Firstly, the restructuring of firms was a time-consuming process and investment 
programmes following privatization typically require 4-5 years to be executed and to bear 
fruit. Consequently, the transition of ownership from state to private, especially in the case of 
250 
 
large companies with substantial inherited problems affecting their efficiency and solvency 
sold to foreign investors, might not produce the desired effect reflected in firm performance. 
Secondly, at times the choice of investors in terms of their credibility, qualifications and 
investment strategy was debatable. 
 
 
5.3 Contribution to knowledge 
 
This thesis began with the investigation of a set of issues related to the agency problem and 
the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance in developed market 
economies and TEs. Innovative research on these issues reflected in our main empirical 
findings (Chapters 3 and 4) and outlined in this subsection represent the contributions to 
knowledge of this thesis. 
 
Our primary contribution was the first Meta-regression analysis on the relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance, as distinct from meta-analysis, of the 
literature conducted previously. Next, to extend the analysis to Montenegro, we generated a 
new primary dataset using a variety of company records. In turn, this unique dataset, which 
also demonstrated a surprisingly high level of ownership concentration compared to other 
TEs, enabled the first empirical investigations of the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance in Montenegrin companies. In the Montenegrin context, 
ownership concentration might be a functional substitute for a developed corporate 
governance system. 
 
To begin with, we conducted a Meta-regression analysis on the extensive but inconclusive 
empirical literature assessing the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance. 
Although previous Meta-analysis has been conducted on this topic, our Chapter 3 is a 
pioneering application of current best-practice methodology in meta-regression analysis (as 
outlined in Stanley, et al., 2013). The MRA methodology has the distinguishing feature of 
being designed to quantitatively identify and measure the true value of the effect size existing 
across studies, beyond publication bias, while identifying sources and magnitudes of 
heterogeneity in the literature. This MRA is the first study to measure publication selection 
bias in this empirical literature and to correct for it in deriving quantitative insights into the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. The key findings 
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reported in detail in the previous section are all contributions to knowledge. The primary 
finding of the MRA suggests that the functional form of the model estimated in the primary 
literature and the identity of the largest owner matters in assessing the presence of publication 
bias, authentic empirical effects and the relevant moderator variables explaining the 
heterogeneity of the findings in this empirical literature. Moreover, MRA in the context of the 
functional form and the identity of the largest owner requires sub-sampling. Finally, beyond 
the confines of this particular literature, we have proposed a new line of enquiry for MRA 
methodology; namely, that diagnostic failure with respect to the validity of a linear model for 
the meta regression may reveal the trace of a similar specification failure in the primary 
regressions. At present, we offer this as no more than a potential line of enquiry. 
 
The post-privatization ownership structures and their impact on firm performance has not 
been investigated previously in Montenegro. Using primary data collected and organised by 
the author, we analyse the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance in the 
unique setting of the small open Montenegrin economy- characterised particularly with a 
much delayed privatisation programmes starting from 1999 due to an unfavourable political 
setting accompanied by economic instability.  
 
We also control for the presence of different investors types (another company, an individual, 
a financial institution, etc.) and criteria of origin (domestic-owned, foreign-owned, etc.). 
Introducing different thresholds for ownership structure (largest vs. controlling owners 
evident in Specification 2 and Specification 3 in Chapter 4), we are able to capture the robust 
presence of state ownership performance in comparison to privately-owned and foreign-
owned companies that become even stronger if the state is a controlling owner. The 
comparison of the owners’ behaviour and the impact on the firm performance in the case 
when they are the largest vs. controlling owner has been theoretically discussed previously 
but, to our knowledge, has not been empirically analysed. 
 
 
5.4 Policy implications 
 
Although the fundamentals of the ownership concentration-firm performance relationship 
date back to Berle and Means (1932), the associated empirical research is highly 
inconclusive. Mixed results tend to confuse policymakers with respect to which institutional 
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framework to implement, which blend of corporate governance mechanisms are most 
relevant to diminishing agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and 
management, and which corporate governance structures may be considered optimal. We do 
not claim that the application of MRA, which provides an objective and comprehensive 
quantitative synthesis of the empirical economic evidence on the subject based on the 
literature from developed economies, has the capacity to resolve all these questions 
successfully. However, it has the ability to provide some useful insights for policymakers that 
could enable them at the very least to come to a more objective assessment and, 
consequently, a direction for taking action.  
 
Firstly, the empirical literature assessing the relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance suffers from persistent publication bias, suggesting that researchers 
have a strong incentive to conform to the prevailing theories. Therefore, conclusions drew 
from the empirical literature needs to be circumspect with respect to policy advice on the 
preferable corporate governance structure. Furthermore, it appears that indeed the identity of 
owners does matter with respect to firm performance.  
 
Secondly, once publication selection is controlled for, a positive authentic empirical effect of 
insider ownership concentration on firm performance emerges, which is consistent with the 
convergence-of-interest hypothesis between owners and managers developed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Therefore, in developed corporate governance systems, it appears that 
ownership concentration of insiders still should not be discarded as a mechanism for the 
alignment of managers; and owners’ interests.  
 
Conversely, in the Pure Linear Outsiders subsample, when we control for positive publication 
bias, a negative authentic empirical effect emerges in the context of the impact on firm 
performance of outsider ownership concentration. Here, MRA suggests that the empirical 
effect supports the hypothesis that the large shareholder can expropriate assets at the expense 
of other shareholders (Thomsen et al., 2006; La Porta et al., 1999, among others). These 
effects seem to be diluted in the context of Anglo Saxon countries; i.e., the presence of a 
negative authentic empirical performance effect of ownership concentration is not as evident 
as it is in Continental European countries. Therefore, policy measures in the Continental 
European countries should more closely address the presence of private benefits of control 
experienced by large shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders.  
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Thirdly, regarding the success of the privatisation process in Montenegro, we find firm 
evidence that those companies that went through the process of MVP performed, on average, 
worse than those that were not part of MVP. Moreover, our results indicate that foreign 
owned companies, on average, perform worse compared to state-owned or domestically- 
owned firms. This suggests that the restructuring of companies in Montenegro is a time 
consuming and complex process which still has not reached its ultimate goal and optimum 
state. Consequently, ownership transition from state to private, especially in the case of large 
companies that are sold to foreign investors with substantial inherited problems of efficiency 
and solvency might not have produced the expected impact on firm performance in the period 
under investigation. An additional reason for not finding the anticipated (positive) impacts of 
foreign ownership on firm performance might be that some of the largest companies in 
Montenegro were the subject of controversial privatization based on direct sale negotiated 
between the Government and the foreign owner. 
 
Fouthly, we suggest that the Council for Privatisation in Montenegro should press for more 
prudent and reliable evaluation of future investors in the processes of direct sales. The poor 
experiences with strategic foreign investors that assumed ownership of the largest privatized 
exporting firms raises the need for a more thorough assessment of foreign investors’ 
aspirations and long-term investment orientation.  Coupled with the fact that the size of the 
Montenegrin market does not allow for much “trial and error” privatisation, and given the 
importance of each privatised firm in the value added creation of the Montenegrin economy,  
we believe that stricter due diligence with respect to potential investors would contribute to a 
more efficient outcome of Montenegro’s privatisation process. 
 
Fifthly, a deep restructuring of the secondary market for securities, or its integration into a 
nearby regional centre is essential now. The secondary market for securities in Montenegro’s 
post-privatisation period was influenced by an enormous asset bubble, which burst in 2008 
resulting in an adverse effect on its deepening and overall development. The secondary 
securities market, consisting of 247 joint stock companies (with 12 are considered as “A” 
listed companies), poorly developed investment funds and seven broker-dealer houses, is too 
small and, from experience, easily subjected to speculative activities that may jeopardize 
financial stability in the country. Therefore, our general recommendation is that the strategy 
of a Stock Exchange merger with the more institutionalized neighbouring markets such as the 
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Stock Exchange in Ljubljana should be given serious consideration. This is supported by 
additional arguments based on the size of the country, an almost non-existent primary 
securities market, and heavy reliance on the SME sector -- all combined with debt financing 
practices of the corporate sector.  
 
5.5 Limitations of the research 
 
Our research strategy aimed to implement relevant and advanced methodologies in our 
investigation in order to strengthen the validity and credibility of our findings. Nonetheless, 
we are aware of some unavoidable limitations which are highlighted here.  
 
In Chapter 3, we applied what is now widely recognised as best practice in meta-regression 
analysis (MRA).  In one respect at least, MRA goes beyond previous approaches in meta-
analysis: in particular, by incorporating measurement, analysis and control of publication 
bias, MRA can establish representative authentic empirical effects and/or sources of 
heterogeneity in such effects “beyond publication bias”. Moreover, in another respect, we 
have tried to contribute to MRA methodology. For the first time, to the best of our 
knowledge, we raise the possibility that widespread misspecification with respect to 
functional form in the primary regressions may leave a statistical trace in the form of 
misspecification with respect to functional form in the meta regression. However, within the 
confines of this thesis, this possibility is limited to a potential line of enquiry. 
Simultaneously, there is a limitation of the applied MRA due to the extensive volume of the 
literature. Therefore, we applied restrictive criteria that narrowed the choice of empirical 
literature coded for the purpose of MRA (published papers, developed corporate governance 
systems from each country that satisfies that criteria).  
 
The analysis of Chapter 4 was made possible by the creation of a new primary dataset: the 
author assembled data from hitherto dispersed company records – often existing only in hard 
copy printouts – into a unique dataset for the Montenegrin corporate sector. In turn, this 
primary data enabled the first econometric analysis for Montenegro of the performance effect 
of ownership concentration. However, limitations of this primary dataset are reflected in 
limitations of model specification and econometric analysis; namely, no distinctions are made 
between insiders and outsiders with respect to ownership concentration or between managers 
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and other large shareholders. These distinctions should have been incorporated into our 
modelling strategy but unfortunately, the data to do so does not yet exist. 
 
Another limitation of the findings in Chapter 4 arises from not taking into consideration the 
potential “cherry picking” approach in the companies’ availability for privatisation, often 
seen in different privatisation schemes and relevant for firms in our database. Selective 
choice of companies was present in the Montenegrin Mass Voucher Privatisation or sale to 
strategic (foreign) investors. We omitted identifying and capturing the nonrandomized 
selection of companies that are present in some empirical findings. Nonetheless, similarly to 
Hamm et al. (2012), we argue that non-randomized choice of companies for privatisation in 
Montenegro would be a difficult task due to the dubious quality of financial data that was 
used in the first place for firms’ selection.  
 
In addition, in conducting the econometric analysis, we instrumented only what is essential 
(ownership concentration, the main variable of interest) rather than what in principle might be 
desirable (i.e. instrumenting in addition liquidity, solvency and size). For example, we can 
hypothesise potential simultaneity (endogeneity) between firm performance and solvency 
ratio. In majority of different specifications, however, the attempt to instrument this 
potentially endogenous variable increased the number of instruments in relation to the 
number of observations. (We discuss the problem of “too many instruments” in the context of 
system GMM estimation below.) This was evident in poor model diagnostics and the failure 
of the model to yield useful results. Still, Solvency appears to be an important indicator of 
firm performance in the context of the Montenegrin economy, and we underline that an 
argument can be made that this variable is potentially endogenous and that a precise 
quantitative interpretation of its estimated effect may not be valid. 
 
Finally, following an argument that full confidence in the m2 test requires rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation in the differenced error terms (meaning that there 
is first order autocorrelation in the differenced error terms), in all three model specifications 
estimated by the GMM estimator, this problem arises, i.e., the m1 test fails to provide 
sufficient evidence that there is serial autocorrelation in the differenced error term. 
Unfortunately, the literature is scarce and divided concerning the function and importance of 
the m1 test and its implications in the case when the m1 null does not hold. 
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In addition, the m1 test, in the context of our model specification, is sensitive to the upper and 
lower limits placed on our dependent variable (ROE). If we take only a slightly less 
conservative approach to removing outliers then, in the first two variant specifications of our 
model, the corresponding m1 tests uniformly reject the null hypothesis of no first-order 
autocorrelation in the differenced error terms. Given that estimation within a more restricted 
range of ROE yields results that are similar to those presented in the main discussion of 
Chapter 4 (presented in Appendix 4.3), we conclude that these presented results are not 
invalidated by the associated m1 statistics 
 
 
5.6 Suggestions for further research 
 
The empirical research reported in this dissertation identifies a need and direction for future 
research. A general suggestion for further empirical work is to examine the robustness of the 
empirical results after more data becomes available. In the context of MRA, extending the 
data set with additional (recent) papers would be very useful to check the robustness of our 
findings. Moreover, a special challenge is the application of MRA methodology to explore 
the ownership concentration-firm performance literature in the context of TE countries and its 
comparison with the findings reported in this thesis based on the experience of developed 
economies. 
 
Another avenue for further research is to extend the sample size in order to check the 
robustness of results obtained from GMM estimation of the ownership concentration-firm 
performance relationship in the context of the Montenegrin economy. This would enable us 
to capture the impact of the financial crisis, which had a substantial negative impact on the 
Montenegrin corporate sector. Moreover, we would be interested to investigate whether 
privatisation of large export-oriented companies to strategic foreign investors finally resulted 
in successful deep restructuring plans and capacity-enhancing strategies without being 
restricted or pressured by special social agreements regarding, for example, gradual sub-
optimal working labour dismissal, and wage scheme designs, etc. (Filatotchev et al., 2007). 
We hope to research whether the real effects of privatisation become evident three to six 
years after privatisation as is argued by Mickiewicz et al., 2005, given that most of the largest 
companies in the sample were privatised in the period 2004-2008 covered by our sample. 
Finally, much work also remains to be done in estimating the impact of insiders on firm 
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performance; i.e., tracing insider ownership in order to analyse whether managers exhibit 
entrenched behaviour with their increase of ownership, and what is the level of management, 
strategic independence and/or whether outsiders bound their decision-making. This would 
overwhelmingly contribute to a better understanding of managerial behaviour in the TE 
setting of Montenegro, as well as how much managers actually contribute to firm value.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
This dissertation set out to investigate the impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance and reveals a significant and positive impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance in the context of one, hitherto not analysed transition economy. This relationship 
seems to be robust across different model specifications based on the inclusion of variables 
regarding the identity of the main shareholder. Our findings are in line with the argument 
that, in the setting of TEs, a significant ownership concentration should not be treated as an 
endogenous “amalgam of shareholdings owned by persons with different interests” unrelated 
to firm performance - characteristic of Anglo-Saxon countries -but rather as a viable 
substitute for a lacking or undeveloped country-level corporate governance framework. 
Furthermore, in the context of the Montenegrin economy, we find firm evidence that the 
choice of privatisation designs and supporting institutions do matter with respect to 
ownership structure, stability and final implications for firm performance.   
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